Unholy alignment and boomerang civil conflicts: Examining how conflicts beget conflicts through external states support for rebels

IF 0.9 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Small Wars and Insurgencies Pub Date : 2023-09-15 DOI:10.1080/09592318.2023.2257592

Thomas Ameyaw-Brobbey

{"title":"Unholy alignment and boomerang civil conflicts: Examining how conflicts beget conflicts through external states support for rebels","authors":"Thomas Ameyaw-Brobbey","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2257592","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThis paper focuses on external state support for rebel movements by developing an analytical tool to explain how external support for rebels leads to civil conflict onset and intensification in the target state and how conflict reverses to the sponsoring state, engendering conflict diffusion and continuation. I present a two-fold argument that a cooperative relationship between external states and rebels triggers the remote causes of civil conflict, translating latent grievances into manifest conflict in the target state. Further, the resulting conflict has a boomerang effect. It has the potential to reverse to the sponsoring state. I do this by using a case studies method – cooperative relationships of governments of Sudan and Chad with each other’s rebels vis-à-vis Sudan Civil War (2000–2005) and Chad Civil War (2005–2010) – to provide a detailed explanation of the framework and its hypotheses. The explanations I offer here may help us understand some African conflict dynamics for us to take some recent developments, for example, in the Great Lakes, more seriously.KEYWORDS: unholy alignmentcivil war and conflictinsurgency and counterinsurgencySudan and Chadsub-Saharan Africaweak statesstate-rebel cooperationrebel sponsorship Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1. Notes.Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 4–27; Welz, ‘Omnibalancing and international interventions’, 387.2. Cilliers, ‘Violence in Africa’, 3–11.3. Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 7.4. Ibid., 13.5. Arowolo, ‘Dancing on a Knife-edge’, 6–8.6. Wegenast and Schneider, ‘Ownership Matters’, 110–18.7. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer, ‘Voting for Militants’, 3.8. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 782–94.9. Ibid.10. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; San-Akca, States in Disguise, 38–41; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 783; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.11. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 5–13.12. International Crisis Group (ICG), Averting proxy wars, 1–3.13. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 3–5.14. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 709–44.15. Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions’, 1360–389; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 21–24, 34–38; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 58–70.16. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 243.17. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 248–252; van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246; Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361; Terpstra, “Rebel Governance, 1143–1173.18. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246.19. Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361.20. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 222, 233–237.21. Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed, ‘The Role of External Support’, 1175–1178.22. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two’, 580–81.23. Ibid., 571–72.24. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 790–92; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.25. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 712–15.26. Ibid., 709–44.27. Carter, ‘A Blessing or a Curse?’, 130.28. Klabbers, International Law, 70–73.29. Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 73–90.30. Ibid.31. Ibid., 74–83, 95.32. Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence’, 377.33. Ibid.34. Ibid., 367–84; Lucas, Appel and Prorok, ‘Not Too Distant’, 497–523.35. Abdullah and Rashid, ‘Rebel Movements’, 169–93; Beevers, Peacebuilding and natural resource, 67–76.36. Agbu, West Africa’s Trouble Spots, 21–28.37. Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence’, 377–80.38. Strüver, ‘China’s Partnership Diplomacy’, 35–37; Wilkins, ‘“Alignment”, Not “Alliance”’, 59–62.39. Wilkins, ‘“Alignment”, Not “Alliance”’, 53–76.40. Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence’, 377–80; Walter, ‘Why Bad Governance’, 1243–49; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War, 58–90, 94–116.41. Walsh et al., ‘Funding Rebellion’, 699–707.42. Ibid.; Beevers, Peacebuilding and natural resource, 67–76, 125–132.43. Abdullah and Rashid, ‘Rebel Movements’, 180–89.44. Ibid., 188.45. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.46. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, 4–15.47. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 21–46.48. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 246–47.49. Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 3.50. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 58–70.51. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer, ‘Voting for Militants’, 81–107.52. Glawion and Le Noan, ‘Rebel governance or governance in rebel territory’, 24–51.53. Ibid., 25, 37–41.54. Hyyppä, “Council in war, 52–80.55. Ibid., 53, 60–65.56. Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions’, 1375.57. Loyle et al., ‘New Directions in Rebel Governance’, 6; Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 25.58. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 25.59. Waterman, ‘The shadow of “the boys”’, 279–304.60. Ibid., 280, 286–295.61. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 24–5.62. Ibid., 25.63. Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 25.64. Gerring, Case Study Research, 65.65. Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 7.66. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 635–36.67. Walsh et al., ‘Funding Rebellion’, 699–707.68. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 785–86.69. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 105–106.70. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 636.71. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two’, 572–74.72. Ghatak, ‘The Role of Political Exclusion’, 87–89; Hendrix, ‘Measuring State Capacity’, 273–74.73. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 638.74. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 786.75. Ibid., 790–92; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.76. Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’, 507.77. Hendrix, ‘Measuring State Capacity’, 273.78. Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency’, 80.79. Byman and Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction?’, 9–10; Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’, 505–506; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 641.80. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 224.81. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, 13–15.82. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 638.83. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 712.84. Byman and Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction?’, 2–4; Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’, 505–507.85. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 23.86. Tounsel, Chosen Peoples, 92.87. Ibid.88. Ayers, ‘Sudan’s Uncivil War’, 161.89. Natsios, ‘Beyond Darfur’, 82.90. Ayers, ‘Sudan’s Uncivil War’, 166–67.91. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 133.92. Ibid., 132–34; Tounsel, Chosen Peoples, 91.93. Tounsel, Chosen Peoples, 92–93; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 138.94. Ibid., 104–105; Ibid., 133.95. Tanner and Tubiana, Divided They Fall, 31–36.96. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 14–20.97. Ibid., 26–31; Tubiana and Gramizzi, Tubu Trouble, 19.98. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 132–34; Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 12.99. Tanner and Tubiana, Divided They Fall, 17–29; Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 14–20.100. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 2.101. Tubiana and Gramizzi, Tubu Trouble, 23.102. Ibid., 19.103. Natsios, ‘Beyond Darfur’, 83.104. Debos, Living by the Gun, 2–44.105. Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390.106. Debos, Living by the Gun, 27.107. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 25–27; Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390.108. Yorbana, ‘Representations of Oil’, 65–83; Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390–91.109. Ibid., 76–78; Ibid., 391.110. Yorbana, ‘Representations of Oil’, 70–71.111. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 1–2.112. Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 391.113. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 28.114. Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390.115. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 2.116. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 14.117. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 2, 44–47.118. Gain, ‘Shifting Sentiments’, paragraphs 1–20.119. Arieff et al., Russia’s Wagner Group, 1.120. Ibid.Additional informationNotes on contributorsThomas Ameyaw-BrobbeyThomas Ameyaw-Brobbey is an Assistant Professor of International Relations, Diplomacy, and Security. His research interest is interdisciplinary, spanning international relations, security, civil conflicts and wars, human security, state-building, domestic governance institutions of developing countries, China-African public relations, and sports politics. He is a current member of the following professional societies: ISA, IPSA, ASAA, and ACPS. His recent publications appeared journals, including World Affairs, Journal of International Studies, Africa Review, National Interest, Global Policy, and Insight on Africa.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"50 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2257592","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}

