Rwanda’s War in Mozambique: Road-Testing a Kigali Principles approach to counterinsurgency?

IF 0.9 Q3 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Ralph Shield
{"title":"Rwanda’s War in Mozambique: Road-Testing a Kigali Principles approach to counterinsurgency?","authors":"Ralph Shield","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTRwandan military behavior in Mozambique operationalizes Kigali’s rhetorical commitment to aggressively defend endangered civilians. The counterinsurgency doctrine applied in Cabo Delgado balances insurgent pursuit and civilian protection through a combination of contact patrolling and tactical restraint. This formula demonstrates learning from the country’s past experience with domestic rebellion and international peacekeeping but contrasts sharply with Rwandan army conduct in eastern Congo. The disparity suggests Rwandan battlefield demeanor is conditioned by institutional culture and role conception. The campaign underscores the influence of ideology on Rwandan soldiers' self-understanding and complicates the equivalence of nondemocratic regime type with repressive strategies of counterinsurgency.KEYWORDS: Rwandacounterinsurgencypeacekeepingcivilian protectionMozambique AcknowledgmentsThe author thanks Rick Orth, Emilia Columbo, Marco Jowell, Brittany Hall, and Tertius Jacobs for sharing insights, comments, and feedback that informed and improved this article. The author is also indebted to Focus Group intelligence-driven risk management company for granting complimentary access to subscription products related to the Cabo Delgado crisis on a research exchange basis.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400Notes1. Kisangani and Pickering, African Interventions, 4–5, 8–11; Bode and Karlsrud, ‘Implementation in Practice’, 465; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 1–2, 11–3.2. Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 12, 156; Harig and Jenne, ‘Whose Rules? Whose Power?’ 662–5.3. Abiola et al ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–60.4. Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Diplomacy’.5. Cabo Ligado Monthly (abbreviated hereafter as CLM): December 2021 (21 December 2021), 6–7; CLM: March 2022 (15 April 2022), 2–46. This analysis draws heavily on insights from the Cabo Ligado conflict observatory (https://acleddata.com/cabo-ligado-mozambique-conflict-observatory/) and Focus Group risk management company (https://focusholding.net/). Focus Group reporting is cited here with express permission; referenced products remain proprietary materials subject to applicable use and disclosure restrictions.7. Keeler, Kigali Principles.8. Paul et al, ‘Moving Beyond Population-Centric’.9. Whereas Kigali seeks stability in Mozambique, CAR, and its various peacekeeping engagements, high-level regime defectors have indicated that the regime prefers a chronic but manageable modicum of disorder in eastern Congo – see Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 280–1.10. Ruffa, Military Cultures, 31–5.11. Abiola et al, ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–9; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 2.12. Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’.13. Peacekeeping Data: Fatalities, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities (accessed 9 February 2022). Fatalities include 32 in Darfur, 16 in CAR, and nine in South Sudan.14. Jenna, ‘Don’t Blame Authoritarianism’; Jones, ‘Between Pyongyang and Singapore’, 242.15. Anna, ‘Police Used “Excessive Force”’. Charbonneau and Nichols, ‘Rwandan Peacekeepers Shooting Protesters’.16. International Peace Institute (IPI), ‘Accountability System’; Nichols, ‘U.N. Reaction to Malakal Violence’; Wells, A Refuge in Flames.17. Sieff and Amur, ‘Peacekeepers Made Major Errors’; Lynch, ‘UN Peacekeepers Accused of Child Abuse, Bestiality, and Cowardice’.18. ‘The Kigali Principles’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.19. Keeler, Kigali Principles.20. The principles were not uncontroversial. See UN, ‘Opinions Divided over Protection of Civilians’.21. ‘RDF Deploys Level 2 Hospital’ The New Times; ‘RDF Completes Level Two Hospital Deployment’, IGIHE.22. Karuhanga, ‘Rwandan Special Forces’ Operation in CAR’.23. Rolland, ‘Bullets and Panic’.24. CLM: September 2021 (15 October 2021), 7.25. Shield, ‘Rwandan Military Effectiveness’.26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: The Hidden Violence’; Human Rights Watch, World Report; Rever, Praise of Blood, 131–152.27. Stearns, Glory of Monsters, 250–266.28. Jackson, Defeat in Victory.29. Bekoe et al, Extremism in Mozambique, 21–24.30. Engelhardt, ‘Democracies, Dictatorships’, 56–7; Lyall, ‘Inferior Counterinsurgents?’ 169–70; Byman, ‘’Death Solves All Problems’’, 14–7; Heuser and Shamir, ‘Universal Toolbox’, 369.31. CLM: July 2021 (16 August 2021), 1–2, 6; CLM: August 2021 (15 September 2021), 1–2, 4–5;32. The Islamic State-affiliated insurgency in Cabo Delgado initially self-identified by the name Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma but is known locally and referred to throughout this paper as al Shabaab; it should not to be confused with the al Qaeda-linked group of the same name which operates from Somalia.33. Deliberate out-of-area deployments include Niassa, Mueda, Macomia, Nangade, and Ancuabe - CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 4, 8; Cabo Ligado Weekly (CLW hereafter): 9–15 May (17 May 2022), 2; CLW: 16–22 May (24 May 2022), 2; CLM: June 2022 (15 July 2022), 5. Regarding hot-pursuit operations, see CLW: 21–27 March (30 March 2022), 1.34. As characterized by Friesendorf, Rwanda has thus been effective in reducing both negative and positive threats to the civilian population - How Western Soldiers Fight, 13.35. See CLW: 27 June − 3 July (5 July 2022), 2.36. Reports of Mozambican security force abuses, misbehavior, and self-enrichment are rife. See – ‘Nascer em Mocímboa da Praia’, Ikweli; CLM: November 2021 (15 December 2021), 6; CLM: January 2022 (18 February 2022), 7; CLW: 9–15 May (17 May 2022), 3; CLW: 23–29 May 2022 (31 May 2022), 5; CLM: July 2022 (17 August 2022), 4.37. See – CLW: 9–15 August (17 August 2021), 2; ‘Nascer em Mocímboa da Praia’, Ikweli; CLW: 28 March − 3 April 2022 (5 April 2022), 1; CLW: 4–10 April (12 April 2022), 2; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 2; 2021 Country Reports, U.S. State Department, 10.38. For positive comparisons and reflections of poor public confidence in SAMIM and FADM, see CLW: 11–17 October (19 October 2021), 2; CLM: November 2021 (15 December 2021), 7; CLW: 25 April − 8 May (10 May 2022), 2; CLM: July 2022 (17 August 2022), 4.39. CLW: 27 June − 3 July (5 July 2022), 2.40. CLM: March 2022 (15 April 2022), 6; ‘Interview with Cristóvão Artur Chume’, Chatham House, 6 April 2022.https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/04/interview-cristovao-artur-chume.41. CLM: November 2021 (15 December 2021), 2; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 4, 8; Columbo, ‘Enduring Counterterrorism Challenge’, 5; ‘Intelligence and Military Exasperated by Omnipresent Rwandan Forces in Cabo Delgado’, African Intelligence, 18 July 2023, https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2023/07/18/intelligence-and-military-exasperated-by-omnipresent-rwandan-forces-in-cabo-delgado,110004637-eve.42. Biddle, Military Power, 2–5, 17–19. Biddle’s concept was developed in relation to conventional, interstate warfare but has been usefully adapted to analysis of counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and non-state armed group military behavior – see Ruffa, Military Cultures, 19–20; Biddle, Nonstate Warfare.43. See, inter alia Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 65–66, 84; Krepinevich, Army and Vietnam, 10–15; Kilcullen, Accidental Guerilla, 136.44. Lyall and Wilson III, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, 67–106.45. Divergent views tend not to take issue with the value of contact patrolling, arguing instead that mechanization is less strictly determinative than Lyall and Wilson assert or that the relative merits of information collection and protected firepower vary with the kinetic capability of the insurgent adversary. See Smith and Toronto, ‘All the Rage’, 519–28; Caverley and Sechser, ‘Military Technology’, 704–20; Van Wie and Walden, ‘Troops or Tanks?’ 