Design and Selection of Pharmaceutical Innovation Incentive Policies: Subsidy or Inclusion in Health Insurance Plan

Xinxin ZHANG, Chenglin SHEN, Junran HUANG
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Abstract

A critical problem plaguing regulators in promoting pharmaceutical innovation is to design and select efficient incentive policies. In this study, we develop a stylized model comprising a regulator and two representative drug producers to evaluate the effects of three incentive policies: Innovation subsides, inclusion new drugs in the health insurance plan, and the combination of the above two policies (also called hybrid policy). Our analysis shows that innovation subsidies and inclusion of new drugs in the health insurance plan can both promote pharmaceutical innovation, but their incentive effects vary in different policy objectives. Specifically, if the regulator aims to improve patient welfare, he should incorporate new drugs into the health insurance plan to expand the accessibility of new drug when the copayment level is low. However, if the regulator aims to improve social welfare, he should choose innovation subsidies when the copayment level is high, and the hybrid policy when the copayment level is low. In particular, with a sufficiently low copayment level, the hybrid policy allows the new drug producer, patients and the regulator to achieve Pareto improvement due to a lower regulator's innovation subsidy expenditure, higher profits of the new drug producer and consumer surplus.

医药创新激励政策的设计与选择:补贴或纳入健康保险计划
如何设计和选择有效的激励政策,是困扰监管部门推动药品创新的关键问题。在本研究中,我们建立了一个由监管者和两个具有代表性的药品生产商组成的程式化模型,以评估三种激励政策的效果:创新补贴,新药纳入健康保险计划,以及上述两种政策的组合(也称为混合政策)。我们的分析表明,创新补贴和将新药纳入医保计划都能促进药品创新,但在不同的政策目标下,两者的激励效果有所不同。具体来说,如果监管机构以改善患者福利为目标,就应该将新药纳入健康保险计划,在共同支付水平较低的情况下扩大新药的可及性。然而,如果监管者以提高社会福利为目标,则在共同支付水平较高时应选择创新补贴,在共同支付水平较低时应选择混合政策。特别是,在足够低的共同支付水平下,混合政策使得新药生产商、患者和监管机构实现了帕累托改进,因为监管机构的创新补贴支出较低,新药生产商的利润较高,消费者剩余较高。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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