Why inconsistent intentional states underlie our grasp of objects

IF 0.8 3区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Rea Golan
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Several authors maintain that we are capable of having inconsistent intentional states, either in cases of illusion, in certain cases of imagination, or because the observable world is (partly) inconsistent and we perceive it as such. These views are all premised on the assumption that inconsistent intentional states—even if acknowledged—are peculiar and have nothing essential to do with our perceptual capacities. In the present article, I would like to present, and argue for, a much stronger thesis: that inconsistent intentional states underlie the possibility of having intentional content in mind. I argue for this thesis based on a Husserlian phenomenological analysis of our grasp of objects, which I formulate in terms of incompatibility semantics.
为什么不一致的意图状态是我们对物体理解的基础
一些作者认为,我们能够拥有不一致的意图状态,要么是在幻觉的情况下,要么是在想象的某些情况下,要么是因为可观察到的世界(部分)不一致,而我们是这样感知它的。这些观点都是基于这样一个假设:不一致的意图状态——即使被承认——是特殊的,与我们的感知能力没有本质的关系。在这篇文章中,我想提出并论证一个更有力的论点:不一致的意图状态是拥有意图内容的可能性的基础。我的论点是基于胡塞尔对我们对客体的把握的现象学分析,我用不容性语义来表述。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.20
自引率
0.00%
发文量
36
期刊介绍: The Southern Journal of Philosophy has long provided a forum for the expression of philosophical ideas and welcome articles written from all philosophical perspectives, including both the analytic and continental traditions, as well as the history of philosophy. This commitment to philosophical pluralism is reflected in the long list of notable figures whose work has appeared in the journal, including Hans-Georg Gadamer, Hubert Dreyfus, George Santayana, Wilfrid Sellars, and Richard Sorabji.
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