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Abstract

ABSTRACTThis paper focuses on external state support for rebel movements by developing an analytical tool to explain how external support for rebels leads to civil conflict onset and intensification in the target state and how conflict reverses to the sponsoring state, engendering conflict diffusion and continuation. I present a two-fold argument that a cooperative relationship between external states and rebels triggers the remote causes of civil conflict, translating latent grievances into manifest conflict in the target state. Further, the resulting conflict has a boomerang effect. It has the potential to reverse to the sponsoring state. I do this by using a case studies method – cooperative relationships of governments of Sudan and Chad with each other’s rebels vis-à-vis Sudan Civil War (2000–2005) and Chad Civil War (2005–2010) – to provide a detailed explanation of the framework and its hypotheses. The explanations I offer here may help us understand some African conflict dynamics for us to take some recent developments, for example, in the Great Lakes, more seriously.KEYWORDS: unholy alignmentcivil war and conflictinsurgency and counterinsurgencySudan and Chadsub-Saharan Africaweak statesstate-rebel cooperationrebel sponsorship Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.Notes1. Notes.Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 4–27; Welz, ‘Omnibalancing and international interventions’, 387.2. Cilliers, ‘Violence in Africa’, 3–11.3. Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 7.4. Ibid., 13.5. Arowolo, ‘Dancing on a Knife-edge’, 6–8.6. Wegenast and Schneider, ‘Ownership Matters’, 110–18.7. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer, ‘Voting for Militants’, 3.8. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 782–94.9. Ibid.10. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 9–33; San-Akca, States in Disguise, 38–41; Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 783; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.11. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 5–13.12. International Crisis Group (ICG), Averting proxy wars, 1–3.13. Gras, ‘DRC: Why Tensions are Rising’, para. 3–5.14. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 709–44.15. Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions’, 1360–389; Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 21–24, 34–38; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 58–70.16. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 243.17. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 248–252; van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246; Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361; Terpstra, “Rebel Governance, 1143–1173.18. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 221–246.19. Schievels and Colley, ‘Explaining Rebel-State Collaboration’, 1332–1361.20. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 222, 233–237.21. Sawyer, Cunningham and Reed, ‘The Role of External Support’, 1175–1178.22. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two’, 580–81.23. Ibid., 571–72.24. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 790–92; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.25. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 712–15.26. Ibid., 709–44.27. Carter, ‘A Blessing or a Curse?’, 130.28. Klabbers, International Law, 70–73.29. Acemoglu and Robinson, Why Nations Fail, 73–90.30. Ibid.31. Ibid., 74–83, 95.32. Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence’, 377.33. Ibid.34. Ibid., 367–84; Lucas, Appel and Prorok, ‘Not Too Distant’, 497–523.35. Abdullah and Rashid, ‘Rebel Movements’, 169–93; Beevers, Peacebuilding and natural resource, 67–76.36. Agbu, West Africa’s Trouble Spots, 21–28.37. Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence’, 377–80.38. Strüver, ‘China’s Partnership Diplomacy’, 35–37; Wilkins, ‘“Alignment”, Not “Alliance”’, 59–62.39. Wilkins, ‘“Alignment”, Not “Alliance”’, 53–76.40. Allen, ‘Warfare, Endemic Violence’, 377–80; Walter, ‘Why Bad Governance’, 1243–49; Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War, 58–90, 94–116.41. Walsh et al., ‘Funding Rebellion’, 699–707.42. Ibid.; Beevers, Peacebuilding and natural resource, 67–76, 125–132.43. Abdullah and Rashid, ‘Rebel Movements’, 180–89.44. Ibid., 188.45. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.46. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, 4–15.47. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 21–46.48. Staniland, ‘States, Insurgents, and Wartime’, 246–47.49. Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 3.50. