Common enemies? Coups, insurgent strength and intra-elite competition: evidence from Latin America

IF 3.7 1区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Guillermo Kreiman
{"title":"Common enemies? Coups, insurgent strength and intra-elite competition: evidence from Latin America","authors":"Guillermo Kreiman","doi":"10.1080/13510347.2023.2268007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTWhat is the relation between coups d’etat and civil wars? While a wide set of studies have traced the determinants of internal armed conflicts and coup attempts, the interplay between these contentious processes remains unexplored. Building on different strands of research, this article seeks to explain why, and under what conditions, some regimes experience coup attempts in the midst of civil wars while others do not. Concretely, I posit that coup attempts during internal armed conflicts are more likely to occur when two conditions converge: when insurgents reach a medium-level of strength in situations of intra-elite competition. Key military forces, elite outsiders and coalition insiders interpret this situation as a unique opportunity for changes in the distribution of power and potentially coalesce through the formation of alternative regime coalitions. This argument is tested with a novel dataset on 90 Latin American revolutionary socialist insurgencies active since 1950 and a qualitative case study of the dynamics leading to the 1976 coup d’etat in Argentina, with results supporting the theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to a more detailed understanding of the relation between coups and civil wars, opening the way for further studies on this burgeoning area of research.KEYWORDS: Civil warscoupsinsurgencyelitesLatin America AcknowledgementsI am grateful to Stathis Kalyvas, Andrea Ruggeri, Luis de la Calle, Benoit Siberdt, Luis Schenoni, Joaquín Artés, Klaudia Wegschaider, Raquel Chantó, Sandra León, Inés Pina, members of the T.E. Lawrence Program on the Study of Conflict, and participants in the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, the Conflict and Change Workshop at UCL, the Council for European Studies Annual Conference and the Carlos III Juan March Institute Conference for their feedback. I also thank the editor of Democratization and two anonymous reviewers.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes.”2 Roessler, Ethnic Politics.3 Wood, Forging Democracy from Below.4 Johnson and Thyne, “Squeaky Wheels.”5 Casper and Tyson, “Popular Protest and Elite Coordination.”6 Slater, Ordering Power.7 Paine, “The Dictator's Power-Sharing Dilemma.”8 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.9 Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic origins.10 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, 15.11 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 7.12 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 51. The concept of selectorate is defined as “the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government´s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government´s leadership” (Ibid., 42).13 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 6.14 The concept of ruling coalition reflects the agreement between the incumbent and the actors that endow it with political power, the winning coalition.15 The core actors that form the winning coalition are coalition insiders and key military players.16 Albertus, Autocracy and Redistribution, 33.17 Heger and Salehyan, “Ruthless Rulers,” 387.18 Kim and Sudduth, “Political Institutions and Coups,” 7.19 Staniland, Networks of Rebellion, 5.20 See Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich, “Explaining Military Coups.”21 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, 10–13.22 Slater, Ordering Power.23 Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting.”24 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, 13.25 Future studies should deepen into the impact on this relation of size of the winning coalition. See Table A30 in the Appendix.26 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, 11.27 Singh, Seizing Power.28 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes,” 1435–7.29 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 8.30 Though insurgent strength is certainly a linear variable, I distinguish between three ideal categories. See Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, “Non-State Actors.”31 Lewis, How Insurgency Begins.32 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.33 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 125–9.34 Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence.35 Wood, Insurgent Collective Action.36 Roessler, Ethnic Politics; Sudduth, “Coup-Proofing.”37 Casper and Tyson, “Popular Protest and Elite Coordination.”38 Lewis, How Insurgency Begins.39 Arjona, Rebelocracy.40 Leventoglu and Metternich, “Born Weak, Growing Strong.”41 Two mechanisms could explain elite convergence: the instrumental exploitation of the presence of a subversive force; and the fear of successful revolution.42 Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting,” 1019.43 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes,”1436.44 Nilsson, “Turning Weakness into Strength”; Clayton, “Relative Rebel Strength.”45 Wood, Forging Democracy From Below.46 Leventoglu and Metternich, “Born Weak, Growing Strong.”47 An alternative mechanism could be that coup plotters face a credible threat of countercoups by insurgents and other forces.48 Balcells and Kalyvas, Revolution in Civil War, 5.49 Among others, the Center for Systemic Peace dataset on coups d’etat (Marshall and Marshall, Coup D’état Events), the database on Latin American coups from Lehoucq and Pérez Liñán (“Breaking Out of the Coup Trap”) or the Dataset on Global Instances of Coups (Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups”).50 Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups,” 252.51 This is similar to the percentage of coups during civil war found in prior studies.52 Albertus, Autocracy and Redistribution.53 Ibid., 148–9.54 See Subsection C3 in the Appendix.55 Wood, Forging Democracy from Below.56 Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, “It Takes Two.”57 Clayton, “Relative Rebel Strength.”58 Leventoglu and Metternich, “Born Weak, Growing Strong.”59 Holtermann, “Relative Capacity.”60 Kreiman 2023.61 Clayton, “Relative Strength,” 611.62 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes,”1442.63 Maddison Project Database.64 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency.”65 Ibid.66 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation; Roessler, Ethnic Politics.67 Leventoglu & Metternich, “Born Weak, Growing Strong”; Paine, “The Dictator's Power-Sharing Dilemma.”68 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes.”69 Stanley, The Protection Racket State.70 Romero, Breve historia contemporánea de la Argentina.71 Gudat, La insurrección anhelada.72 Data comes from the Banks CNTS Dataset.73 Gläßel, González, and Scharpf, “Grist to the Mill of Subversion.”74 Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting”; Johnson and Thyne, “Squeaky Wheels.”75 Table A29 of the Appendix shows an analysis of the determinants of coups in non-war periods.76 Stanley, The Protection Racket State, 148–9.77 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, 10–11.78 This complements the theory of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, specifying how and under what conditions the level of threat of the activation of the popular sector could lead to the implementation of a bureaucratic-authoritarian state (O´Donnell, “Reflections”).79 The other rebel forces active were either short-lived or absorbed by these groups.80 Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol, 90.81 Alianza Anticomunista Argentina.82 de Riz, 54.83 This polarization had a direct impact on the preferences of civilians.84 Verbitsky and Bohoslavsky, The Economic Accomplices.85 This also includes actors as the Church.86 APEGE, “Declaración de la APEGE”; Cited in Wermus, 231.87 Schorr, “Industrial Economic Power,” 237–9.88 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 124.89 Ibid., 124.90 Franco, Un enemigo para la nación, 144.91 Muleiro, 1976: El golpe civil, 21.92 Romero, Breve historia contemporánea de la Argentina, 21.93 Schorr, “Industrial Economic Power,” 235.94 Rapoport and Zaiat, “The Complicity of Agricultural Business Chambers.”Additional informationNotes on contributorsGuillermo KreimanGuillermo Kreiman postdoctoral researcher at Carlos III University (Madrid), works on political violence, political philosophy and comparative political economy. He has published, or will publish soon, articles in journals such as Latin American Politics and Society, the Journal of Peace Research, or Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, among others. He holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Oxford.","PeriodicalId":47953,"journal":{"name":"Democratization","volume":"51 12","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":3.7000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Democratization","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2023.2268007","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACTWhat is the relation between coups d’etat and civil wars? While a wide set of studies have traced the determinants of internal armed conflicts and coup attempts, the interplay between these contentious processes remains unexplored. Building on different strands of research, this article seeks to explain why, and under what conditions, some regimes experience coup attempts in the midst of civil wars while others do not. Concretely, I posit that coup attempts during internal armed conflicts are more likely to occur when two conditions converge: when insurgents reach a medium-level of strength in situations of intra-elite competition. Key military forces, elite outsiders and coalition insiders interpret this situation as a unique opportunity for changes in the distribution of power and potentially coalesce through the formation of alternative regime coalitions. This argument is tested with a novel dataset on 90 Latin American revolutionary socialist insurgencies active since 1950 and a qualitative case study of the dynamics leading to the 1976 coup d’etat in Argentina, with results supporting the theoretical expectations. These findings contribute to a more detailed understanding of the relation between coups and civil wars, opening the way for further studies on this burgeoning area of research.KEYWORDS: Civil warscoupsinsurgencyelitesLatin America AcknowledgementsI am grateful to Stathis Kalyvas, Andrea Ruggeri, Luis de la Calle, Benoit Siberdt, Luis Schenoni, Joaquín Artés, Klaudia Wegschaider, Raquel Chantó, Sandra León, Inés Pina, members of the T.E. Lawrence Program on the Study of Conflict, and participants in the Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conference, the Conflict and Change Workshop at UCL, the Council for European Studies Annual Conference and the Carlos III Juan March Institute Conference for their feedback. I also thank the editor of Democratization and two anonymous reviewers.