‘Nobody Is Proud of Soft Dollars’: the Impact of MiFID II on US Financial Markets

IF 2 Q1 LAW
Howell E Jackson, Jeffery Y Zhang
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Abstract

Abstract Scholars and policy makers have long debated whether securities firms should be allowed to bundle the cost of execution services with the cost of research. Investor advocates condemn the practice whereas industry representatives defend it. In 2018, as part of the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II) legislative regime, the EU forced the unbundling of commission charges, diverging from US legal standards which still allow ‘soft dollar’ payments for research. The EU’s unbundling regime has challenged global financial services firms, which must now comply with conflicting rules across national boundaries. For more than five years, the US Securities and Exchange Commission provided temporary no-action relief to facilitate compliance with MiFID II, but that relief expired in July 2023, presenting an opportunity to reconsider the impact of MiFID II’s unbundling regime and its implications for US regulators and investors. While this article takes a critical view of soft dollar practices, the story of MiFID II presents contested issues of policy analysis as the agency costs inherent in bundled commissions could be offset by the public benefits of additional research. Unbundling also offers a noteworthy example of an innovation in capital markets regulation flowing from Europe to the United States rather than the other way around.
“没有人对软美元感到骄傲”:MiFID II对美国金融市场的影响
长期以来,学者和政策制定者一直在争论是否应该允许证券公司将执行服务的成本与研究成本捆绑在一起。投资者倡导者谴责这种做法,而行业代表则为其辩护。2018年,作为《金融工具市场指令II》(MiFID II)立法制度的一部分,欧盟强制取消了佣金收费,这与美国仍然允许“软美元”支付研究费用的法律标准有所不同。欧盟的分拆制度对全球金融服务公司构成了挑战,它们现在必须遵守跨越国界的相互冲突的规则。五年多来,美国证券交易委员会提供了临时的无行动救济,以促进对MiFID II的遵守,但该救济于2023年7月到期,这为重新考虑MiFID II拆分制度的影响及其对美国监管机构和投资者的影响提供了机会。虽然本文对软美元做法持批判观点,但MiFID II的故事提出了有争议的政策分析问题,因为捆绑佣金固有的代理成本可以被额外研究的公共利益所抵消。分拆还提供了一个值得注意的例子,说明资本市场监管的创新是从欧洲流向美国,而不是反过来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
5.60
自引率
3.80%
发文量
12
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