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 58–70.51. Cunningham, Huang, and Sawyer, ‘Voting for Militants’, 81–107.52. Glawion and Le Noan, ‘Rebel governance or governance in rebel territory’, 24–51.53. Ibid., 25, 37–41.54. Hyyppä, “Council in war, 52–80.55. Ibid., 53, 60–65.56. Arjona, ‘Wartime Institutions’, 1375.57. Loyle et al., ‘New Directions in Rebel Governance’, 6; Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 25.58. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 25.59. Waterman, ‘The shadow of “the boys”’, 279–304.60. Ibid., 280, 286–295.61. Kasfir, ‘Rebel Governance’, 24–5.62. Ibid., 25.63. Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly, Rebel Governance, 25.64. Gerring, Case Study Research, 65.65. Bakken and Rustad, ‘Conflict Trends in Africa’, 7.66. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 635–36.67. Walsh et al., ‘Funding Rebellion’, 699–707.68. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 785–86.69. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 105–106.70. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 636.71. Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, ‘It Takes Two’, 572–74.72. Ghatak, ‘The Role of Political Exclusion’, 87–89; Hendrix, ‘Measuring State Capacity’, 273–74.73. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 638.74. Fortna, Lotito and Rubin, ‘Don’t Bite the Hand’, 786.75. Ibid., 790–92; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 633–61.76. Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’, 507.77. Hendrix, ‘Measuring State Capacity’, 273.78. Fearon and Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency’, 80.79. Byman and Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction?’, 9–10; Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’, 505–506; Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 641.80. van Baalen and Terpstra, ‘Behind enemy lines’, 224.81. Reno, Warfare in Independent Africa, 13–15.82. Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood, ‘External Rebel Sponsorship’, 638.83. Salehyan, Gleditsch, and Cunningham, ‘Explaining External Support’, 712.84. Byman and Kreps, ‘Agents of Destruction?’, 2–4; Salehyan, ‘The Delegation of War’, 505–507.85. Byman et al., Trends in Outside Support, 23.86. Tounsel, Chosen Peoples, 92.87. Ibid.88. Ayers, ‘Sudan’s Uncivil War’, 161.89. Natsios, ‘Beyond Darfur’, 82.90. Ayers, ‘Sudan’s Uncivil War’, 166–67.91. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 133.92. Ibid., 132–34; Tounsel, Chosen Peoples, 91.93. Tounsel, Chosen Peoples, 92–93; Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 138.94. Ibid., 104–105; Ibid., 133.95. Tanner and Tubiana, Divided They Fall, 31–36.96. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 14–20.97. Ibid., 26–31; Tubiana and Gramizzi, Tubu Trouble, 19.98. Mampilly, Rebel Rulers, 132–34; Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 12.99. Tanner and Tubiana, Divided They Fall, 17–29; Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 14–20.100. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 2.101. Tubiana and Gramizzi, Tubu Trouble, 23.102. Ibid., 19.103. Natsios, ‘Beyond Darfur’, 83.104. Debos, Living by the Gun, 2–44.105. Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390.106. Debos, Living by the Gun, 27.107. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 25–27; Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390.108. Yorbana, ‘Representations of Oil’, 65–83; Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390–91.109. Ibid., 76–78; Ibid., 391.110. Yorbana, ‘Representations of Oil’, 70–71.111. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 1–2.112. Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 391.113. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 28.114. Welz, “Omnibalancing and International Interventions, 390.115. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 2.116. Tubiana, The Chad-Sudan Proxy War, 14.117. Thomas-Jensen, Nasty neighbors, 2, 44–47.118. Gain, ‘Shifting Sentiments’, paragraphs 1–20.119. Arieff et al., Russia’s Wagner Group, 1.120. Ibid.Additional informationNotes on contributorsThomas Ameyaw-BrobbeyThomas Ameyaw-Brobbey is an Assistant Professor of International Relations, Diplomacy, and Security. His research interest is interdisciplinary, spanning international relations, security, civil conflicts and wars, human security, state-building, domestic governance institutions of developing countries, China-African public relations, and sports politics. He is a current member of the following professional societies: ISA, IPSA, ASAA, and ACPS. His recent publications appeared journals, including World Affairs, Journal of International Studies, Africa Review, National Interest, Global Policy, and Insight on Africa.

