Moral Sense in Different Senses

Abstract

ABSTRACT To understand the internal structure of moral positions and the nature of moral disagreements, it would be useful to have a “moral sense” model of our different types of moral sensitivity, from our relatively spontaneous friendliness to our appreciation for traditional community norms, ideal ethical norms, and spiritual appeals to ultimate concern. After the first round of modern moral sense theory in Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Edwards, most discussions of the moral sense concept have centered on general theses about moral value (objective or subjective, rational or emotional) without attending to this complexity. Even though the familiar positions in these discussions are not reconcilable on the plane of ethical theory, they need not be seen as simply antagonistic. Working with clearly differentiated senses of both “moral” and “sense,” this article refashions “moral sense theory” as a way of placing the insights of the classic moral sense theories, ethical rationalism, and a distinctly spiritual sensibility in a conceptually stable and empirically more discriminating order. The article also suggests strengthening the realist premise of moral sensing by invoking the model of a game player’s operational sense of how things are going in pursuit of a game’s objectives.