Institutional Design of Pension Systems Versus Labor Market Structure: What Matters Most?

Abstract

Abstract Since the 1980s, policy makers have favored Defined Contribution (DC) pension systems as the alternative to address the unsustainability of Defined Benefit systems. While DC schemes offer benefits and economic advantages, they also present challenges and limitations. We evaluate the mandatory DC pension system for workers in the private formal sector in Mexico, introduced in 1997. We intend to determine for which workers the design of the system is effective and for which workers it is not. The Mexican labor market has high levels of informality and workers constantly flow in and out of the formal sector. Our findings support the view that workers’ personal characteristics place them in the structure of the labor market that in turn determines pension benefits. We analyze involvement with the formal sector and the pension system and identify 3 groups of pension participants that reflect the structure of the local labor market: occasional workers, frequent interruptions, and workers with high participation rates. We conclude that frictions in the labor market prevail over the good intentions of the pension design, like reducing informality and encouraging saving for retirement. Our results show that the system properly serves only 36% of affiliated workers. We explain why very few workers report behaviors consistent with high participation, and why most affiliates have insufficient participation to receive pension benefits. We shed light on the relationship between the structure of the labor market and the design of the pension system and their impact on workers’ future pension benefits.