1032–58.46. Ruffa, for instance, employs vehicle-to-soldier ratios and detailed data on patrol frequency and timing – Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’, 199–225; Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’, 391–422.47. See comments by General Patrick Nyamvumba, then-Chief of Defence Staff for the RDF, during U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) panel discussion ‘Implementing the “Kigali Principles” for Peacekeeping’, 14 December 2016, https://www.usip.org/events/implementing-kigali-principles-peacekeeping. See also Matisek, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 306.48. Author review of news media still and video imagery from 9 August 2021–13 May 2022 (see Supplementary Online Material).49. Regarding RPA’s early adoption of the Toyota 4-Runner with outward-facing truck-bed seating as a standard troop carrier, see Odom, Journey, 189–190.50. Author review of news media still and video imagery from 3 January 2021–5 January 2021 (see Supplementary Online Material).51. Lamarque, Insulating the Borderland, 102, 132–134, 138–139, 145–146, 152; 218–222; Author’s personal observations, Kigali, April 2021 – February 2022.52. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 8, 11–12.53. Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’; IGIHE (@IGIHE), Twitter, 2 September 2021, 9:25 AM, https://twitter.com/igihe/status/1433420940667281410?s=11; Karuhanga, ‘Cabo Delgado: Rwandan Forces Help’; The New Times (Rwanda) (@NewTimesRwanda), Twitter, 20 October 2021, 1:57 AM, https://twitter.com/NewTimesRwanda/status/1450702733095415815; CLW: 18–24 October (26 October 2021), 2; ‘Rwanda Security Forces, Mozambican Security Organs and Residents of Palma Conduct Community Work in Palma Town, Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique’, Rwanda MoD official website, 27 November 2021, https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/rwanda-security-forces-mozambican-security-organs-and-residents-of-palma-conduct-community-work-in-palma-town-cabo-delgado-province-mozambique; IGIHE (@IGIHE), Twitter, 29 January 2022, 2:09 PM, https://twitter.com/igihe/status/1487503170247008260?s=11.54. Regarding medical care, see Mugwiza, ‘Rwandan Medics Treated 788 Patients’; Karuhanga, ‘Rwandan Medics Are Overwhelmed’; Karuhanga, ‘What Rwandan and Mozambican Forces Are Doing’. With respect to dynamic activities, see CLW: 16–22 May (24 May 2022), 3–4; ‘Mocimboa da Praia Residents Return’, DefenceWeb.55. Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’; Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’; Friesendorf, How Western Soldiers Fight; Day et al, Assessing the Effectiveness, 18–9, 70–1.56. Comments by Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean, before European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 26 January 2022, https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/subcommittee-on-security-and-defence_20220126–1345-COMMITTEE-SEDE; CLW: 27 September − 3 October 2021 (5 October 2021), 1; CLM: January 2022 (18 February 2022), 3–5; CLW: 14–20 February 2022 (23 February 2022), 2–3; CLM: February 2022 (17 March 2022), 2; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 5–6; CLW: 13–19 June (22 June 2022), 2.57. Regarding SAMIM troop limits, resource shortfalls, and morale problems, see CLM: September 2021 (15 October 2021), 7; Focus Group Weekly (abbreviated hereafter as FGW), Issue 396, 15 December 2021–19 January 2022; ‘SAMIM Seemingly Going Nowhere’, DefenceWeb. Charles Onyango-Obbo has suggested that the Tanzanian army’s lackluster performance is politically motivated; Fernando Lima suggests the same regarding SAMIM as a whole – see Onyango-Obbo, ‘In Mozambique’s War’; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 8–9. This seems unlikely, however, in light of the adverse impacts Tanzania and other contributors could incur as spillover effects from a worsening insurgency – see comments by Emilia Columbo in The Red Line podcast ‘Mozambique: The Campaign Against Cabo Delgado’, episode 80, October 17, 2022, https://www.theredlinepodcast.com/post/episode-80-mozambique-the-campaign-against-cabo-delgado.58. Nhamirre, ‘Cabo Delgado: Two Years’.59. See comments by South African defense analyst John Stupart in interview with Lester Kiewit, ‘SA Troops in Mozambique. What’s Been Happening?’ The Morning Review (CapeTalk567AM), 14 July 2022, https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/449673/sandf-losing-battle-against-insurgents-in-mozambique-says-military-journalist.60. On SANDF long-range patrolling and its aftermath, see Fabricius, ‘Wars Can’t Be Fought on the Cheap’; FGW Issue 426, 10–17 August 2022.61. ‘Security Alert 221,027-ARA001: Insurgent Attack on Macomia Town’, Focus Group, 27 October 2022. Regarding reinforcement, reference the long-awaited arrival of the SANDF’s Combat Team Alpha – FGW Issue 426, 10–17 August 2022.62. Up to 45 insurgent-led attacks are reported to have occurred in Macomia District between September 2022 and March 2023, none of which appear to have elicited a response from the SANDF battlegroup stationed there - FGW Issue 452, 8–15 March 2023. Regarding the delta in tactical posture and deterrent effectiveness between the RDF and SAMIM overall, see FGW Issue 396, 15 December 2021–19 January 2022; FGW Issue 399, 2–9 February 2022; ‘Mozambique Situation Report 220,304-ARM001: Insurgents Attack Nangade, While Sporadic Activity Occurs in Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia’, Focus Group, 4 March 2022; FGW Issue 408, 6–13 April 2022. Regarding deficient SAMIM back-stopping during RDF offensives in neighboring districts, see CLW: 30 May − 5 June (7 June 2022), 2.63. Interview with western security official, Kigali, August 2021.64. Onyango-Obbo, ‘Mozambique’s Swahili-speaking Region’; Bekoe et al, Extremism in Mozambique, 15. Swahili was used by both the RPF and its institutional parent, the Ugandan National Resistance Army, as a bridge language to facilitate communication between various non-indigenous members – see Bell, ‘Military Culture and Restraint’, 507–508, and the documentary film The 600: The Soldiers’ Story, directed by Laurent Basset and Richard Hall, Great Blue Productions, 2019.65. Rubin, ‘Islamic State Isn’t Defeated’; CLW: 28 March − 3 April (5 April 2022), 1; CLW: 16–22 May (24 May 2022), 3.66. Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 24–30; Meyer, ‘Flipping the Switch’, 252.67. CLM: July 2021 (16 August 2021), 6.68. Regarding the distinction between contact and communication in the context of foreign intervention, see Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, 32.69. Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’.70. Comments by Lionel Dyck, ‘Countering the Insurgency in Mozambique’, DefenceWeb virtual conference, 16 November 2021. DAG’s efforts were confounded despite extensive measures to mitigate the possibility of civilian casualties. Per Dyck, DAG embarked Mozambican officers as host-nation riders aboard their aircraft during operations and cleared all engagements through these counterparts prior to opening fire.71. Harding, ‘The Battle of Palma’; Beaumont, ‘Total Chaos‘; Amnesty International, ‘What I Saw is Death’, 17.72. Martin, ‘Paramount-supplied Military Hardware’; de Cherisey, ‘Mozambique’s Bush War’.73. RDF-connected use of air and artillery-delivered fires appears restricted to remote or cordoned areas. Examples include bombardment of insurgent forest bases Siri 1 and Siri 2 near Mbau in mid-August 2021 and difficult-to-reach insurgent positions on southern bank of the Messalo River on 25 September 2021 – see AIM/TVM, ‘Mozambique: ‘Most Important Mission Yet to Come’, Club of Mozambique; ‘Major Ambush on Militants’, Club of Mozambique; Cabo Delgado (@DelgadoCabo), Twitter, 26 September 2021 9:37 AM, https://twitter.com/DelgadoCabo/status/1442121253297410058.74. Nhamirre, ‘Cabo Delgado: Two Years’.75. Rwanda’s current SAMIM and FADM counterparts are also largely ground-bound, similarly equipped, and have recourse to FADM helicopter air support yet have struggled to match the RDF’s performance in simultaneously responding to insurgent violence, avoiding civilian harm, and gaining