Financing Municipal Water and Sanitation Services in Nairobi's Informal Settlements

Aidan Coville, Sebastian Galiani, Paul Gertler, Susumu Yoshida
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Abstract

Abstract We test two ways to improve revenue collection efficiency for water and sanitation utilities: (i) face-to-face engagement between utility staff and customers and (ii) contract enforcement for service disconnection due to nonpayment in the form of transparent and credible disconnection notices. Engagement has no effect, while enforcement significantly increases payment. We find no effect on access to water, perceptions of the utility, relationships between tenants and property owners, or on tenant mental well-being nine months after the intervention. These results suggest that transparent contract enforcement was effective at improving revenue collection efficiency without incurring significant observed social or political costs.
资助内罗毕非正式住区的市政供水和卫生服务
我们测试了两种方法来提高水和卫生公用事业的税收效率:(i)公用事业人员和客户之间的面对面接触;(ii)以透明和可信的中断通知的形式执行因未付款而中断服务的合同。参与没有效果,而强制执行会显著增加支付。我们发现,干预后9个月,对水的获取、对公用事业的看法、租户与业主之间的关系或租户的心理健康都没有影响。这些结果表明,透明的合同执行可以有效地提高税收效率,而不会产生显著的社会或政治成本。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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