{"title":"A Deep Dive Into Distributive Concession Making and the Likelihood of Impasses in Negotiations","authors":"Marc Mertes, Dana Kunz, Joachim Hüffmeier","doi":"10.1525/collabra.88929","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Negotiation impasses can have severe negative consequences, but only little research attention has been devoted to investigating their causes. Studies on distributive concession making (i.e., high demands and low concessions) as a cause of impasses were inconclusive due to low sample sizes and methodological choices. Moreover, distributive concession making entails two hitherto fully entangled properties: reduction of conceded value and violation of the reciprocity norm. In our experiment, participants negotiated with a confederate who administered different concession patterns that allowed us to disentangle these properties. We found unambiguous evidence that distributive concession making increases the likelihood of impasses. This effect was driven by the reduction of conceded value rather than the violation of the reciprocity norm. Confrontation with distributive concession making led participants to develop negative internal attributions and anger, which mediated the effect of distributive concession making on the impasse rate. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the causes and underlying mechanisms of negotiation impasses.","PeriodicalId":93422,"journal":{"name":"Collabra","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Collabra","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1525/collabra.88929","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Negotiation impasses can have severe negative consequences, but only little research attention has been devoted to investigating their causes. Studies on distributive concession making (i.e., high demands and low concessions) as a cause of impasses were inconclusive due to low sample sizes and methodological choices. Moreover, distributive concession making entails two hitherto fully entangled properties: reduction of conceded value and violation of the reciprocity norm. In our experiment, participants negotiated with a confederate who administered different concession patterns that allowed us to disentangle these properties. We found unambiguous evidence that distributive concession making increases the likelihood of impasses. This effect was driven by the reduction of conceded value rather than the violation of the reciprocity norm. Confrontation with distributive concession making led participants to develop negative internal attributions and anger, which mediated the effect of distributive concession making on the impasse rate. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the causes and underlying mechanisms of negotiation impasses.