public trust. The South African contingent of SAMIM brought a handful of additional air assets – initially comprising two Oryx troop transport helicopters and a C-208 Caravan reconnaissance aircraft – but in insufficient numbers to support a more air-enabled concept of operations. See ‘South African National Defence Force Has Reportedly Arrived in Mozambique: Darren Olivier’, SABC News, YouTube video, 26 July 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wbzWBj80TAw.76. Regarding RDF marksmanship, see Morgenstein, ‘Speak Softly’.77. Felter and Shapiro, ‘Limiting Civilian Casualties’, 44–58.78. Al Shabaab insurgents often move and camp in company with kidnapped civilians and supporters, hence the challenge of avoiding collateral casualties is particularly demanding in Cabo Delgado – see FGW Issue 404, 9–16 March 2021.79. Castelli and Zambernardi, ‘Force Protection and its Trade-offs’, 45–9. In US military parlance, this is often discussed in terms of a tension between risk-to-mission and risk-to-force.80. For an alternative theory of ‘troop reticence’ in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping – albeit one based on a rather selective and charitable survey of the Indian experience – see Podder and Roy, ‘Use of Force to Protect Civilians’.81. See discussion of ‘costly compliance’ in Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 36–7.82. Losses reported in Karuhanga, ‘Nyusi: Kagame Understood Mozambicans’ Suffering’. For hints of higher numbers, see CLW: 19–25 July (28 July 2021), 3; CLW: 26 July − 1 August (3 August 2021), 2; CLM: July 2021 (16 August 2021), 2; CLM: April 2022, 8. Kigali’s official reluctance to divulge casualty data in Mozambique is a marked departure from its public affairs posture in peacekeeping, where deaths are freely acknowledged and duly commemorated – see Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’.83. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 4, 7.84. FGW, Issue 395, 8–15 December 2021.85. CLM: March 2023 (17 April 2023), 2; CLW: 13–19 September (21 September 2021), 2–3; International Crisis Group (ICG), Winning Peace, 7; FGW Issue 404, 9–16 March 2022. Regarding the effects these technologies impose on counterinsurgent risk calculus, see also Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 24–5.86. CLM: September 2021 (15 October 2021), 6.87. ICG, Winning Peace, 5; FGW Issue 399, 2–9 February 2022; CLM: January 2022 (18 February 2022), 5–6.88. The abusive and extortionate tendencies of federal authorities toward inhabitants of the northern province, and the skewed recruiting of security forces from the south, are long-standing – see Baker, ‘Policing and the Rule of Law in Mozambique’, 145–54. See also references to checkpoint shakedowns and past police brutality in Onyango-Obbo, 3 April 2022; ICG, Winning Peace, 5, 10.89. CLW: 13–19 June, 22 June 2022, 3; FGW Issue 422, 13–20 July 2022; FGW Issue 426, 10–17 August 2022.90. Comments by Claude Nikobisanzwe, Rwandan ambassador to Mozambique, during ISS webcast ‘Will Foreign Intervention Save Cabo Delgado?’ 8 November 2021, https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado; ICG, Winning Peace, 8. See also discussion of the establishment of a joint Intelligence Fusion Centre for intelligence sharing with SAMIM and Mozambican authorities – CLW: 11–17 April (20 April 2022), 4. For a test of the force structure thesis that failed in much the same manner, see Scarinzi, ‘Force Structure and Counterinsurgency’, 212–5.91. Comments by Joe van der Walt, ‘Countering the Insurgency in Mozambique’, DefenceWeb virtual conference, 16 November 2021. Regarding the relationship between human sources and predictive intelligence, see Felter, Guns to a Knife Fight, 12–13, and comments by Joe van der Walt in FGW Issue 400, 9–16 February 2022.92. ‘Security Situation Update 220,606-SEC001: Insurgent Activity Increases and Expands, While Attacks Resume in Mocimboa da Praia and Palma’, Focus Group, 6 June 2022.93. Damman, ‘Rwanda’s Strategic Humanitarianism’.94. Ibid.; Beswick, ‘The Risks of African Military Capacity Building’, 212–231; Beswick, ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, 739–54; Liégeois and Deltenre, ‘Astuteness in Commitment’, 421–35. For a more recent treatment in much the same vein, see Cannon and Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Deployments’, 9–1395. ‘TotalEnergies Puts Construction Group Close to Kagame on Mozambique LNG Short List’, Africa Intelligence, 1 March 2022; Nhachote, ‘Rwanda Eyes the Spoils of War’; Umurerwa, ‘Rwanda, Mozambique Sign Agreements to Reinforce Justice’.96. ‘How Kigali is Exporting its Military Expertise Across Africa’, Africa Intelligence, 10 December 2021, https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_diplomacy/2021/12/10/how-kigali-is-exporting-its-military-expertise-across-africa,109710456-ar2; Handy, ‘African “Smart Power”’; Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Diplomacy’, United Nations, ‘Speakers Warn Security Council’. The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting Kigali’s courting of diplomatic support from allies and partners in other corners of the continent.97. Ruffa et al, ‘Soldiers Drawn into Politics’, 322–34.98. Felter and Shapiro, ‘Limiting Civilian Casualties’, 44–58.99. Harding and Burke, ‘Russian Mercenaries’; Rubin, ‘Rwanda Is Fixing Peacekeeping’.100. ICG, Rwanda’s Growing Role, 6 Questioned by committee members about Rwandan dissident arrests and disappearances elsewhere in Mozambique, Bléjean confirmed no complaints had been registered about RDF misbehavior or humanitarian violations in the conflict zone – see testimony before European Parliament of 26 January 2022.101. Matisek, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 280–281 Bareebe, An Army with a State or a State with an Army?, 242–244; Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 58, 222–3.102. See discussion of the role of political commissars, inspectors general, intelligence officers, and presidential loyalists and informants in Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization’, 282, 284, and Jowell, ‘Civil-Military Relations’. See also similar distinction between internal monitoring for political purposes versus domestic crime prevention in Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 162.103. Rehder, Guerillas to Peacekeepers, 10–11, 30.104. Chemouni, ‘Rwandan Decentralization’, 17–25. Per Chemouni, the RPF substitute service delivery for alternative forms of legitimacy that are unavailable to its urban, ex-patriate, and ethnic minority ruling elite.105. Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army.106. On the importance of small unit leadership to counterinsurgency and peacekeeping effectiveness, see Tripodi, ‘Peacekeepers, Moral Autonomy, and the Use of Force’, 214–32; Felter, Guns to a Knife Fight, 9; Ruffa et al, ‘Soldiers Drawn into Politics’.107. Shamir, Transforming Command.108. Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization’, 283.109. See comments by Valentine Rugwabiza, Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the UN, during IPI panel discussion ‘Lessons from the Implementation of the Kigali Principles’, 29 May 2020, https://www.ipinst.org/2020/05/poc-lessons-from-the-implementation-of-kigali-principles#8 and discussion of efforts to instill a ‘bias to action’ at the RDF Training Academy in Rehder, Guerillas to Peacekeepers, 29.110. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 10.111. USIP panel discussion 14 December 2016.112. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 164; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 135, 190. See Rehder, Guerillas to Peacekeepers, 11, 30; Jones, 244.113. See Ruffa’s examination of culture’s influence on force employment – Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’. Regarding culture’s role in the exercise of battlefield restraint in an American context, see Kahl’s discussion of the ‘annihilation-restraint paradox’ in ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 37–45.114. Kuehnel and Wilen, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 163–166; Matisek, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 301–302; Holmes, ‘Enhancing Operational Effectiveness?’ 