A Deep Dive Into Distributive Concession Making and the Likelihood of Impasses in Negotiations

Collabra Pub Date : 2023-01-01 DOI:10.1525/collabra.88929
Marc Mertes, Dana Kunz, Joachim Hüffmeier
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Negotiation impasses can have severe negative consequences, but only little research attention has been devoted to investigating their causes. Studies on distributive concession making (i.e., high demands and low concessions) as a cause of impasses were inconclusive due to low sample sizes and methodological choices. Moreover, distributive concession making entails two hitherto fully entangled properties: reduction of conceded value and violation of the reciprocity norm. In our experiment, participants negotiated with a confederate who administered different concession patterns that allowed us to disentangle these properties. We found unambiguous evidence that distributive concession making increases the likelihood of impasses. This effect was driven by the reduction of conceded value rather than the violation of the reciprocity norm. Confrontation with distributive concession making led participants to develop negative internal attributions and anger, which mediated the effect of distributive concession making on the impasse rate. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the causes and underlying mechanisms of negotiation impasses.
深入探讨分配让步和谈判僵局的可能性
谈判僵局可能会产生严重的负面后果,但对其原因的调查研究却很少。关于分配让步(即高要求和低让步)作为僵局原因的研究由于样本量小和方法选择不确定。此外,分配让步涉及两个迄今为止完全纠缠在一起的属性:减少让步价值和违反互惠准则。在我们的实验中,参与者与一个管理不同让步模式的同盟者进行谈判,使我们能够解开这些属性。我们发现明确的证据表明,分配让步增加了僵局的可能性。这种效应是由让步价值的减少所驱动的,而不是违反互惠准则。面对分配让步导致被试产生消极的内部归因和愤怒情绪,从而中介了分配让步对僵局率的影响。我们的研究有助于更好地理解谈判僵局的原因和潜在机制。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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