{"title":"A Map of Selves: Beyond Philosophy of Mind","authors":"T Parent","doi":"10.1093/pq/pqad014","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In many respects, N.M.L. Nathan's latest book feels timeless. Its brevity and pithiness especially remind one of Descartes’ Meditations; it even has similar overarching concerns and conclusions. Thus, Chapter 1 offers not only an analysis of the self, but also defends its introspective powers, its capacity for freewill, and its immateriality. Chapter 2 diverges somewhat from Cartesian themes; it rebuts two arguments for ‘ulterior selves’, that is, for the view that material objects are composed of selves (a view that Nathan associates with panpsychism). But Chapters 3 and 4 return to distinctly Cartesian issues, offering a cosmological argument for the existence of (something like) a god, and explaining how the account of selves bears on the possibility of post-mortem existence. Naturally, Nathan is not simply repeating Descartes or his scholastic influences. Written after the ‘metaphysical turn’ (instituted by David Lewis, David Armstrong, etc.), Nathan's book can be seen instead as a significant, 21st-century ‘update’ to a Cartesian-scholastic view.","PeriodicalId":47749,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-02-16","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad014","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In many respects, N.M.L. Nathan's latest book feels timeless. Its brevity and pithiness especially remind one of Descartes’ Meditations; it even has similar overarching concerns and conclusions. Thus, Chapter 1 offers not only an analysis of the self, but also defends its introspective powers, its capacity for freewill, and its immateriality. Chapter 2 diverges somewhat from Cartesian themes; it rebuts two arguments for ‘ulterior selves’, that is, for the view that material objects are composed of selves (a view that Nathan associates with panpsychism). But Chapters 3 and 4 return to distinctly Cartesian issues, offering a cosmological argument for the existence of (something like) a god, and explaining how the account of selves bears on the possibility of post-mortem existence. Naturally, Nathan is not simply repeating Descartes or his scholastic influences. Written after the ‘metaphysical turn’ (instituted by David Lewis, David Armstrong, etc.), Nathan's book can be seen instead as a significant, 21st-century ‘update’ to a Cartesian-scholastic view.
期刊介绍:
The Philosophical Quarterly is one of the most highly regarded and established academic journals in philosophy. In an age of increasing specialism, it remains committed to publishing high-quality articles from leading international scholars across the range of philosophical study. Accessibility of its content for all philosophers - including students - is an editorial priority. The Philosophical Quarterly regularly publishes articles, discussions and reviews, and runs an annual Essay Prize. Its distinguished international contributors engage with both the established and the new, for example, through reflection on cognitive psychology, decision theory, quantum mechanics.