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes.”2 Roessler, Ethnic Politics.3 Wood, Forging Democracy from Below.4 Johnson and Thyne, “Squeaky Wheels.”5 Casper and Tyson, “Popular Protest and Elite Coordination.”6 Slater, Ordering Power.7 Paine, “The Dictator's Power-Sharing Dilemma.”8 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival.9 Boix, Democracy and Redistribution; Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic origins.10 Acemoglu and Robinson, Economic Origins, 15.11 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 7.12 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 51. The concept of selectorate is defined as “the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government´s leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government´s leadership” (Ibid., 42).13 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 6.14 The concept of ruling coalition reflects the agreement between the incumbent and the actors that endow it with political power, the winning coalition.15 The core actors that form the winning coalition are coalition insiders and key military players.16 Albertus, Autocracy and Redistribution, 33.17 Heger and Salehyan, “Ruthless Rulers,” 387.18 Kim and Sudduth, “Political Institutions and Coups,” 7.19 Staniland, Networks of Rebellion, 5.20 See Pérez-Liñán and Polga-Hecimovich, “Explaining Military Coups.”21 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, 10–13.22 Slater, Ordering Power.23 Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting.”24 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, 13.25 Future studies should deepen into the impact on this relation of size of the winning coalition. See Table A30 in the Appendix.26 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, 11.27 Singh, Seizing Power.28 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes,” 1435–7.29 de Mesquita et al., The Logic of Political Survival, 8.30 Though insurgent strength is certainly a linear variable, I distinguish between three ideal categories. See Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, “Non-State Actors.”31 Lewis, How Insurgency Begins.32 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule.33 Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, 125–9.34 Della Porta, Social Movements, Political Violence.35 Wood, Insurgent Collective Action.36 Roessler, Ethnic Politics; Sudduth, “Coup-Proofing.”37 Casper and Tyson, “Popular Protest and Elite Coordination.”38 Lewis, How Insurgency Begins.39 Arjona, Rebelocracy.40 Leventoglu and Metternich, “Born Weak, Growing Strong.”41 Two mechanisms could explain elite convergence: the instrumental exploitation of the presence of a subversive force; and the fear of successful revolution.42 Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting,” 1019.43 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes,”1436.44 Nilsson, “Turning Weakness into Strength”; Clayton, “Relative Rebel Strength.”45 Wood, Forging Democracy From Below.46 Leventoglu and Metternich, “Born Weak, Growing Strong.”47 An alternative mechanism could be that coup plotters face a credible threat of countercoups by insurgents and other forces.48 Balcells and Kalyvas, Revolution in Civil War, 5.49 Among others, the Center for Systemic Peace dataset on coups d’etat (Marshall and Marshall, Coup D’état Events), the database on Latin American coups from Lehoucq and Pérez Liñán (“Breaking Out of the Coup Trap”) or the Dataset on Global Instances of Coups (Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups”).50 Powell and Thyne, “Global Instances of Coups,” 252.51 This is similar to the percentage of coups during civil war found in prior studies.52 Albertus, Autocracy and Redistribution.53 Ibid., 148–9.54 See Subsection C3 in the Appendix.55 Wood, Forging Democracy from Below.56 Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan, “It Takes Two.”57 Clayton, “Relative Rebel Strength.”58 Leventoglu and Metternich, “Born Weak, Growing Strong.”59 Holtermann, “Relative Capacity.”60 Kreiman 2023.61 Clayton, “Relative Strength,” 611.62 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes,”1442.63 Maddison Project Database.64 Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency.”65 Ibid.66 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation; Roessler, Ethnic Politics.67 Leventoglu & Metternich, “Born Weak, Growing Strong”; Paine, “The Dictator's Power-Sharing Dilemma.”68 Bell and Sudduth, “Causes and Outcomes.”69 Stanley, The Protection Racket State.70 Romero, Breve historia contemporánea de la Argentina.71 Gudat, La insurrección anhelada.72 Data comes from the Banks CNTS Dataset.73 Gläßel, González, and Scharpf, “Grist to the Mill of Subversion.”74 Powell, “Determinants of the Attempting”; Johnson and Thyne, “Squeaky Wheels.”75 Table A29 of the Appendix shows an analysis of the determinants of coups in non-war periods.76 Stanley, The Protection Racket State, 148–9.77 Higley and Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation, 10–11.78 This complements the theory of bureaucratic-authoritarianism, specifying how and under what conditions the level of threat of the activation of the popular sector could lead to the implementation of a bureaucratic-authoritarian state (O´Donnell, “Reflections”).79 The other rebel forces active were either short-lived or absorbed by these groups.80 Moyano, Argentina’s Lost Patrol, 90.81 Alianza Anticomunista Argentina.82 de Riz, 54.83 This polarization had a direct impact on the preferences of civilians.84 Verbitsky and Bohoslavsky, The Economic Accomplices.85 This also includes actors as the Church.86 APEGE, “Declaración de la APEGE”; Cited in Wermus, 231.87 Schorr, “Industrial Economic Power,” 237–9.88 Lewis, Guerrillas and Generals, 124.89 Ibid., 124.90 Franco, Un enemigo para la nación, 144.91 Muleiro, 1976: El golpe civil, 21.92 Romero, Breve historia contemporánea de la Argentina, 21.93 Schorr, “Industrial Economic Power,” 235.94 Rapoport and Zaiat, “The Complicity of Agricultural Business Chambers.”Additional informationNotes on contributorsGuillermo KreimanGuillermo Kreiman postdoctoral researcher at Carlos III University (Madrid), works on political violence, political philosophy and comparative political economy. He has published, or will publish soon, articles in journals such as Latin American Politics and Society, the Journal of Peace Research, or Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, among others. He holds a PhD in Politics from the University of Oxford.