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邪恶的结盟和自讨苦吃的国内冲突:考察冲突如何通过外部国家对叛军的支持而引发冲突

摘要本文关注外部国家对叛乱运动的支持，通过开发一种分析工具来解释外部支持如何导致目标国内部冲突的爆发和加剧，以及冲突如何反向到赞助国，从而导致冲突的扩散和持续。我提出了一个双重论点，即外部国家和叛军之间的合作关系触发了国内冲突的远程原因，将潜在的不满转化为目标国家的明显冲突。此外，由此产生的冲突具有自食其果的效果。它有可能逆转到发起国。我通过使用案例研究方法——苏丹和乍得政府与彼此的叛军在-à-vis苏丹内战(2000-2005)和乍得内战(2005-2010)中的合作关系——来提供框架及其假设的详细解释。我在这里提供的解释可能有助于我们了解非洲的一些冲突动态，以便我们更认真地对待最近的一些事态发展，例如在大湖区。关键词:邪恶联盟;内战与冲突;叛乱与反叛乱;苏丹与乍得;撒哈拉以南非洲;笔记。Bakken和Rustad，“非洲的冲突趋势”，第4-27页;Welz，“全面平衡与国际干预”，387.2。《非洲的暴力》，第3-11.3页。Bakken和Rustad，“非洲的冲突趋势”，第7.4页。如上,13.5。Arowolo，《在刀刃上跳舞》，6-8.6。Wegenast和Schneider，“所有权问题”，110-18.7。Cunningham, Huang和Sawyer，“为激进分子投票”，第3.8页。Byman等人，《外部支持趋势》，9-33;Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood，“外部叛军赞助”，633-61页;Fortna, Lotito和Rubin， ' Don ' t Bite the Hand '， 782-94.9。Ibid.10。Byman等人，《外部支持趋势》，9-33;圣阿卡，伪装的国家，38-41;Fortna, Lotito和Rubin， ' Don ' t Bite the Hand '， 783;Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood，“外部叛军赞助”，633-61.11。格拉斯，《刚果民主共和国:为什么紧张局势正在加剧》，第2段。5 - 13.12。国际危机组织(ICG)，避免代理战争，1-3.13。格拉斯，《刚果民主共和国:为什么紧张局势正在加剧》，第2段。3 - 5.14。Salehyan, Gleditsch和Cunningham，“解释外部支持”，709-44.15。Arjona，“战时机构”，1360-389;Arjona, Kasfir, and Mampilly，叛军治理，21-24,34-38;《反叛的统治者》，58-70.16页。斯坦兰，《国家、叛乱分子和战时》，243.17。斯坦兰，《国家、起义者和战时》，248-252页;范巴伦和特普斯特拉，《敌后》，221-246页;Schievels and Colley，“解释叛军与国家的合作”，1332-1361;Terpstra， <叛军治理>，1143-1173.18。范巴伦和特普斯特拉，“敌后”，221-246.19。Schievels and Colley，“解释叛军与国家的合作”，1332-1361.20。范巴伦和特普斯特拉，“敌后”，222,233-237.21。索耶，坎宁安和里德，“外部支持的作用”，1175-1178.22。Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan， ' It Takes Two '， 580-81.23。出处同上,571 - 72.24。Fortna, Lotito和Rubin， ' Don ' t Bite the Hand '， 790-92;Salehyan, Siroky, and Wood，“外部叛军赞助”，633-61.25。Salehyan, Gleditsch和Cunningham，“解释外部支持”，712-15.26。出处同上,709 - 44.27。《是福还是祸?》”,130.28。克拉伯斯，国际法，70-73.29。阿西莫格鲁和罗宾逊，《国家为什么失败》，73-90.30页。Ibid.31。同上，74-83,95.32。艾伦，《战争，地方性暴力》，377.33。Ibid.34。出处同上,367 - 84;Lucas, Appel和prorook， ' Not Too Distant '， 497-523.35。阿卜杜拉和拉希德，《反叛运动》，169-93;比弗斯，建设和平与自然资源，67-76.36。阿布，西非的动乱地区，21-28.37。艾伦，《战争，地方性暴力》，377-80.38页。strinver，《中国的伙伴外交》，第35-37页;威尔金斯，“结盟”，而不是“联盟”，59-62.39。威尔金斯，“结盟”，而不是“联盟”，53-76.40。艾伦，《战争，地方性暴力》，377-80页;沃尔特，《为什么治理不好》，1243-49;《不平等、不满与内战》，第58-90期，第94-116.41页。Walsh等人，《Funding Rebellion》，699-707.42。同前。建设和平与自然资源，67-76,125-132.43。阿卜杜拉和拉希德，《反叛运动》，180-89.44页。如上,188.45。Salehyan, Siroky和Wood，“外部叛军赞助”，633-61.46。《独立非洲的战争》，第4-15.47页。Kasfir，“叛军治理”，21-46.48页。斯坦兰，《国家、叛乱分子和战时》，246-47.49页。Arjona, Kasfir和Mampilly，叛军治理，3.50。《反叛的统治者》，58-70.51页。Cunningham, Huang和Sawyer，“为激进分子投票”，81-107.52。Glawion和Le Noan，“叛军治理或叛军领土内的治理”，24-51.53。同上，25,37-41.54。Hyyppä，“战争委员会，52-80.55。同上，53,60-65.56。Arjona，“战时机构”，1375.57。Loyle等人。

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来源期刊

Small Wars and Insurgencies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-

CiteScore

1.90

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25.00%

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