Maximizing the Benefits of an On-Demand Workforce: Fill Rate-Based Allocation and Coordination Mechanisms

IF 4.8 3区管理学 Q1 MANAGEMENT

M&som-Manufacturing & Service Operations Management Pub Date : 2023-06-16 DOI:10.1287/msom.2021.0327

Tao Lu, Zhichao Zheng, Yuanguang Zhong

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Problem definition: With the rapid growth of the gig economy, on-demand staffing platforms have emerged to help companies manage their temporary workforce. This emerging business-to-business context motivates us to study a new form of supply chain coordination problem. We consider a staffing platform managing an on-demand workforce to serve multiple firms facing stochastic labor demand. Before demand realization, each individual firm can hire permanent employees, whereas the platform determines a compensation rate for potential on-demand workers. After knowing the realized demand, firms in need can request on-demand workers from the platform, and then, the platform operator allocates the available on-demand workforce among the firms. We explore how to maximize and distribute the benefits of an on-demand workforce through coordinating self-interested parties in the staffing system. Methodology/results: We combine game theory and online optimization techniques to address the challenges in incentivizing and coordinating the online workforce. We propose a novel and easily implementable fill rate-based allocation and coordination mechanism that enables the on-demand workforce to be shared optimally when individual firms and the platform operator make decisions in their own interest. We also show that the proposed mechanism can be adapted to the cases when contract terms need to be identical to all firms and when actual demand is unverifiable. Managerial implications: The proposed contract mechanism is in line with the performance-based contracting commonly used in on-demand staffing services. Our results suggest that under an appropriately designed performance-based mechanism, individual firms and the platform operator can share the maximum benefits of on-demand staffing. Funding: This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grant 71871097] and the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, China. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0327 .

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按需劳动力的利益最大化:基于填充率的分配和协调机制

问题定义:随着零工经济的快速增长，按需招聘平台应运而生，帮助企业管理临时员工。这种新兴的企业对企业的环境促使我们研究一种新的供应链协调问题。我们考虑一个管理按需劳动力的人力资源平台，以服务于面临随机劳动力需求的多家公司。在需求实现之前，每个公司都可以雇佣固定员工，而平台则为潜在的按需员工确定一个补偿率。在了解实现需求后，有需求的企业可以向平台请求按需劳动力，然后平台运营商将可用的按需劳动力分配给企业。我们探索如何通过协调人员配置系统中自利的各方来最大化和分配按需劳动力的利益。方法/结果:我们结合博弈论和在线优化技术来解决激励和协调在线劳动力的挑战。我们提出了一种新颖且易于实施的基于填充率的分配和协调机制，当单个公司和平台运营商根据自己的利益做出决策时，该机制可以实现按需劳动力的最佳共享。我们还表明，所提出的机制可以适用于合同条款需要与所有公司相同以及实际需求无法验证的情况。管理影响:拟议的合同机制与按需员额配置服务中常用的基于业绩的合同是一致的。我们的研究结果表明，在适当设计的基于绩效的机制下，个体企业和平台运营商可以分享按需人员配置的最大利益。基金资助:国家自然科学基金项目[no . 71871097]和中央高校基本科研业务费专项基金资助。补充材料:在线附录可在https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2021.0327上获得。

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来源期刊

M&som-Manufacturing & Service Operations Management 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

9.30

自引率

12.70%

发文量

184

审稿时长

12 months

期刊介绍： M&SOM is the INFORMS journal for operations management. The purpose of the journal is to publish high-impact manuscripts that report relevant research on important problems in operations management (OM). The field of OM is the study of the innovative or traditional processes for the design, procurement, production, delivery, and recovery of goods and services. OM research entails the control, planning, design, and improvement of these processes. This research can be prescriptive, descriptive, or predictive; however, the intent of the research is ultimately to develop some form of enduring knowledge that can lead to more efficient or effective processes for the creation and delivery of goods and services. M&SOM encourages a variety of methodological approaches to OM research; papers may be theoretical or empirical, analytical or computational, and may be based on a range of established research disciplines. M&SOM encourages contributions in OM across the full spectrum of decision making: strategic, tactical, and operational. Furthermore, the journal supports research that examines pertinent issues at the interfaces between OM and other functional areas.