共同的敌人?政变、叛乱力量和精英内部竞争:来自拉丁美洲的证据
摘要政变与内战的关系是什么?虽然一系列广泛的研究追踪了国内武装冲突和政变企图的决定因素,但这些有争议的过程之间的相互作用仍未得到探索。基于不同的研究线索,本文试图解释为什么以及在什么条件下,一些政权在内战中经历了政变企图,而另一些政权则没有。具体地说,我认为当两个条件汇合时,内部武装冲突中的政变企图更有可能发生:当叛乱分子在精英内部竞争的情况下达到中等水平时。关键的军事力量、外部精英和联盟内部人士将这种情况解读为改变权力分配的独特机会,并有可能通过形成替代政权联盟而联合起来。这一论点通过一个新颖的数据集进行了检验,该数据集包含了自1950年以来活跃的90个拉丁美洲革命社会主义叛乱,并对导致1976年阿根廷政变的动态进行了定性案例研究,结果支持了理论预期。这些发现有助于更详细地了解政变与内战之间的关系,为这一新兴研究领域的进一步研究开辟了道路。关键词:致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢致谢欧洲研究委员会年会和卡洛斯三世胡安马奇研究所会议的反馈意见。我还要感谢民主化杂志的编辑和两位匿名审稿人。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。注1:Bell and Sudduth,《原因与结果》。2罗斯勒,《民族政治》,3伍德,《自下而上锻造民主》,4约翰逊和泰恩,《吱吱作响的车轮》。5卡斯珀和泰森,大众抗议和精英协调。6 .斯莱特,《权力秩序》。7 .潘恩,《独裁者的权力分享困境》。8 de Mesquita et al.,《政治生存的逻辑》,《民主与再分配》;阿塞莫格鲁和罗宾逊,《经济起源》10阿西莫格鲁和罗宾逊,《经济起源》,15.11 de Mesquita等人,《政治生存的逻辑》,7.12 de Mesquita等人,《政治生存的逻辑》,51。选择群体的概念被定义为“一群人,他们的禀赋包括选择政府领导的制度所要求的品质或特征,并且是获得政府领导发放的私人福利所必需的”(同上,42)执政联盟的概念反映了现任者和行动者之间的协议,这些协议赋予了它政治权力,即获胜的联盟组成获胜联盟的核心角色是联盟内部人士和关键的军事参与者阿尔伯图斯,专制和再分配,33.17 Heger和Salehyan,“无情的统治者”,387.18 Kim和Sudduth,“政治制度和政变”,7.19 Staniland,“叛乱网络”,5.20参见Pérez-Liñán和Polga-Hecimovich,“解释军事政变”。21 Higley和Gunther,精英与民主巩固,10-13.22 Slater,秩序权力。23 Powell,“尝试的决定因素”。24 Higley和Gunther,精英与民主巩固,13.25未来的研究应该深入研究获胜联盟规模对这种关系的影响。见附录中的表A30。26 Higley和Gunther,精英和民主巩固,11.27 Singh,夺取权力。28 Bell和Sudduth,“原因和结果”,1435-7.29 de Mesquita等人,政治生存的逻辑,8.30虽然叛乱力量肯定是一个线性变量,但我区分了三种理想类别。参见Cunningham, Gleditsch和Salehyan的《非国家行为体》。31刘易斯:《叛乱是如何开始的》,32斯沃利克:《威权统治的政治》,33斯沃利克:《威权统治的政治》,125-9.34德拉·门塔:《社会运动与政治暴力》,35伍德:《叛乱的集体行动》,36罗斯勒:《民族政治》;Coup-Proofing Sudduth。”《卡斯珀和泰森》,大众抗议和精英协调。38刘易斯:《叛乱是如何开始的》;39阿尔乔纳:《反叛政治》;40列文托格鲁和梅特涅:《生来软弱,成长为强者》。有两种机制可以解释精英趋同:对存在的颠覆力量的工具性利用;以及对革命成功的恐惧Powell,“尝试的决定因素”,1019.43 Bell和Sudduth,“原因和结果”,1436.44 Nilsson,“将弱点转化为力量”;克莱顿,《相对反抗力量》。45伍德,《自下而上锻造民主》。 46列文托格鲁和梅特涅,《生来软弱,成长为强者》。“47另一种机制可能是,政变策划者面临叛乱分子和其他力量发动反政变的可信威胁其中,关于政变的系统和平中心数据集(马歇尔和马歇尔,Coup d’acimtat Events),来自Lehoucq和pacimrez的拉丁美洲政变数据库Liñán(“打破政变陷阱”)或全球政变实例数据集(鲍威尔和Thyne,“全球政变实例”)。50Powell和thne,“政变的全球实例”,252.51这与先前研究中发现的内战期间政变的百分比相似55 Wood:《从底层锻造民主》。