Shared Auditors in Private Lending

IF 1.3 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Petya Platikanova, Kazbi Soonawalla
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We examine whether borrowers who share the same auditor with a syndicate lender (i.e., shared auditors) have improved access to the syndicate loan market. We predict and find evidence that shared auditors reduce information asymmetries between lenders and borrowers as well as between lenders in a syndicate. We also find that borrowers who share auditors with lenders obtain better price and non-price terms compared with those without. Our empirical evidence also suggests that when borrowers and lenders share auditors, syndicates are less concentrated and more diverse, consistent with the prediction that shared auditors provide informational benefits on the syndicate market. Loan facilities with shared auditors are also more likely to be renegotiated with more favorable terms for borrowers. Taken together, our findings suggest that shared auditors contribute to the efficient functioning of debt markets by reducing the information asymmetries in debt contracting. JEL Classifications: M42, M41, G32, O16
私人借贷的共同审计师
我们研究了与银团贷款人(即共享审计师)共享同一审计师的借款人是否改善了进入银团贷款市场的机会。我们预测并发现证据表明,共享审计师减少了贷方和借款人之间以及辛迪加贷方之间的信息不对称。我们还发现,与贷方共享审计师的借款人比没有审计师的借款人获得更好的价格和非价格条款。我们的经验证据还表明,当借款人和贷款人共享审计师时,辛迪加的集中度降低,多样性增加,这与共享审计师为辛迪加市场提供信息效益的预测相一致。有共同审计师的贷款安排也更有可能以对借款人更有利的条款重新谈判。综上所述,我们的研究结果表明,共享审计师通过减少债务合同中的信息不对称,有助于债务市场的有效运作。JEL分类:M42, M41, G32, O16
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来源期刊
CiteScore
4.20
自引率
7.10%
发文量
27
期刊介绍: The Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance (JAAF) is committed to publishing high quality studies in accounting and related fields. Papers on accounting issues relating to developing in other fields such as finance, economics, and operations are also welcome. Empirical, analytical and experimental works of all varieties and paradigms, normative as well as positive, will be considered, provided they significantly contribute to the advancement of our knowledge in accounting. Manuscripts submitted should contain original unpublished research and should not be under consideration for possible publication elsewhere.
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