Arthur V. Atanesyan, Bradley M. Reynolds, Artur E. Mkrtichyan
{"title":"Balancing between Russia and the West: the hard security choice of Armenia","authors":"Arthur V. Atanesyan, Bradley M. Reynolds, Artur E. Mkrtichyan","doi":"10.1080/09662839.2023.2258528","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTArmenia’s official foreign policy of complementarism aims to sustain national security and development by balancing strategic and friendly relations with Russia, while also engaging in multilevel political, economic and cultural interactions with the EU and the USA. However, after the 2020 Karabakh War and amidst the increasing confrontation between the West and Russia, complementarism faced unprecedented challenges. To investigate whether Armenian elites still adhere to the line of complementarism and to determine whether they reflect or contradict public perceptions of foreign policy, we gathered novel sociological data on foreign policy preferences in Armenian society through a nationwide survey, outlining changes and continuities in their perceptions over the past ten years. Our study reveals that Armenian elites have started to modify complementarism as they began to doubt Russia’s role in Armenian foreign policy, particularly in the context of the European neighbourhood. Armenian society’s trust in Russia has consistently declined, despite Moscow still being ranked as the main strategic ally in public perceptions. The misbalancing of complementarism by Armenian elites not only challenges Russia’s role in Armenian security and public opinion but also offers no viable alternative for the security of Armenia and the Armenian population in Karabakh.KEYWORDS: Armenian societyRussiaThe WestComplementarismKarabakh WarSecurity priorities Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 This foreign policy is also referred to as a “Complementarian” foreign policy or simply Complementarity, but in this article, we prefer the common term “Complementarism” as is common in the academic literature on the topic.Additional informationFundingThis work is part of the research project “Armenian Society on Crossroad: Foreign Political Orientation, Priorities and Perceptions,” funded by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Armenia) in 2021–2022.","PeriodicalId":46331,"journal":{"name":"European Security","volume":"89 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":2.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Security","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2023.2258528","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"AREA STUDIES","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACTArmenia’s official foreign policy of complementarism aims to sustain national security and development by balancing strategic and friendly relations with Russia, while also engaging in multilevel political, economic and cultural interactions with the EU and the USA. However, after the 2020 Karabakh War and amidst the increasing confrontation between the West and Russia, complementarism faced unprecedented challenges. To investigate whether Armenian elites still adhere to the line of complementarism and to determine whether they reflect or contradict public perceptions of foreign policy, we gathered novel sociological data on foreign policy preferences in Armenian society through a nationwide survey, outlining changes and continuities in their perceptions over the past ten years. Our study reveals that Armenian elites have started to modify complementarism as they began to doubt Russia’s role in Armenian foreign policy, particularly in the context of the European neighbourhood. Armenian society’s trust in Russia has consistently declined, despite Moscow still being ranked as the main strategic ally in public perceptions. The misbalancing of complementarism by Armenian elites not only challenges Russia’s role in Armenian security and public opinion but also offers no viable alternative for the security of Armenia and the Armenian population in Karabakh.KEYWORDS: Armenian societyRussiaThe WestComplementarismKarabakh WarSecurity priorities Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 This foreign policy is also referred to as a “Complementarian” foreign policy or simply Complementarity, but in this article, we prefer the common term “Complementarism” as is common in the academic literature on the topic.Additional informationFundingThis work is part of the research project “Armenian Society on Crossroad: Foreign Political Orientation, Priorities and Perceptions,” funded by Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Armenia) in 2021–2022.