Generation of IDS Signatures through Exhaustive Execution Path Exploration in PoC Codes for Vulnerabilities

Q4 Computer Science
Masaki Kobayashi, Yo Kanemoto, Daisuke Kotani, Yasuo Okabe
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

There have been many vulnerabilities, and we need prompt countermeasures. One factor that makes more rapid measures necessary is Proof of Concept (PoC) codes. Although they are released to promote vulnerability countermeasures, attackers can also abuse them. In this paper, we analyze PoC codes that send HTTP requests, then generate IDS signatures. To analyze codes, there are two policies: dynamic analysis and static analysis. However, the former cannot cover the execution paths, and the latter cannot analyze dynamically determined values. In addition, symbolic execution compensates for their shortcomings, but its implementation cost is high. We propose a signature generation method for PoC codes that send HTTP requests based on an analysis combining dynamic and static analysis. We first statically explore execution paths of the code by searching for the conditional branch syntax using the abstract syntax tree. Then, we rewrite the branch conditions to enforce the specific execution path and generate a new code corresponding to each path. Finally, we execute each code, generate the attack requests dynamically, and extract signatures. The average detection rate for the requests was 86.9%. Moreover, we tested the signatures for 30 codes by actually executing them, and for nine codes, we detected the attack.
通过穷举执行路径探索PoC代码漏洞生成IDS签名
有许多漏洞,我们需要迅速采取对策。使更快速的措施成为必要的一个因素是概念验证(PoC)代码。尽管发布它们是为了促进漏洞对策,但攻击者也可以滥用它们。在本文中,我们分析发送HTTP请求的PoC代码,然后生成IDS签名。要分析代码,有两种策略:动态分析和静态分析。但是,前者不能覆盖执行路径,后者不能分析动态确定的值。此外,符号执行弥补了它们的不足,但其实现成本较高。提出了一种基于动态分析和静态分析相结合的HTTP请求对讲码签名生成方法。我们首先通过使用抽象语法树搜索条件分支语法来静态地探索代码的执行路径。然后,我们重写分支条件以强制执行特定的执行路径,并生成与每个路径对应的新代码。最后,我们执行每个代码,动态生成攻击请求,并提取签名。请求的平均检出率为86.9%。此外,我们对30个代码的签名进行了测试,其中9个代码检测到了攻击。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Information Processing
Journal of Information Processing Computer Science-Computer Science (all)
CiteScore
1.20
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