Mitigating or exacerbating the root causes of violence?: critically analysing the role of USAID in terrorism prevention

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn 2009, a USAID-commissioned report examined the social, economic, and personal contexts that have incited political violence, such as military intervention, economic deprivation, the denial of civil rights, and repeated foreign interference. Although the report acknowledges how these formative contexts give rise to violence, the psychologising language of extremism has led to USAID’s development of antiterrorism approaches aimed at interrupting the psychological, cultural, and theological pathologies perceived to be located within individual actors, rather than the material conditions that incite armed resistance. This article explores how the concept of terrorist radicalisation has informed antiterrorism programming undertaken by the development sector and has exacerbated, not mitigated, the root causes of political violence in Somalia and the Somali diaspora. Given these outcomes, I offer concluding thoughts on how we might recentre the material conditions in which violence circulates to consider alternative approaches to violence prevention efforts in the development sector.KEYWORDS: Political violencesecuritydevelopmentUSAID and violent extremismSomalia Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1. Denoeux and Carter, Drivers of Violent Extremism, 51.2. Ibid., 15, 16.3. Ibid., 16, n. 24.4. Ibid., 2.5. Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 5.6. FBI, The Radicalization Process, 5.7. Denoeux and Carter, 15.8. Department of State & USAID, ‘Joint Strategy on Countering Violent Extremism’, 10.9. U.S. Embassy Mauritania, ‘New $7 Million Investment to Combat Violent Extremism’.10. See, for example, Mesok, ‘Counterinsurgency’, 721.11. McCauley and Moskalenko, ‘Understanding Political Radicalization’, 205.12. FBI, The Radicalization Process, 5.13. Ibid., 7.14. Ibid., 8.15. Ibid.16. Ibid.17. Ibid., 10.18. Ibid., 3.19. Silber and Bhatt, Radicalization in the West, 7.20. Ibid., 33.21. National Counterterrorism Center, Countering Violent Extremism, 19–22.22. Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority et al., ‘Communities Acting to Refer and Engage’, 24.23. Silver et al., ‘A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviours’, 16.24. Department of Homeland Security, ‘Public Awareness Bulletin’, 3.25. Borum, ‘Radicalization into Violent Extremism I’, 8.26. USAID, ‘East Africa, Kenya, and Somalia’, 3.27. See, for example, Kundnani, Countering Violent Extremism; Koushik, ‘Countering Violent Extremism’.28. Weine, ‘Building Community Resilience’, 81–89.29. Horgan, ‘Psychological Approaches to the Study of Terrorism’, 8.30. Ibid., 210, 220.31. Simi and Windisch, ‘Why Radicalization Fails’.32. Weine, ‘Building Community Resilience’, 85, 85–6.33. See, for example, Cherney et al., ‘The Push and Pull of Radicalization’.34. United States Agency for International Development, Development Response to Violent Extremism, 4–5.35. Stevan Weine et al., ‘Addressing Violent Extremism’, 7.36. Commission for Countering Extremism, Challenging Hateful Extremism, 125.37. Ibid.38. Manzoor-Khan, Tangled in Terror, 104.39. Ibid., 105.40. Thaler, Naming Violence, 1.41. Kundnani, ‘Radicalization’; Li, The Universal Enemy; McQuade, Genealogy of Terrorism; Patel, ‘Rethinking Radicalization’; Thaler, Naming Violence; Poynting and White, ‘Conclusion’.42. Abraham, ‘Constructing the “Extraordinary Criminals”’.43. Hyams, Terrorists and Terrorism.44. Singh, ‘Politics and Violence’.45. Ibid., 5.46. Commission for Countering Extremism, Challenging Hateful Extremism, 7.47. Saleh, ‘The Human Cost of U.S. Interventions’, 10.48. Asad, On Suicide Bombing, 14.49. Wise, ‘al-Shabaab’, 4.50. Ibid.51. Kawash, ‘Terrorists and Vampires’, 