Impartial third and disinterested judgment: Kojève and Arendt’s cosmopolitan phenomenologies of human rights as a response to Schmitt

Abstract

This article proposes that Hannah Arendt and Alexandre Kojève’s responses to Carl Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty, when combined, provide a historical and normative basis for a cosmopolitan view on human rights. I argue that by systematically merging Kojève’s theory of the “disinterested and impartial third” and Arendt’s theory of “disinterested judgment,” legal institutions, economic redistribution, and intersubjective normativity can be combined to create a robust response to Schmitt’s theory of sovereignty. To demonstrate this, I examine their efforts to resolve the contradiction between universal rights and national sovereignty from a phenomenological standpoint. Arendt’s idea of the “common world” is analyzed, showing how it upholds the idea of a non-sovereign public realm as a normative source of human rights but fails to consider the institutional and economic factors required for their realization. I then explore Kojève’s theory of impartial international legal institutions and his critique of economic colonialism to confront these factors. Additionally, Arendt’s theory of disinterested judgment is shown to address the limitations of Kojève’s phenomenological view of disinterestedness. This convergence between Kojève and Arendt provides a comprehensive response to the practical challenges of Arendt’s theory, while also highlighting the importance of “world opinion” in transforming sovereignty.