14–16; Kühnel Larsen and Struwe, ‘Military Capacity Building’, 3–4.115. See Wax, ‘In Darfur, Rwandan Soldiers Relive Their Past’.116. Kuehnel and Wilen, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 163–166. In the typology sketched by Ruffa’s subject militaries, the Rwandan ‘operational style’ would appear to constitute a compromise or hybrid case incorporating elements of both the deterrence- and humanitarian-oriented models – see Ruffa ’What Peacekeepers Think’, 217.117. ‘RDF in Peacekeeping Mission’, Rwanda MoD official website, https://www.mod.gov.rw/rdf/peacekeeping; Wilen, ‘From “Peacekept” to Peacekeeper’, 7–10. Most references regard peacekeeping but regime officials have described and justified the Cabo Delgado mission using the same language, explicitly linking the intervention to foundational themes of protection, atrocity prevention, and self-sacrifice – see Mwara, ‘Rwanda Sees Another Darfur Moment’; ‘DIGP Namuhoranye Briefs Police Officers’, Taarifa; Comments by Claude Nikobisanzwe, Rwandan ambassador to Mozambique, during ISS webcast ‘Will Foreign Intervention Save Cabo Delgado?’ 8 November 2021, https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado.118. For insights from organization theory establishing a correspondence between organizational image, member identification, and individual performance, see Dutton et al, ‘Organizational Images and Member Identification’, 239–240, 246, 255, 260.119. Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’; Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’.120. For a typology of norm transmission, see Oksamytna and Wilen, ‘Adoption, Adaptation or Chance’, 2357–2374.121. Stearns, From CNDP to M23, 19, 25, 32–33, 44, 46–47, 54–55; ‘Resurgent M23 Rebels Target Civilians’, Human Rights Watch.122. ‘Diplomatic Cat and Mouse’, Africa Intelligence: ‘UN Experts Say Rwanda Intervened’, Reuters.123. ‘Rwanda Says Two Soldiers’, Reuters.124. Thomson, Rwanda: From Genocide to Precarious Peace, 235–236; Clark, ‘Rwanda’s Recovery’, 36–37.125. Regarding the deep aversion to social disharmony within Rwanda, see Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 187–194; 244. Regarding a cultivated sense of insecurity and portrayal of the FDLR as a persistent threat, see ibid., 228, and Andrea Purdeková et al, ‘Militarisation of Governance’, 168. Further underscoring the sense of danger and complicating its realistic appraisal, the term ‘FDLR’ is applied liberally within Rwanda to various enemies of the state regardless of affiliation with the actual militia – see Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 250.126. Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 280.127. Ibid., 330, 420.128. Regarding veneration of war-time experience and inter-generational transmission of knowledge and beliefs across age cohorts within the RDF, see Matisek’s discussion of value models held by RPA-era ‘patriots’ and ‘new RDF’ members, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 307–10.129. On the RDF’s internally perceived responsibility to safeguard social cohesion see Rusagara, Resilience of a Nation, 192.130. Joyce, ‘Soldiers’ Dilemma’, 48–90.131. Burgess, ‘From Failed Power Sharing’, 92–99; Krebs and Licklider, ‘United They Fall’.132. See especially the RDF’s aspiration to recover a (possibly apocryphal) ideal of pre-colonial cohesion – Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization’, 284, 287–8. Also, Mathys, ‘Bringing History Back In’, 473–4.133. Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, 100–106.134. Hedlund, ‘There Was No Genocide’, 32–34; Davey, ‘A Soldier’s Journey’, NPI 2568.135. Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo.136. Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’, 394; Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’, 210–1.137. See comments by Jason K. Stearns during CSIS livestream discussion with Mvemba Phezo Dizolel, ‘Addressing Rising Tensions Between the DRC and Rwanda’, YouTube video, 10 June 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u0_rFrmKbbA.138. Orth, ‘Rwanda’s Hutu Extremist Insurgency’; Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 104–5, 251.139. Author video interview with Focus Group analysts Brittany Hall and Tertius Jacobs, 18 October 2022.140. CLW: 25 April − 8 May (10 May 2022), 2–3.141. ‘Rwandan Police Kill’, Reuters; ‘Rwanda police shoot dead’, BBC News.142. Stearns, The War That Doesn’t Say Its Name, 80–3.143. See Damman’s description of ‘Janus-faced’ state in ‘Rwanda’s Strategic Humanitarianism’.144. Chemouni and Mugiraneza, ‘Ideology and Interests’, 115–140; McDoom, ‘Securocratic State-Building’, 535–567.145. Engelhardt, ’Democracies, Dictatorships’, 58; Lalwani, Selective Leviathans; Ucko, ‘The People Are Revolting’.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRalph ShieldRalph Shield is a senior researcher with the Strategic and Operational Research Department (SORD) at the US Naval War College. He previously served as an intelligence officer, defense attaché, and foreign military advisor. His earlier work has appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and the Journal of Southern African Studies (forthcoming). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent official positions or assessments of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the United States government.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-10-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

ABSTRACTRwandan military behavior in Mozambique operationalizes Kigali’s rhetorical commitment to aggressively defend endangered civilians. The counterinsurgency doctrine applied in Cabo Delgado balances insurgent pursuit and civilian protection through a combination of contact patrolling and tactical restraint. This formula demonstrates learning from the country’s past experience with domestic rebellion and international peacekeeping but contrasts sharply with Rwandan army conduct in eastern Congo. The disparity suggests Rwandan battlefield demeanor is conditioned by institutional culture and role conception. The campaign underscores the influence of ideology on Rwandan soldiers' self-understanding and complicates the equivalence of nondemocratic regime type with repressive strategies of counterinsurgency.KEYWORDS: Rwandacounterinsurgencypeacekeepingcivilian protectionMozambique AcknowledgmentsThe author thanks Rick Orth, Emilia Columbo, Marco Jowell, Brittany Hall, and Tertius Jacobs for sharing insights, comments, and feedback that informed and improved this article. The author is also indebted to Focus Group intelligence-driven risk management company for granting complimentary access to subscription products related to the Cabo Delgado crisis on a research exchange basis.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Supplementary materialSupplemental data for this article can be accessed online at https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400Notes1. Kisangani and Pickering, African Interventions, 4–5, 8–11; Bode and Karlsrud, ‘Implementation in Practice’, 465; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 1–2, 11–3.2. Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 12, 156; Harig and Jenne, ‘Whose Rules? Whose Power?’ 662–5.3. Abiola et al ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–60.4. Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Diplomacy’.5. Cabo Ligado Monthly (abbreviated hereafter as CLM): December 2021 (21 December 2021), 6–7; CLM: March 2022 (15 April 2022), 2–46. This analysis draws heavily on insights from the Cabo Ligado conflict observatory (https://acleddata.com/cabo-ligado-mozambique-conflict-observatory/) and Focus Group risk management company (https://focusholding.net/). Focus Group reporting is cited here with express permission; referenced products remain proprietary materials subject to applicable use and disclosure restrictions.7. Keeler, Kigali Principles.8. Paul et al, ‘Moving Beyond Population-Centric’.9. Whereas Kigali seeks stability in Mozambique, CAR, and its various peacekeeping engagements, high-level regime defectors have indicated that the regime prefers a chronic but manageable modicum of disorder in eastern Congo – see Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 280–1.10. Ruffa, Military Cultures, 31–5.11. Abiola et al, ‘The Large Contributors’, 158–9; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 2.12. Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’.13. Peacekeeping Data: Fatalities, https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities (accessed 9 February 2022). Fatalities include 32 in Darfur, 16 in CAR, and nine in South Sudan.14. Jenna, ‘Don’t Blame Authoritarianism’; Jones, ‘Between Pyongyang and Singapore’, 242.15. Anna, ‘Police Used “Excessive Force”’. Charbonneau and Nichols, ‘Rwandan Peacekeepers Shooting Protesters’.16. International Peace Institute (IPI), ‘Accountability System’; Nichols, ‘U.N. Reaction to Malakal Violence’; Wells, A Refuge in Flames.17. Sieff and Amur, ‘Peacekeepers Made Major Errors’; Lynch, ‘UN Peacekeepers Accused of Child Abuse, Bestiality, and Cowardice’.18. ‘The Kigali Principles’, Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect.19. Keeler, Kigali Principles.20. The principles were not uncontroversial. See UN, ‘Opinions Divided over Protection of Civilians’.21. ‘RDF Deploys Level 2 Hospital’ The New Times; ‘RDF Completes Level Two Hospital Deployment’, IGIHE.22. Karuhanga, ‘Rwandan Special Forces’ Operation in CAR’.23. Rolland, ‘Bullets and Panic’.24. CLM: September 2021 (15 October 2021), 7.25. Shield, ‘Rwandan Military Effectiveness’.26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: The Hidden Violence’; Human Rights Watch, World Report; Rever, Praise of Blood, 131–152.27. Stearns, Glory of Monsters, 250–266.28. Jackson, Defeat in Victory.29. Bekoe et al, Extremism in Mozambique, 21–24.30. Engelhardt, ‘Democracies, Dictatorships’, 56–7; Lyall, ‘Inferior Counterinsurgents?’ 169–70; Byman, ‘’Death Solves All Problems’’, 14–7; Heuser and Shamir, ‘Universal Toolbox’, 369.31. CLM: July 2021 (16 August 2021), 1–2, 6; CLM: August 2021 (15 September 2021), 1–2, 4–5;32. The Islamic State-affiliated insurgency in Cabo Delgado initially self-identified by the name Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma but is known locally and referred to throughout this paper as al Shabaab; it should not to be confused with the al Qaeda-linked group of the same name which operates from Somalia.33. Deliberate out-of-area deployments include Niassa, Mueda, Macomia, Nangade, and Ancuabe - CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 4, 8; Cabo Ligado Weekly (CLW hereafter): 9–15 May (17 May 2022), 2; CLW: 16–22 May (24 May 2022), 2; CLM: June 2022 (15 July 2022), 5. Regarding hot-pursuit operations, see CLW: 21–27 March (30 March 2022), 1.34. As characterized by Friesendorf, Rwanda has thus been effective in reducing both negative and positive threats to the civilian population - How Western Soldiers Fight, 13.35. See CLW: 27 June − 3 July (5 July 2022), 2.36. Reports of Mozambican security force abuses, misbehavior, and self-enrichment are rife. See – ‘Nascer em Mocímboa da Praia’, Ikweli; CLM: November 2021 (15 December 2021), 6; CLM: January 2022 (18 February 2022), 7; CLW: 9–15 May (17 May 2022), 3; CLW: 23–29 May 2022 (31 May 2022), 5; CLM: July 2022 (17 August 2022), 4.37. See – CLW: 9–15 August (17 August 2021), 2; ‘Nascer em Mocímboa da Praia’, Ikweli; CLW: 28 March − 3 April 2022 (5 April 2022), 1; CLW: 4–10 April (12 April 2022), 2; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 2; 2021 Country Reports, U.S. State Department, 10.38. For positive comparisons and reflections of poor public confidence in SAMIM and FADM, see CLW: 11–17 October (19 October 2021), 2; CLM: November 2021 (15 December 2021), 7; CLW: 25 April − 8 May (10 May 2022), 2; CLM: July 2022 (17 August 2022), 4.39. CLW: 27 June − 3 July (5 July 2022), 2.40. CLM: March 2022 (15 April 2022), 6; ‘Interview with Cristóvão Artur Chume’, Chatham House, 6 April 2022.https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/04/interview-cristovao-artur-chume.41. CLM: November 2021 (15 December 2021), 2; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 4, 8; Columbo, ‘Enduring Counterterrorism Challenge’, 5; ‘Intelligence and Military Exasperated by Omnipresent Rwandan Forces in Cabo Delgado’, African Intelligence, 18 July 2023, https://www.africaintelligence.com/southern-africa-and-islands/2023/07/18/intelligence-and-military-exasperated-by-omnipresent-rwandan-forces-in-cabo-delgado,110004637-eve.42. Biddle, Military Power, 2–5, 17–19. Biddle’s concept was developed in relation to conventional, interstate warfare but has been usefully adapted to analysis of counterinsurgency, peacekeeping, and non-state armed group military behavior – see Ruffa, Military Cultures, 19–20; Biddle, Nonstate Warfare.43. See, inter alia Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, 65–66, 84; Krepinevich, Army and Vietnam, 10–15; Kilcullen, Accidental Guerilla, 136.44. Lyall and Wilson III, ‘Rage Against the Machines’, 67–106.45. Divergent views tend not to take issue with the value of contact patrolling, arguing instead that mechanization is less strictly determinative than Lyall and Wilson assert or that the relative merits of information collection and protected firepower vary with the kinetic capability of the insurgent adversary. See Smith and Toronto, ‘All the Rage’, 519–28; Caverley and Sechser, ‘Military Technology’, 704–20; Van Wie and Walden, ‘Troops or Tanks?’ 1032–58.46. Ruffa, for instance, employs vehicle-to-soldier ratios and detailed data on patrol frequency and timing – Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’, 199–225; Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’, 391–422.47. See comments by General Patrick Nyamvumba, then-Chief of Defence Staff for the RDF, during U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) panel discussion ‘Implementing the “Kigali Principles” for Peacekeeping’, 14 December 2016, https://www.usip.org/events/implementing-kigali-principles-peacekeeping. See also Matisek, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 306.48. Author review of news media still and video imagery from 9 August 2021–13 May 2022 (see Supplementary Online Material).49. Regarding RPA’s early adoption of the Toyota 4-Runner with outward-facing truck-bed seating as a standard troop carrier, see Odom, Journey, 189–190.50. Author review of news media still and video imagery from 3 January 2021–5 January 2021 (see Supplementary Online Material).51. Lamarque, Insulating the Borderland, 102, 132–134, 138–139, 145–146, 152; 218–222; Author’s personal observations, Kigali, April 2021 – February 2022.52. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 8, 11–12.53. Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’; IGIHE (@IGIHE), Twitter, 2 September 2021, 9:25 AM, https://twitter.com/igihe/status/1433420940667281410?s=11; Karuhanga, ‘Cabo Delgado: Rwandan Forces Help’; The New Times (Rwanda) (@NewTimesRwanda), Twitter, 20 October 2021, 1:57 AM, https://twitter.com/NewTimesRwanda/status/1450702733095415815; CLW: 18–24 October (26 October 2021), 2; ‘Rwanda Security Forces, Mozambican Security Organs and Residents of Palma Conduct Community Work in Palma Town, Cabo Delgado Province, Mozambique’, Rwanda MoD official website, 27 November 2021, https://www.mod.gov.rw/news-detail/rwanda-security-forces-mozambican-security-organs-and-residents-of-palma-conduct-community-work-in-palma-town-cabo-delgado-province-mozambique; IGIHE (@IGIHE), Twitter, 29 January 2022, 2:09 PM, https://twitter.com/igihe/status/1487503170247008260?s=11.54. Regarding medical care, see Mugwiza, ‘Rwandan Medics Treated 788 Patients’; Karuhanga, ‘Rwandan Medics Are Overwhelmed’; Karuhanga, ‘What Rwandan and Mozambican Forces Are Doing’. With respect to dynamic activities, see CLW: 16–22 May (24 May 2022), 3–4; ‘Mocimboa da Praia Residents Return’, DefenceWeb.55. Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’; Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’; Friesendorf, How Western Soldiers Fight; Day et al, Assessing the Effectiveness, 18–9, 70–1.56. Comments by Vice Admiral Hervé Bléjean, before European Parliament Subcommittee on Security and Defence, 26 January 2022, https://multimedia.europarl.europa.eu/en/webstreaming/subcommittee-on-security-and-defence_20220126–1345-COMMITTEE-SEDE; CLW: 27 September − 3 October 2021 (5 October 2021), 1; CLM: January 2022 (18 February 2022), 3–5; CLW: 14–20 February 2022 (23 February 2022), 2–3; CLM: February 2022 (17 March 2022), 2; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 5–6; CLW: 13–19 June (22 June 2022), 2.57. Regarding SAMIM troop limits, resource shortfalls, and morale problems, see CLM: September 2021 (15 October 2021), 7; Focus Group Weekly (abbreviated hereafter as FGW), Issue 396, 15 December 2021–19 January 2022; ‘SAMIM Seemingly Going Nowhere’, DefenceWeb. Charles Onyango-Obbo has suggested that the Tanzanian army’s lackluster performance is politically motivated; Fernando Lima suggests the same regarding SAMIM as a whole – see Onyango-Obbo, ‘In Mozambique’s War’; CLM: April 2022 (19 May 2022), 8–9. This seems unlikely, however, in light of the adverse impacts Tanzania and other contributors could incur as spillover effects from a worsening insurgency – see comments by Emilia Columbo in The Red Line podcast ‘Mozambique: The Campaign Against Cabo Delgado’, episode 80, October 17, 2022, https://www.theredlinepodcast.com/post/episode-80-mozambique-the-campaign-against-cabo-delgado.58. Nhamirre, ‘Cabo Delgado: Two Years’.59. See comments by South African defense analyst John Stupart in interview with Lester Kiewit, ‘SA Troops in Mozambique. What’s Been Happening?’ The Morning Review (CapeTalk567AM), 14 July 2022, https://www.capetalk.co.za/articles/449673/sandf-losing-battle-against-insurgents-in-mozambique-says-military-journalist.60. On SANDF long-range patrolling and its aftermath, see Fabricius, ‘Wars Can’t Be Fought on the Cheap’; FGW Issue 426, 10–17 August 2022.61. ‘Security Alert 221,027-ARA001: Insurgent Attack on Macomia Town’, Focus Group, 27 October 2022. Regarding reinforcement, reference the long-awaited arrival of the SANDF’s Combat Team Alpha – FGW Issue 426, 10–17 August 2022.62. Up to 45 insurgent-led attacks are reported to have occurred in Macomia District between September 2022 and March 2023, none of which appear to have elicited a response from the SANDF battlegroup stationed there - FGW Issue 452, 8–15 March 2023. Regarding the delta in tactical posture and deterrent effectiveness between the RDF and SAMIM overall, see FGW Issue 396, 15 December 2021–19 January 2022; FGW Issue 399, 2–9 February 2022; ‘Mozambique Situation Report 220,304-ARM001: Insurgents Attack Nangade, While Sporadic Activity Occurs in Mocímboa da Praia and Macomia’, Focus Group, 4 March 2022; FGW Issue 408, 6–13 April 2022. Regarding deficient SAMIM back-stopping during RDF offensives in neighboring districts, see CLW: 30 May − 5 June (7 June 2022), 2.63. Interview with western security official, Kigali, August 2021.64. Onyango-Obbo, ‘Mozambique’s Swahili-speaking Region’; Bekoe et al, Extremism in Mozambique, 15. Swahili was used by both the RPF and its institutional parent, the Ugandan National Resistance Army, as a bridge language to facilitate communication between various non-indigenous members – see Bell, ‘Military Culture and Restraint’, 507–508, and the documentary film The 600: The Soldiers’ Story, directed by Laurent Basset and Richard Hall, Great Blue Productions, 2019.65. Rubin, ‘Islamic State Isn’t Defeated’; CLW: 28 March − 3 April (5 April 2022), 1; CLW: 16–22 May (24 May 2022), 3.66. Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 24–30; Meyer, ‘Flipping the Switch’, 252.67. CLM: July 2021 (16 August 2021), 6.68. Regarding the distinction between contact and communication in the context of foreign intervention, see Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, 32.69. Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’.70. Comments by Lionel Dyck, ‘Countering the Insurgency in Mozambique’, DefenceWeb virtual conference, 16 November 2021. DAG’s efforts were confounded despite extensive measures to mitigate the possibility of civilian casualties. Per Dyck, DAG embarked Mozambican officers as host-nation riders aboard their aircraft during operations and cleared all engagements through these counterparts prior to opening fire.71. Harding, ‘The Battle of Palma’; Beaumont, ‘Total Chaos‘; Amnesty International, ‘What I Saw is Death’, 17.72. Martin, ‘Paramount-supplied Military Hardware’; de Cherisey, ‘Mozambique’s Bush War’.73. RDF-connected use of air and artillery-delivered fires appears restricted to remote or cordoned areas. Examples include bombardment of insurgent forest bases Siri 1 and Siri 2 near Mbau in mid-August 2021 and difficult-to-reach insurgent positions on southern bank of the Messalo River on 25 September 2021 – see AIM/TVM, ‘Mozambique: ‘Most Important Mission Yet to Come’, Club of Mozambique; ‘Major Ambush on Militants’, Club of Mozambique; Cabo Delgado (@DelgadoCabo), Twitter, 26 September 2021 9:37 AM, https://twitter.com/DelgadoCabo/status/1442121253297410058.74. Nhamirre, ‘Cabo Delgado: Two Years’.75. Rwanda’s current SAMIM and FADM counterparts are also largely ground-bound, similarly equipped, and have recourse to FADM helicopter air support yet have struggled to match the RDF’s performance in simultaneously responding to insurgent violence, avoiding civilian harm, and gaining public trust. The South African contingent of SAMIM brought a handful of additional air assets – initially comprising two Oryx troop transport helicopters and a C-208 Caravan reconnaissance aircraft – but in insufficient numbers to support a more air-enabled concept of operations. See ‘South African National Defence Force Has Reportedly Arrived in Mozambique: Darren Olivier’, SABC News, YouTube video, 26 July 2021, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wbzWBj80TAw.76. Regarding RDF marksmanship, see Morgenstein, ‘Speak Softly’.77. Felter and Shapiro, ‘Limiting Civilian Casualties’, 44–58.78. Al Shabaab insurgents often move and camp in company with kidnapped civilians and supporters, hence the challenge of avoiding collateral casualties is particularly demanding in Cabo Delgado – see FGW Issue 404, 9–16 March 2021.79. Castelli and Zambernardi, ‘Force Protection and its Trade-offs’, 45–9. In US military parlance, this is often discussed in terms of a tension between risk-to-mission and risk-to-force.80. For an alternative theory of ‘troop reticence’ in counterinsurgency and peacekeeping – albeit one based on a rather selective and charitable survey of the Indian experience – see Podder and Roy, ‘Use of Force to Protect Civilians’.81. See discussion of ‘costly compliance’ in Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 36–7.82. Losses reported in Karuhanga, ‘Nyusi: Kagame Understood Mozambicans’ Suffering’. For hints of higher numbers, see CLW: 19–25 July (28 July 2021), 3; CLW: 26 July − 1 August (3 August 2021), 2; CLM: July 2021 (16 August 2021), 2; CLM: April 2022, 8. Kigali’s official reluctance to divulge casualty data in Mozambique is a marked departure from its public affairs posture in peacekeeping, where deaths are freely acknowledged and duly commemorated – see Jowell, ‘Contributor Profile’.83. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 4, 7.84. FGW, Issue 395, 8–15 December 2021.85. CLM: March 2023 (17 April 2023), 2; CLW: 13–19 September (21 September 2021), 2–3; International Crisis Group (ICG), Winning Peace, 7; FGW Issue 404, 9–16 March 2022. Regarding the effects these technologies impose on counterinsurgent risk calculus, see also Kahl, ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 24–5.86. CLM: September 2021 (15 October 2021), 6.87. ICG, Winning Peace, 5; FGW Issue 399, 2–9 February 2022; CLM: January 2022 (18 February 2022), 5–6.88. The abusive and extortionate tendencies of federal authorities toward inhabitants of the northern province, and the skewed recruiting of security forces from the south, are long-standing – see Baker, ‘Policing and the Rule of Law in Mozambique’, 145–54. See also references to checkpoint shakedowns and past police brutality in Onyango-Obbo, 3 April 2022; ICG, Winning Peace, 5, 10.89. CLW: 13–19 June, 22 June 2022, 3; FGW Issue 422, 13–20 July 2022; FGW Issue 426, 10–17 August 2022.90. Comments by Claude Nikobisanzwe, Rwandan ambassador to Mozambique, during ISS webcast ‘Will Foreign Intervention Save Cabo Delgado?’ 