239–40.52. Patel and German, ‘Fighting Terrorism without Dividing Us’.53. Mesok, ‘Counterinsurgency’, 722.54. Ibid., 724.55. Ibid.56. Ibid., 731.57. Ibid.58. Ibid.59. Euben, ‘Killing (for) Politics’, 7.60. Zeiger, ‘Countering Violent Extremism and Education’.61. Barnett and Weiss, ‘Humanitarianism’, 9.62. Douglas-Bowers, ‘NGOs’, 1.63. Mesok, ‘Counterinsurgency’, 729, 724.64. United Nations General Assembly, ‘Human Rights Impact’.65. Patel and Koushik, ‘Countering Violent Extremism’, 17.66. USAID, ‘East Africa, Kenya, and Somalia’, 267. USAID, ‘Policy for Countering Violent Extremism through Development Assistance’.68. Attewell, The Quiet Violence of Empire.69. Norris, The Enduring Struggle, 8.70. USAID, ‘About us’.71. Attewell, The Quiet Violence of Empire, 4.72. Essex, Development, Security, and Aid, 86.73. Aldrich, ‘First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds?’ 524.74. Ibid.75. Ibid.76. Ibid., 525.77. USAID, ‘Policy for Countering Violent Extremism’, 6.78. Ibid., 3.79. Ibid.80. Ibid., 10.81. Tesfaye, Critical Choices, 4–5.82. Tesfaye, 7.83. USAID, ‘Promising Practices’, 5.84. Tesfaye, Critical Choices, 13.85. Ibid., 14.86. Ibid., 13.87. Ibid., 15.88. Tesfaye, ‘If Youth Are Given a Chance’, 18.89. Ibid., 24.90. Swedberg and Reisman, ‘Mid-Term Evaluation of Three Countering Violent Extremism Projects’, 43.91. Ibid.92. Ibid., 44.93. Tesfaye, Critical Choices, 25.94. Ibid., 9.95. United Nations Development Programme, ‘Journey to Extremism in Africa’.96. Van Zyl and Mahdi, ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’, 12.97. Saferworld, ‘Thinking beyond “Countering Violent Extremism”’.98. Ibid.99. Harper, ‘Is Anybody Listening?’ 369–78.100. as quoted in Harper, ‘Is Anybody Listening?’ 371.101. Ibid.102. Ibid., 363.103. Lyall, ‘Can Economic Assistance Shape Combatant Support in Wartime?’ 128.104. Ibid., 129.105. Ibid.106. Aldrich, ‘First Steps Towards Hearts and Minds?’ 541.107. Ibid.108. Ibid.109. Aliaga and O’Farrell, ‘Counter-Terror in Tunisia’, 22.110. Ibid.111. Ibid.112. Zahzah, ‘Warcare Economies’, 34.113. ‘Shifta’ is a Somali word for ‘bandit’ and has been used by Kenyan authorities to discredit Somali fighters.114. Swedberg and Reisman, ‘Mid-Term Evaluation of Countering Violent Extremism’, 13.115. Office of Transition Initiatives, ‘Kenya’; USAID, ‘East Africa, Kenya, and Somalia’.116. Zahzah, ‘Warcare Economies’, 34.117. Qureshi, ‘Fight the Power’; Kundnani, ‘Radicalisation’; Nguyen, Suspect Communities; Selod, Forever Suspect.118. Attree and Street, ‘U.N. Peace Operations’, 13.119. Ibid., 12.120. Bhungalia, ‘Managing Violence’; Debarre, ‘Countering Terrorism and Violent Extremism’; Ki-moon, ‘Remarks at General Assembly’; Norwegian Refugee Council, ‘Countering Violent Extremism’; United Nations General Assembly, ‘Human Rights Impact’.121. Kiernat, ‘Minneapolis Public Schools CVE Program’.122. Participant observation, 2017.123. Ibid.124. Ibid.125. Ibid.126. Ibid.127. Ibid.128. Dylann Roof shot and killed nine Black church congregants at Emanuel African Methodist Episcopal Church in Charleston, South Carolina in 2015.129. Interview, 2017.130. Tesfaye, Critical Choices, 6.131. Correa, ‘A Transitional Justice Approach to Foreign Fighters’, 41.132. Li, ‘A Jihadism Anti-Primer’, 16.133. Horton, Nakhlawi, and Mekhennet, ‘Ukraine War Volunteers’.134. Mesok, ‘Counterinsurgency’, 723.135. Correa, ‘A Transitional Justice Approach to Foreign Fighters’, 1.136. Ibid., 43.137. Ibid., 15.Additional informationNotes on contributorsNicole NguyenNicole Nguyen is associate professor of criminology, law, & justice at the University of Illinois at Chicago. She is author of A Curriculum of Fear: Homeland Security in U.S. Public Schools (University of Minnesota Press, 2016) and Suspect Communities: Anti-Muslim Racism and the Domestic War on Terrorism (University of Minnesota Press, 2019).