{"title":"Idealizing Abolition","authors":"Daniel Fryer","doi":"10.1007/s11572-023-09700-9","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract The United States system of policing is in drastic need of change. Some recent critics have encouraged that we avoid trying to repair the system—and abolish it altogether. In advancing this position, they often invoke ideas of “dreams,” “speculative imagination,” and “horizons” to guide efforts at fixing the problems of policing. In this essay, I caution against the overuse of this sort of idealized discourse in debates about policing. Specifically, I show how idealizations risk being counterproductive with respect to abolitionists’ activist goals, in that they suggest that if abolition is desirable, approximating abolition is also desirable; fail to clarify what the conditions of application of their view are; and operate without the feasibility-sensitivity that one should expect from a non-evaluative position. My goal is not to suggest that our system of policing is fine as is. Nor is it to diminish the importance of having a long-term revolutionary vision. By pointing out the ways in which the idealizations invoked are inconsistent with abolitionists’ activist agenda, I hope to help clarify the merits of police abolition as a guiding strategy for change and caution against the use of certain forms of idealized thinking in our efforts at police reform.","PeriodicalId":45447,"journal":{"name":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","volume":"5 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Criminal Law and Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11572-023-09700-9","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"LAW","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract The United States system of policing is in drastic need of change. Some recent critics have encouraged that we avoid trying to repair the system—and abolish it altogether. In advancing this position, they often invoke ideas of “dreams,” “speculative imagination,” and “horizons” to guide efforts at fixing the problems of policing. In this essay, I caution against the overuse of this sort of idealized discourse in debates about policing. Specifically, I show how idealizations risk being counterproductive with respect to abolitionists’ activist goals, in that they suggest that if abolition is desirable, approximating abolition is also desirable; fail to clarify what the conditions of application of their view are; and operate without the feasibility-sensitivity that one should expect from a non-evaluative position. My goal is not to suggest that our system of policing is fine as is. Nor is it to diminish the importance of having a long-term revolutionary vision. By pointing out the ways in which the idealizations invoked are inconsistent with abolitionists’ activist agenda, I hope to help clarify the merits of police abolition as a guiding strategy for change and caution against the use of certain forms of idealized thinking in our efforts at police reform.
期刊介绍:
Rationale The philosophy of crime and criminal law has been undergoing a renaissance.Increasing numbers of lawyers and philosophers are researching, writing and teaching in the area. Lawyers who are exploring theoretical issues related to criminal liability and punishment find that they must turn to philosophy. Philosophers recognise the importance of the criminal law as a focus for both analytical and normative inquiry. The practical importance of the subject is also obvious, especially at a time when western governments are having to reconsider their rationales for criminalization and sentencing in the light of substantial changes in criminal justice systems and their social contexts. Until recently, there was no journal solely devoted to the philosophy of crime and criminal law. Criminal Law and Philosophy fills this gap, and provides a platform for the high quality work that is being done in this area.
High quality content; specific and inclusive in scope Criminal Law and Philosophy aims to publish high quality articles that take a philosophical perspective on any issues in the broad field of crime and punishment. The main areas and topics include: crime and criminalization; the content, principles and structure of substantive criminal law; criminal justice and the criminal process; punishment and sentencing. The journal is inclusive in its scope: it publishes articles with a historical focus on earlier philosophical discussions of crime and punishment, as well as articles with a more contemporary focus. It seeks contributions from a range of philosophical schools and approaches, in particular both from analytically oriented philosophers and from those who draw more on contemporary continental philoshophy. Readership Criminal Law and Philosophy is becoming essential reading for academics in philoso phy, in law and in criminology who take a philosophically informed critical, analytical or normative approach to the criminal law and criminal justice. It is also an important resource for students in those subjects, and for practitioners with an interest in philosophical approaches to their practice. Through this journal, readers can access the latest thinking by the best scholars in the philosophy of crime and punishment. Editorial Board The editors, editorial board and advisors constitute an impressive, international group of leading scholars working in the philosophy of crime and punishment. They represent a variety of systems of criminal law, including systems that cross national boundaries.