56 Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan:《需要两个人》。57克莱顿,《相对反抗力量》。58列文托格鲁和梅特涅,《生来软弱,成长为坚强》。59 Holtermann,《相对能力》。60克莱曼2023.61克莱顿,“相对实力”,611.62贝尔和Sudduth,“原因和结果”,1442.63麦迪逊项目数据库。64费伦和拉丁,“种族,叛乱。”65同上,66 Higley和Gunther:《精英与民主巩固》;Leventoglu & Metternich,《生来软弱,成长为坚强》;潘恩,《独裁者的权力分享困境》。68 Bell and Sudduth, <原因与结果>。69 Stanley,保护费国家。70 Romero, Breve history contemporánea de la Argentina.71 Gudat, la insurrección anhelada.72数据来自Banks cnt Dataset.73 Gläßel、González和Scharpf的《颠覆磨坊的谷物》。鲍威尔:《尝试的决定因素》;约翰逊和泰恩,《吱吱作响的车轮》。“75附录表A29显示了对非战争时期政变决定因素的分析Stanley,《保护费国家》,148-9.77 Higley和Gunther,《精英与民主巩固》,10-11.78这是对官僚-威权主义理论的补充,详细说明了大众部门激活的威胁程度如何以及在什么条件下可能导致官僚-威权主义国家的实施(O ' Donnell,“反思”)79其他活跃的反叛力量不是短命的就是被这些集团吸收了Moyano,阿根廷迷失的巡逻队,90.81阿根廷反共产主义联盟,82 de Riz, 54.83这种两极分化对平民的偏好有直接的影响韦尔比斯基和波霍斯拉夫斯基,《经济共犯》85这也包括演员,如教会86 APEGE " Declaración de la APEGE ";引用于Wermus, 231.87 Schorr,“工业经济力量”,237-9.88 Lewis,游击队和将军,124.89同上,124.90 Franco, unenemigo para la nación, 144.91 Muleiro, 1976: El golpe civil, 21.92 Romero, Breve historia contemporánea de la Argentina, 21.93 Schorr,“工业经济力量”,235.94 Rapoport和Zaiat,“农业商会的共谋”。guillermo Kreiman是卡洛斯三世大学(马德里)的博士后研究员,研究政治暴力、政治哲学和比较政治经济学。他已经或即将在《拉丁美洲政治与社会》、《和平研究杂志》、《冲突与恐怖主义研究》等杂志上发表文章。他拥有牛津大学政治学博士学位。
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来源期刊
Democratization
Democratization POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
6.40
自引率
12.50%
发文量
73
期刊介绍: Democratization aims to promote a better understanding of democratization - defined as the way democratic norms, institutions and practices evolve and are disseminated both within and across national and cultural boundaries. While the focus is on democratization viewed as a process, the journal also builds on the enduring interest in democracy itself and its analysis. The emphasis is contemporary and the approach comparative, with the publication of scholarly contributions about those areas where democratization is currently attracting considerable attention world-wide.
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