8 November 2021, https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado; ICG, Winning Peace, 8. See also discussion of the establishment of a joint Intelligence Fusion Centre for intelligence sharing with SAMIM and Mozambican authorities – CLW: 11–17 April (20 April 2022), 4. For a test of the force structure thesis that failed in much the same manner, see Scarinzi, ‘Force Structure and Counterinsurgency’, 212–5.91. Comments by Joe van der Walt, ‘Countering the Insurgency in Mozambique’, DefenceWeb virtual conference, 16 November 2021. Regarding the relationship between human sources and predictive intelligence, see Felter, Guns to a Knife Fight, 12–13, and comments by Joe van der Walt in FGW Issue 400, 9–16 February 2022.92. ‘Security Situation Update 220,606-SEC001: Insurgent Activity Increases and Expands, While Attacks Resume in Mocimboa da Praia and Palma’, Focus Group, 6 June 2022.93. Damman, ‘Rwanda’s Strategic Humanitarianism’.94. Ibid.; Beswick, ‘The Risks of African Military Capacity Building’, 212–231; Beswick, ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, 739–54; Liégeois and Deltenre, ‘Astuteness in Commitment’, 421–35. For a more recent treatment in much the same vein, see Cannon and Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Deployments’, 9–1395. ‘TotalEnergies Puts Construction Group Close to Kagame on Mozambique LNG Short List’, Africa Intelligence, 1 March 2022; Nhachote, ‘Rwanda Eyes the Spoils of War’; Umurerwa, ‘Rwanda, Mozambique Sign Agreements to Reinforce Justice’.96. ‘How Kigali is Exporting its Military Expertise Across Africa’, Africa Intelligence, 10 December 2021, https://www.africaintelligence.com/eastern-and-southern-africa_diplomacy/2021/12/10/how-kigali-is-exporting-its-military-expertise-across-africa,109710456-ar2; Handy, ‘African “Smart Power”’; Donelli, ‘Rwanda’s Military Diplomacy’, United Nations, ‘Speakers Warn Security Council’. The author is grateful to an anonymous reviewer for highlighting Kigali’s courting of diplomatic support from allies and partners in other corners of the continent.97. Ruffa et al, ‘Soldiers Drawn into Politics’, 322–34.98. Felter and Shapiro, ‘Limiting Civilian Casualties’, 44–58.99. Harding and Burke, ‘Russian Mercenaries’; Rubin, ‘Rwanda Is Fixing Peacekeeping’.100. ICG, Rwanda’s Growing Role, 6 Questioned by committee members about Rwandan dissident arrests and disappearances elsewhere in Mozambique, Bléjean confirmed no complaints had been registered about RDF misbehavior or humanitarian violations in the conflict zone – see testimony before European Parliament of 26 January 2022.101. Matisek, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 280–281 Bareebe, An Army with a State or a State with an Army?, 242–244; Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 58, 222–3.102. See discussion of the role of political commissars, inspectors general, intelligence officers, and presidential loyalists and informants in Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization’, 282, 284, and Jowell, ‘Civil-Military Relations’. See also similar distinction between internal monitoring for political purposes versus domestic crime prevention in Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 162.103. Rehder, Guerillas to Peacekeepers, 10–11, 30.104. Chemouni, ‘Rwandan Decentralization’, 17–25. Per Chemouni, the RPF substitute service delivery for alternative forms of legitimacy that are unavailable to its urban, ex-patriate, and ethnic minority ruling elite.105. Talmadge, The Dictator’s Army.106. On the importance of small unit leadership to counterinsurgency and peacekeeping effectiveness, see Tripodi, ‘Peacekeepers, Moral Autonomy, and the Use of Force’, 214–32; Felter, Guns to a Knife Fight, 9; Ruffa et al, ‘Soldiers Drawn into Politics’.107. Shamir, Transforming Command.108. Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization’, 283.109. See comments by Valentine Rugwabiza, Permanent Representative of Rwanda to the UN, during IPI panel discussion ‘Lessons from the Implementation of the Kigali Principles’, 29 May 2020, https://www.ipinst.org/2020/05/poc-lessons-from-the-implementation-of-kigali-principles#8 and discussion of efforts to instill a ‘bias to action’ at the RDF Training Academy in Rehder, Guerillas to Peacekeepers, 29.110. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 10.111. USIP panel discussion 14 December 2016.112. Kuehnel and Wilén, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 164; Fisher and Wilen, African Peacekeeping, 135, 190. See Rehder, Guerillas to Peacekeepers, 11, 30; Jones, 244.113. See Ruffa’s examination of culture’s influence on force employment – Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’. Regarding culture’s role in the exercise of battlefield restraint in an American context, see Kahl’s discussion of the ‘annihilation-restraint paradox’ in ‘Crossfire or in the Crosshairs?’ 37–45.114. Kuehnel and Wilen, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 163–166; Matisek, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 301–302; Holmes, ‘Enhancing Operational Effectiveness?’ 14–16; Kühnel Larsen and Struwe, ‘Military Capacity Building’, 3–4.115. See Wax, ‘In Darfur, Rwandan Soldiers Relive Their Past’.116. Kuehnel and Wilen, ‘Rwanda’s Military’, 163–166. In the typology sketched by Ruffa’s subject militaries, the Rwandan ‘operational style’ would appear to constitute a compromise or hybrid case incorporating elements of both the deterrence- and humanitarian-oriented models – see Ruffa ’What Peacekeepers Think’, 217.117. ‘RDF in Peacekeeping Mission’, Rwanda MoD official website, https://www.mod.gov.rw/rdf/peacekeeping; Wilen, ‘From “Peacekept” to Peacekeeper’, 7–10. Most references regard peacekeeping but regime officials have described and justified the Cabo Delgado mission using the same language, explicitly linking the intervention to foundational themes of protection, atrocity prevention, and self-sacrifice – see Mwara, ‘Rwanda Sees Another Darfur Moment’; ‘DIGP Namuhoranye Briefs Police Officers’, Taarifa; Comments by Claude Nikobisanzwe, Rwandan ambassador to Mozambique, during ISS webcast ‘Will Foreign Intervention Save Cabo Delgado?’ 8 November 2021, https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado.118. For insights from organization theory establishing a correspondence between organizational image, member identification, and individual performance, see Dutton et al, ‘Organizational Images and Member Identification’, 239–240, 246, 255, 260.119. Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’; Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’.120. For a typology of norm transmission, see Oksamytna and Wilen, ‘Adoption, Adaptation or Chance’, 2357–2374.121. Stearns, From CNDP to M23, 19, 25, 32–33, 44, 46–47, 54–55; ‘Resurgent M23 Rebels Target Civilians’, Human Rights Watch.122. ‘Diplomatic Cat and Mouse’, Africa Intelligence: ‘UN Experts Say Rwanda Intervened’, Reuters.123. ‘Rwanda Says Two Soldiers’, Reuters.124. Thomson, Rwanda: From Genocide to Precarious Peace, 235–236; Clark, ‘Rwanda’s Recovery’, 36–37.125. Regarding the deep aversion to social disharmony within Rwanda, see Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 187–194; 244. Regarding a cultivated sense of insecurity and portrayal of the FDLR as a persistent threat, see ibid., 228, and Andrea Purdeková et al, ‘Militarisation of Governance’, 168. Further underscoring the sense of danger and complicating its realistic appraisal, the term ‘FDLR’ is applied liberally within Rwanda to various enemies of the state regardless of affiliation with the actual militia – see Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 250.126. Wrong, Do Not Disturb, 280.127. Ibid., 330, 420.128. Regarding veneration of war-time experience and inter-generational transmission of knowledge and beliefs across age cohorts within the RDF, see Matisek’s discussion of value models held by RPA-era ‘patriots’ and ‘new RDF’ members, Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 307–10.129. On the RDF’s internally perceived responsibility to safeguard social cohesion see Rusagara, Resilience of a Nation, 192.130. Joyce, ‘Soldiers’ Dilemma’, 48–90.131. Burgess, ‘From Failed Power Sharing’, 92–99; Krebs and Licklider, ‘United They Fall’.132. See especially the RDF’s aspiration to recover a (possibly apocryphal) ideal of pre-colonial cohesion – Jowell, ‘Cohesion through Socialization’, 284, 287–8. Also, Mathys, ‘Bringing History Back In’, 473–4.133. Lemarchand, The