Shadow Economy in Physicians’ Sector: The Physicians’ Point of View from Greece

IF 1 Q4 HEALTH POLICY & SERVICES
D. Stasinopoulos, A. Goula, C. Kastanioti, M. Sarris, S. Soulis
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Abstract

Tax evasion of self-employed doctors as well as the informal payments made to doctors in public health structures are identified as the two main parameters of Shadow Economy in this sector. In this study, a quantitative survey of 1,022 physicians was conducted to research the attitudes and perceptions of physicians. Although the physicians are mostly opposed to antisocial and unlawful behaviours, they are more tolerant with shadow economy phenomena. The research highlighted a correlation between tax evasion and informal payments where the increase of one phenomenon increases the intensity of the other. ‘Tax evasion’ in the conscience of physicians functions as a ‘corrective mechanism’ in the sector’s charges, which satisfies patients and physicians in the sector of self-employed doctors, acquiring characteristics of ‘Inxit’ of the well-known theory of Gaal and McKee. Informal Payments, on the other hand, as research has shown, act as an incentive for unsatisfied physicians to remain within the public health system. However, they have a negative impact on the employment relationships of health executives while at the same time, they significantly exacerbate the quality of services provided by public health institutions. Deterioration of quality in the ‘organisation’ with open channels of ‘exit’ and ‘voice’, given that there is no ‘loyalty’ of patients in the public health system, as research shows, leads to the conclusion that Informal Payments take on characteristics of ‘utilitarian silence’ on the part of patients, rather than characteristics of an alternative to ‘exit’, ‘protest’—of the well-known ‘EVL’ theory of Hirschman (1970) —or, ultimately, to ‘Inxit’.
医生部门的影子经济:来自希腊医生的观点
自雇医生逃税以及向公共卫生机构医生的非正式付款被确定为该部门影子经济的两个主要参数。本研究对1022名医生进行了定量调查,以研究医生的态度和看法。虽然医生大多反对反社会和非法行为,但他们对影子经济现象的容忍度更高。该研究强调了逃税与非正式支付之间的相关性,其中一种现象的增加会增加另一种现象的强度。医生良心上的“逃税”作为行业收费的“纠正机制”,满足了个体医生领域的患者和医生,获得了著名的Gaal和McKee理论的“Inxit”特征。另一方面,正如研究表明的那样,非正式支付可以激励不满意的医生留在公共卫生系统内。然而,它们对卫生行政人员的雇佣关系产生了负面影响,同时显著恶化了公共卫生机构提供的服务质量。研究表明,鉴于公共卫生系统中没有患者的“忠诚”,具有开放“退出”和“声音”渠道的“组织”质量的恶化导致了这样的结论:非正式支付在患者方面呈现出“功利主义沉默”的特征,而不是“退出”、“抗议”(赫希曼(Hirschman, 1970)著名的“EVL”理论)的替代特征,或者最终是“退出”。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Journal of Health Management
Journal of Health Management HEALTH POLICY & SERVICES-
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
0.00%
发文量
84
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