H. Llorca, M. López, E. Domínguez, T. Tisell, P. Scheidemann
{"title":"Study on the Benefits and Uses of OSNMA in Maritime Navigation","authors":"H. Llorca, M. López, E. Domínguez, T. Tisell, P. Scheidemann","doi":"10.33012/2023.19432","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In the maritime field, the use of GNSS positioning systems is widespread for all types of applications, for both navigation and positioning purposes. The paper shows a study and a proposal for the use of Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) in the implementation of a new advanced maritime DFMC receiver. In recent years, the maritime community has begun to be aware that, in order to guarantee safety and security, it is also necessary to think that the vessels have to be resilient PNT and particularly to Cyberattacks. Multiple cases of spoofing attacks around the world have been reported in the last few years. Thanks to Galileo OSNMA in the receiver, the possibility of having a mechanism capable of mitigating some spoofing attacks has been included. In addition, OSNMA ICD allows different implementation approaches depending on the needs of the end user, focusing on ensuring different target security levels. Considering that spoofing attacks can generate false information in many ways, during tests carried out in the scope of the ASGARD project, the behaviour of OSNMA's functionality in the receiver has been studied through different types of attacks. Those different tested attacks are: meaconing attack (recording and replaying real GNSS SIS), spoofing replicating SIS without OSNMA information, spoofing with OSNMA information replicated as in SIS, spoofing of only some satellites in view (cross authentication) and spoofing with OSNMA information replicated as in SIS keeping the same IODs. Finally, different architecture options to implement OSNMA are assessed. ASGARD receiver has a scheme in which OSNMA is part of an external module. It permits to continue developing the functionalities of OSNMA, without accompanying them on the development of the receiver itself, to use that module in other receivers or autonomously and facilitates the module verification and validation tests.","PeriodicalId":498211,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting","volume":"20 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the Satellite Division's International Technical Meeting","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.33012/2023.19432","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In the maritime field, the use of GNSS positioning systems is widespread for all types of applications, for both navigation and positioning purposes. The paper shows a study and a proposal for the use of Galileo Open Service Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) in the implementation of a new advanced maritime DFMC receiver. In recent years, the maritime community has begun to be aware that, in order to guarantee safety and security, it is also necessary to think that the vessels have to be resilient PNT and particularly to Cyberattacks. Multiple cases of spoofing attacks around the world have been reported in the last few years. Thanks to Galileo OSNMA in the receiver, the possibility of having a mechanism capable of mitigating some spoofing attacks has been included. In addition, OSNMA ICD allows different implementation approaches depending on the needs of the end user, focusing on ensuring different target security levels. Considering that spoofing attacks can generate false information in many ways, during tests carried out in the scope of the ASGARD project, the behaviour of OSNMA's functionality in the receiver has been studied through different types of attacks. Those different tested attacks are: meaconing attack (recording and replaying real GNSS SIS), spoofing replicating SIS without OSNMA information, spoofing with OSNMA information replicated as in SIS, spoofing of only some satellites in view (cross authentication) and spoofing with OSNMA information replicated as in SIS keeping the same IODs. Finally, different architecture options to implement OSNMA are assessed. ASGARD receiver has a scheme in which OSNMA is part of an external module. It permits to continue developing the functionalities of OSNMA, without accompanying them on the development of the receiver itself, to use that module in other receivers or autonomously and facilitates the module verification and validation tests.