Join Up or Stay Away? Coalition Formation for Critical IT Infrastructure

IF 5 3区 管理学 Q1 INFORMATION SCIENCE & LIBRARY SCIENCE
Hong Guo, Yipeng Liu, Barrie R. Nault
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

PRACTICE AND POLICY ABSTRACT We consider the formation of a coalition when districts invest in critical IT infrastructure that, if disrupted, can cause significant damage to security, the economy, public health, or safety. The benefits from these investments can spill over to other districts. Districts choose whether to participate in a coalition, and the coalition subsequently makes IT infrastructure investment decisions for those districts that join the coalition. These inside districts have superior interoperability in their spillovers relative to outside districts. We find that inside districts’ resource levels decrease with the size of the coalition, and this size depends on the coalition’s economies of scale and relative interoperability. Depending on these factors, any size coalition can be an equilibrium or socially optimal. In most cases, the socially optimal coalition size is larger than the equilibrium coalition. A subsidy or tax can incentivize the equilibrium coalition size and district investment levels to be socially optimal, providing a general solution to the provisioning of critical IT infrastructure. We use the European Union’s Digital COVID Certificate program providing vaccine status information and the U.S. Government’s Direct Project that supports the establishment of nationwide health information exchanges to illustrate elements of our model.
加入还是远离?关键IT基础设施联盟的形成
实践与政策摘要:当地区投资于关键的IT基础设施时,我们考虑形成一个联盟,如果被破坏,可能会对安全、经济、公共卫生或安全造成重大损害。这些投资的收益可以溢出到其他地区。地区选择是否加入联盟,联盟随后为加入联盟的地区做出IT基础设施投资决策。相对于外部地区,这些内部地区在溢出效应方面具有更好的互操作性。研究发现,区域内资源水平随联盟规模的增大而降低,而这取决于联盟的规模经济和相对互操作性。根据这些因素,任何规模的联盟都可能是均衡的或社会最优的。在大多数情况下,社会最优联盟的规模大于均衡联盟。补贴或税收可以激励均衡联盟规模和地区投资水平达到社会最优,为关键IT基础设施的供应提供通用解决方案。我们使用提供疫苗状态信息的欧盟数字COVID证书计划和支持建立全国卫生信息交换的美国政府直接项目来说明我们模型的要素。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
9.10
自引率
8.20%
发文量
120
期刊介绍: ISR (Information Systems Research) is a journal of INFORMS, the Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences. Information Systems Research is a leading international journal of theory, research, and intellectual development, focused on information systems in organizations, institutions, the economy, and society.
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