Dynamics of Violence, 100–106.134. Hedlund, ‘There Was No Genocide’, 32–34; Davey, ‘A Soldier’s Journey’, NPI 2568.135. Autesserre, The Trouble with the Congo.136. Ruffa, ‘Military Cultures and Force Employment’, 394; Ruffa, ‘What Peacekeepers Think’, 210–1.137. See comments by Jason K. Stearns during CSIS livestream discussion with Mvemba Phezo Dizolel, ‘Addressing Rising Tensions Between the DRC and Rwanda’, YouTube video, 10 June 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u0_rFrmKbbA.138. Orth, ‘Rwanda’s Hutu Extremist Insurgency’; Lamarque, Insulating the Borderlands, 104–5, 251.139. Author video interview with Focus Group analysts Brittany Hall and Tertius Jacobs, 18 October 2022.140. CLW: 25 April − 8 May (10 May 2022), 2–3.141. ‘Rwandan Police Kill’, Reuters; ‘Rwanda police shoot dead’, BBC News.142. Stearns, The War That Doesn’t Say Its Name, 80–3.143. See Damman’s description of ‘Janus-faced’ state in ‘Rwanda’s Strategic Humanitarianism’.144. Chemouni and Mugiraneza, ‘Ideology and Interests’, 115–140; McDoom, ‘Securocratic State-Building’, 535–567.145. Engelhardt, ’Democracies, Dictatorships’, 58; Lalwani, Selective Leviathans; Ucko, ‘The People Are Revolting’.Additional informationNotes on contributorsRalph ShieldRalph Shield is a senior researcher with the Strategic and Operational Research Department (SORD) at the US Naval War College. He previously served as an intelligence officer, defense attaché, and foreign military advisor. His earlier work has appeared in the Journal of Strategic Studies, the Journal of Slavic Military Studies, and the Journal of Southern African Studies (forthcoming). The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not represent official positions or assessments of the U.S. Navy, the Department of Defense, or the United States government.
卢旺达在莫桑比克的战争:基加利原则对反叛乱方法的道路测试?
卢旺达在莫桑比克的军事行为体现了基加利积极保护濒危平民的口头承诺。德尔加多角实施的反叛乱原则通过接触巡逻和战术克制相结合,平衡了对叛乱分子的追击和对平民的保护。这一模式表明了该国从过去国内叛乱和国际维和行动的经验中吸取教训,但与卢旺达军队在刚果东部的行为形成鲜明对比。这种差异表明卢旺达的战场行为受到制度文化和角色观念的制约。这场运动强调了意识形态对卢旺达士兵自我理解的影响,并使非民主政权类型与镇压叛乱战略的等同性复杂化。作者感谢Rick Orth、Emilia Columbo、Marco Jowell、Brittany Hall和Tertius Jacobs分享的见解、评论和反馈,为本文提供了信息和改进。作者还感谢Focus Group情报驱动的风险管理公司,该公司在研究交流的基础上免费提供与德尔加多角危机相关的订阅产品。披露声明作者未报告潜在的利益冲突。补充材料本文的补充数据可在https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2261400Notes1上在线获取。基桑加尼和皮克林,《非洲干预》,4-5,8-11;Bode and Karlsrud,“实践中的实施”,465;Fisher和Wilen,非洲维和,1 - 2,11 - 3.2。Fisher和Wilen,非洲维和,12,156;哈利格和珍妮,谁的规则?谁的权力?662 - 5.3。Abiola等人的《大贡献者》,158-60.4。多内利,《卢旺达的军事外交》。Cabo Ligado Monthly(以下简称CLM): 2021年12月(2021年12月21日)第6-7期;CLM: 2022年3月(2022年4月15日),2-46。这一分析在很大程度上借鉴了利加多角冲突观察站(https://acleddata.com/cabo-ligado-mozambique-conflict-observatory/)和Focus Group风险管理公司(https://focusholding.net/)的见解。此处引用的焦点小组报告已获得明确许可;参考产品仍然是专有材料,受适用的使用和披露限制。基勒,《基加利原则》,第8页。Paul等人,《超越以人口为中心》。尽管基加利寻求在莫桑比克、中非共和国以及各种维和行动中保持稳定,但高层叛逃者表示,该政权更希望刚果东部出现长期但可控的轻微混乱——见错,不要打扰,280-1.10。鲁法,军事文化,31-5.11。Abiola等人,“大贡献者”,158-9;Fisher and Wilen,《非洲维和》,第12页。Jowell,《贡献者简介》,第13页。维和数据:死亡人数,https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities(可于2022年2月9日查阅)。死亡人数包括达尔富尔32人,中非共和国16人,南苏丹9人。珍娜,“不要责怪威权主义”;琼斯,《平壤与新加坡之间》,242.15。安娜,警察使用了“过度武力”。Charbonneau和Nichols, <卢旺达维和人员射杀抗议者>,第16页。国际和平研究所(IPI),“问责制”;尼克尔斯,”联合国对马拉卡尔暴力的反应’;威尔斯,《火焰中的避难所》。Sieff和Amur,“维和人员犯了重大错误”;林奇,《联合国维和人员被控虐待儿童、兽交和怯懦》,第18页。《基加利原则》,全球保护责任中心。基勒:《基加利原则》第20页。这些原则并非没有争议。参见联合国,“关于保护平民的意见分歧”。“RDF部署二级医院”新时代;" RDF完成二级医院部署",IGIHE.22。卡鲁汉加,“卢旺达特种部队在中非共和国的行动”,第23页。罗兰,《子弹与恐慌》。CLM: 2021年9月(2021年10月15日),7.25《卢旺达军事效能》,第26页。国际特赦组织,《卢旺达:隐藏的暴力》;人权观察,《世界报告》;《血的赞美》,131-152.27页。斯特恩斯,《怪物的荣耀》,250-266.28页。杰克逊,胜利中的失败。Bekoe等人,莫桑比克的极端主义,21-24.30。恩格尔哈特,《民主与独裁》,56-7页;莱尔:“低级反叛军?”169 - 70;Byman,“死亡解决所有问题”,第14-7页;Heuser和Shamir,“通用工具箱”,369.31。CLM: 2021年7月(2021年8月16日),1 - 2,6;CLM: 2021年8月(2021年9月15日),1 - 2,4 - 5;德尔加多角的伊斯兰国附属叛乱分子最初自称为Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamma,但在当地被称为“青年党”(al Shabaab)。33.不应将其与在索马里活动的与基地组织有联系的同名集团混为一谈。 马丁,“派拉蒙提供的军事硬件”;de Cherisey,《莫桑比克的丛林战争》73。与rdf相关的空中和火炮火力似乎仅限于偏远地区或封锁地区。例子包括2021年8月中旬轰炸Mbau附近的叛乱分子森林基地Siri 1和Siri 2,以及2021年9月25日轰炸梅萨洛河南岸难以到达的叛乱分子阵地——见AIM/TVM,“莫桑比克:“最重要的任务尚未到来”,莫桑比克俱乐部;莫桑比克俱乐部“对武装分子的重大伏击”;德尔加多角(@DelgadoCabo), Twitter, 2021年9月26日上午9:37,https://twitter.com/DelgadoCabo/status/1442121253297410058.74。纳米尔,《德尔加多角:两年》,75页。卢旺达目前的SAMIM和莫桑比克国防军的对应部队也主要是地面部队,装备相似,并依靠莫桑比克国防军的直升机空中支援,但在同时应对叛乱暴力、避免平民伤害和赢得公众信任方面,他们的表现难以与卢旺达国防军相媲美。SAMIM的南非分遣队带来了一些额外的空中资产——最初包括两架Oryx部队运输直升机和一架C-208大篷车侦察机——但数量不足,无法支持更多的空中作战概念。见“据报道南非国防军已抵达莫桑比克:达伦·奥利维尔”,SABC新闻,YouTube视频,2021年7月26日,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wbzWBj80TAw.76。关于RDF枪法,请参见Morgenstein的《轻声说话》77。费尔特和夏皮罗,“限制平民伤亡”,44-58.78。青年党叛乱分子经常与被绑架的平民和支持者一起移动和露营,因此避免附带伤亡的挑战在德尔加多角尤为艰巨。Castelli和Zambernardi,“武力保护及其权衡”,第45-9页。在美国的军事术语中,这通常是在任务风险和武力风险之间的紧张关系中讨论的。关于在平叛和维和中“部队沉默”的另一种理论——尽管是基于对印度经验的相当有选择性和慈善的调查——参见Podder和Roy的《使用武力保护平民》。参见Kahl中关于“代价高昂的合规”的讨论,“Crossfire还是in Crosshairs?”的36 - 7.82。卡鲁汉加的损失报告,“纽西:卡加梅理解莫桑比克人的痛苦”。有关更高数据的提示,请参阅CLW: 7月19-25日(2021年7月28日),3;CLW: 7月26日- 8月1日(2021年8月3日),2;CLM: 2021年7月(2021年8月16日),2;CLM: 2022年4月。基加利官方不愿透露在莫桑比克的伤亡数据,这与它在维持和平行动中的公共事务姿态明显不同,在维持和平行动中,死亡是自由承认的,并得到适当的纪念——见Jowell,“贡献者简介”83。Kuehnel和wil<s:1>,“卢旺达的军队”,4,7.84。FGW,第395期,2021.85年12月8-15日。CLM: 2023年3月(2023年4月17日),2;CLW: 9月13-19日(2021年9月21日),2-3;国际危机组织(ICG),赢得和平,7;FGW第404期,2022年3月9-16日。关于这些技术对反叛乱风险计算的影响,参见卡尔的《交叉火力还是在准星上?》“24 - 5.86。CLM: 2021年9月(2021年10月15日)6.87。ICG,赢得和平,5;FGW第399期,2022年2月2-9日;CLM: 2022年1月(2022年2月18日)5-6.88。联邦当局对北部省份居民的虐待和勒索倾向,以及从南部偏颇地招募安全部队,都是长期存在的——见Baker,“莫桑比克的治安和法治”,145-54页。另见2022年4月3日在奥尼扬戈-奥博发生的检查站洗劫和过去的警察暴行;ICG,《赢得和平》,1989年第5期。CLW: 6月13-19日,2022年6月22日,3;FGW第422期,2022年7月13-20日;FGW第426期,2022.90年8月10-17日。卢旺达驻莫桑比克大使Claude Nikobisanzwe在国际空间站网络直播“外国干预会拯救德尔加多角吗?”2021年11月8日,https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado;ICG,赢得和平,8。另见关于建立联合情报融合中心以便与SAMIM和莫桑比克当局共享情报的讨论- CLW: 4月11日至17日(2022年4月20日),第4页。关于以同样方式失败的部队结构理论的测试,见Scarinzi,“部队结构和反叛乱”,212-5.91。Joe van der Walt评论,“打击莫桑比克叛乱”,国防网虚拟会议,2021年11月16日。关于人力资源和预测情报之间的关系,请参见Felter, Guns to a Knife Fight, 12-13,以及Joe van der Walt在FGW 400期,2022.92年2月9-16日的评论。“安全形势更新220,606-SEC001:叛乱活动增加和扩大,而莫桑比克普拉亚和帕尔马的袭击事件恢复”,焦点小组,2022.93年6月6日。达曼,《卢旺达的战略性人道主义》1994。同前。 大多数参考文献都涉及维和行动,但政府官员使用相同的语言描述和证明德尔加多角特派团的合理性,明确将干预与保护、防止暴行和自我牺牲的基本主题联系起来——见Mwara,“卢旺达看到另一个达尔富尔时刻”;“副警长Namuhoranye向警察简报”,塔里法;卢旺达驻莫桑比克大使Claude Nikobisanzwe在国际空间站网络直播“外国干预会拯救德尔加多角吗?”2021年11月8日,https://issafrica.org/events/will-foreign-intervention-save-cabo-delgado.118。关于建立组织形象、成员认同和个人绩效之间对应关系的组织理论的见解,请参见Dutton等人的“组织形象和成员认同”,239 - 240,246,255,260.119。鲁法,《维和人员的想法》;鲁法,<军事文化与武力雇佣>,第120页。关于规范传播的类型学,见Oksamytna和Wilen,“采用,适应或机会”,2357-2374.121。Stearns,《从CNDP到M23、19、25、32-33、44、46-47、54-55》;“复兴的M23叛军以平民为目标”,人权观察,122。“外交猫捉老鼠”,非洲情报:“联合国专家称卢旺达干预”,路透社,123。《两名士兵说卢旺达》,路透社,124。汤姆森:《卢旺达:从种族灭绝到岌岌可危的和平》,第235-236页;克拉克,《卢旺达的复苏》,36-37.125页。关于对卢旺达社会不和谐的深刻厌恶,见拉马克,隔离边境,187-194;244. 关于培养的不安全感和将FDLR描述为持续威胁,见同上,228,以及Andrea purdekov<s:1>等人,“治理的军事化”,168。在卢旺达境内,“卢民主力量”一词被广泛用于国家的各种敌人,而不论其是否隶属于实际的民兵组织,这进一步强调了危险感并使其现实评价复杂化。错误,请勿打扰,280.127。同上,330,420.128。关于对战争时期经验的尊崇以及在RDF内跨年龄群的知识和信念的代际传递,见Matisek关于rpa时代“爱国者”和“新RDF”成员所持有的价值模型的讨论,Pathways to Military Effectiveness, 307-10.129。关于RDF内部认为的维护社会凝聚力的责任,见Rusagara,《一个国家的复原力》,1913年。乔伊斯,《士兵的困境》,48-90.131。伯吉斯,《从失败的权力分享》,第92-99页;克雷布斯和利克利德,《联合就会失败》,第132页。特别是看到RDF的愿望,以恢复(可能是杜撰的)前殖民凝聚力的理想- Jowell,“凝聚力通过社会化”,284,287-8。还有,马蒂斯,《把历史带回来》,473-4.133。Lemarchand,《暴力的动力学》,100-106.134。赫伦德,《没有种族灭绝》,32-34页;戴维,《一个士兵的旅程》,NPI 2568.135。Autesserre,《刚果的麻烦》。Ruffa,“军事文化和部队就业”,394;鲁法,“维和人员的想法”,210-1.137。参见Jason K. Stearns在CSIS与Mvemba Phezo Dizolel的直播讨论中发表的评论,“解决刚果民主共和国与卢旺达之间日益紧张的局势”,YouTube视频,2022年6月10日,https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u0_rFrmKbbA.138。北,“卢旺达胡图族极端主义叛乱”;拉马克:《隔离边疆》,104-5,251.139。作者视频采访焦点集团分析师Brittany Hall和Tertius Jacobs, 2012.10月18日。CLW: 4月25日- 5月8日(2022年5月10日),2-3.141。《卢旺达警察杀人》,路透社;“卢旺达警察开枪杀人”,BBC新闻,142。斯特恩斯,《无名之战》,80-3.143页。参见达曼在“卢旺达的战略人道主义”中对“两面”国家的描述。Chemouni和Mugiraneza,《意识形态与利益》,115-140页;McDoom,“安全的国家建设”,535-567.145。恩格尔哈特,《民主与独裁》,58;Lalwani,选择性利维坦;《人民在反抗》。本文作者ralph Shield是美国海军战争学院战略与作战研究部(SORD)的高级研究员。他曾担任情报官员、国防武官和外国军事顾问。他早期的作品发表在《战略研究杂志》、《斯拉夫军事研究杂志》和《南部非洲研究杂志》(即将出版)上。本文中表达的观点和观点仅代表作者的观点和观点,不代表美国海军、国防部或美国政府的官方立场或评估。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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Small Wars and Insurgencies
Small Wars and Insurgencies INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-
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