Aidan Coville, Sebastian Galiani, Paul Gertler, Susumu Yoshida
{"title":"Financing Municipal Water and Sanitation Services in Nairobi's Informal Settlements","authors":"Aidan Coville, Sebastian Galiani, Paul Gertler, Susumu Yoshida","doi":"10.1162/rest_a_01379","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Abstract We test two ways to improve revenue collection efficiency for water and sanitation utilities: (i) face-to-face engagement between utility staff and customers and (ii) contract enforcement for service disconnection due to nonpayment in the form of transparent and credible disconnection notices. Engagement has no effect, while enforcement significantly increases payment. We find no effect on access to water, perceptions of the utility, relationships between tenants and property owners, or on tenant mental well-being nine months after the intervention. These results suggest that transparent contract enforcement was effective at improving revenue collection efficiency without incurring significant observed social or political costs.","PeriodicalId":275408,"journal":{"name":"The Review of Economics and Statistics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"The Review of Economics and Statistics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01379","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Abstract We test two ways to improve revenue collection efficiency for water and sanitation utilities: (i) face-to-face engagement between utility staff and customers and (ii) contract enforcement for service disconnection due to nonpayment in the form of transparent and credible disconnection notices. Engagement has no effect, while enforcement significantly increases payment. We find no effect on access to water, perceptions of the utility, relationships between tenants and property owners, or on tenant mental well-being nine months after the intervention. These results suggest that transparent contract enforcement was effective at improving revenue collection efficiency without incurring significant observed social or political costs.