{"title":"Do you believe that aliens feel pain? An empirical investigation of mental state attributions","authors":"Gregory Johnson, Alana Knowles","doi":"10.24193/cbb.2023.27.09","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"On what basis do we attribute phenomenal states to others? One answer, defended by John Stuart Mill, appeals to an analogy between ourselves and the similar bodies and actions of others (1865, p. 208). Despite its intuitive plausibility, this position is often rejected (Arico et al., 2011; Buckwalter & Phelan, 2014; Knobe & Prinz, 2008). In line with Mill’s account, we propose that the primary factors used when making phenomenal state ascriptions are the appropriate display of functional and behavioral cues and having bodies with the right kind of physical composition. To test this account, we gave five groups of participants a vignette followed by three to six questions. For four of the groups, the vignette described an alien-human encounter and the participants had to judge the likelihood (on a 7-point scale) that the alien had a non-phenomenal state (a belief) and the likelihood that it could have a phenomenal state (pain). The fifth group, as a control, read a vignette about a similar interaction between two humans. We found that, as appropriate functional and behavioral cues and then humanoid features are added to the alien, people are more willing to attribute a phenomenal state to it. Attributions of the non-phenomenal state are primarily dependent on the appropriate functional and behavioral cues, not on having humanoid features.","PeriodicalId":37371,"journal":{"name":"Cognition, Brain, Behavior. An Interdisciplinary Journal","volume":"223 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-29","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Cognition, Brain, Behavior. An Interdisciplinary Journal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.24193/cbb.2023.27.09","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"Psychology","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
On what basis do we attribute phenomenal states to others? One answer, defended by John Stuart Mill, appeals to an analogy between ourselves and the similar bodies and actions of others (1865, p. 208). Despite its intuitive plausibility, this position is often rejected (Arico et al., 2011; Buckwalter & Phelan, 2014; Knobe & Prinz, 2008). In line with Mill’s account, we propose that the primary factors used when making phenomenal state ascriptions are the appropriate display of functional and behavioral cues and having bodies with the right kind of physical composition. To test this account, we gave five groups of participants a vignette followed by three to six questions. For four of the groups, the vignette described an alien-human encounter and the participants had to judge the likelihood (on a 7-point scale) that the alien had a non-phenomenal state (a belief) and the likelihood that it could have a phenomenal state (pain). The fifth group, as a control, read a vignette about a similar interaction between two humans. We found that, as appropriate functional and behavioral cues and then humanoid features are added to the alien, people are more willing to attribute a phenomenal state to it. Attributions of the non-phenomenal state are primarily dependent on the appropriate functional and behavioral cues, not on having humanoid features.
我们根据什么将现象状态归因于他人?约翰·斯图亚特·密尔(John Stuart Mill)为一个答案辩护,他将我们自己与他人相似的身体和行为进行类比(1865年,第208页)。尽管这一立场在直觉上是合理的,但它经常被拒绝(Arico et al., 2011;Buckwalter,费兰,2014;观看,普林茨,2008)。根据密尔的说法,我们提出,在进行现象状态归因时使用的主要因素是功能和行为线索的适当展示,以及具有正确物理组成的身体。为了验证这个说法,我们给了五组参与者一个小插曲,后面跟着三到六个问题。对于其中四个小组,小插图描述了外星人与人类的相遇,参与者必须判断外星人具有非现象状态(信念)和具有现象状态(疼痛)的可能性(以7分制为标准)。第五组作为对照,阅读一篇关于两个人之间类似互动的小短文。我们发现,当适当的功能和行为线索以及人形特征被添加到外星人身上时,人们更愿意将其归因于一种现象状态。非现象状态的归因主要取决于适当的功能和行为线索,而不是具有类人特征。
期刊介绍:
Cognition, Brain, Behavior. An Interdisciplinary Journal publishes contributions from all areas of cognitive science, focusing on disciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches to information processing and behavior analysis. We encourage contributions from the following domains: psychology, neuroscience, artificial intelligence, linguistics, ethology, anthropology and philosophy of mind. The journal covers empirical studies and theoretical reviews that expand our understanding of cognitive, neural, and behavioral mechanisms. Both fundamental and applied studies are welcomed. On occasions, special issues will be covering particular themes, under the editorship of invited experts.