{"title":"Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence by Paul Scharre (review)","authors":"Divya Siddarth","doi":"10.1353/jod.2023.a900443","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Reimagining Democracy’s Defense Divya Siddarth (bio) Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. By Paul Scharre. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2023. 496 pp. It seems that we are in the throes of an AI arms race. A recent open letter calling for a pause in artificial-intelligence research, with signatories from Elon Musk to Yoshua Bengio, states that “AI labs [are] locked in an outof-control race to develop and deploy AI” that they cannot “understand, predict, or reliably control.” Responses to the letter included exhortations from U.S. senators and CEOs for the United States to instead “step up” its AI arms race against China for fear of being left behind, safety risks from corporate competition notwithstanding. Paul Scharre, a vice-president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, takes the latter position, although he carefully sidesteps using the term “arms race.” In his comprehensive Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Scharre makes the case that the United States is locked in a “race . . . to lead in AI and write the rules of the next century to control the future of global power and security” (p. 8). While the United States is currently in a favorable position, the stakes are too high and the outcome too uncertain for complacency. Scharre calls for a renewed program of AI investment, innovation, and diffusion to cement a U.S. lead. Of course, races to control technology among rival powers are nothing new. The sixteenth century B.C.E. saw the first use of the chariot as a weapon, altering the balance of power in Egypt’s favor and sparking a centuries-long arms race from Anatolia to Mesopotamia. The Roman [End Page 173] ballista, itself derived from earlier Greek designs, set off its own race among rival states in the ancient world. The modern era has seen its share of such races, each more destructive, from the Anglo-German naval arms race, which contributed to the tensions that sparked World War I, to the destruction unleashed and threatened by the development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. But as technology becomes more powerful, the consequences of these arms races rise commensurately, as does the risk—increasingly borne not only by combatants, but by the world at large. Nowhere is this clearer than in the race to lead in AI, both on and off the battlefield (but mostly on). Scharre’s focus is on the risk that falling behind on AI would be a death blow to democracy. As Scharre puts it: “If the United States and other democracies do not work together to lead in AI and shape the rules for how it is used, they risk a creeping tide of techno-authoritarianism that undermines democracy and freedom around the globe” (p. 7). This is very much a Biden-era book, framing this global conflict as one between democracies and autocracies that the United States must focus on winning. If there were any doubts as to the purveyors of this techno-authoritarianism, Scharre puts them to bed early, opening the book with quotes from Xi Jinping and Vladmir Putin expressing their own ambitions to dominate in AI. China, in particular, is the target of Scharre’s concern. If China becomes the world’s AI leader by 2030, as is its goal, Scharre foresees a future of widespread surveillance, human-rights abuses, and the erosion of global freedoms. Worryingly, according to Scharre, China may be poised to do just that. The country produces more AI papers than the United States does, collects and can utilize far more data than the privacy-concerned West can, and is on track to spend billions on research, training, and launching large-scale AI projects. If democracies do not propose an alternative model for AI governance, Scharre fears that the speed and scale of China’s action may bulldoze other efforts. Scharre enumerates four battlegrounds on which the future of AI will be decided, each of which is described as a surface area of competition between the United States and China: data, compute (or computing hardware), talent, and institutions. Throughout the book, he ties...","PeriodicalId":48227,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Democracy","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.3000,"publicationDate":"2023-07-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Democracy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2023.a900443","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 4
Abstract
Reimagining Democracy’s Defense Divya Siddarth (bio) Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence. By Paul Scharre. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2023. 496 pp. It seems that we are in the throes of an AI arms race. A recent open letter calling for a pause in artificial-intelligence research, with signatories from Elon Musk to Yoshua Bengio, states that “AI labs [are] locked in an outof-control race to develop and deploy AI” that they cannot “understand, predict, or reliably control.” Responses to the letter included exhortations from U.S. senators and CEOs for the United States to instead “step up” its AI arms race against China for fear of being left behind, safety risks from corporate competition notwithstanding. Paul Scharre, a vice-president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, takes the latter position, although he carefully sidesteps using the term “arms race.” In his comprehensive Four Battlegrounds: Power in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, Scharre makes the case that the United States is locked in a “race . . . to lead in AI and write the rules of the next century to control the future of global power and security” (p. 8). While the United States is currently in a favorable position, the stakes are too high and the outcome too uncertain for complacency. Scharre calls for a renewed program of AI investment, innovation, and diffusion to cement a U.S. lead. Of course, races to control technology among rival powers are nothing new. The sixteenth century B.C.E. saw the first use of the chariot as a weapon, altering the balance of power in Egypt’s favor and sparking a centuries-long arms race from Anatolia to Mesopotamia. The Roman [End Page 173] ballista, itself derived from earlier Greek designs, set off its own race among rival states in the ancient world. The modern era has seen its share of such races, each more destructive, from the Anglo-German naval arms race, which contributed to the tensions that sparked World War I, to the destruction unleashed and threatened by the development of nuclear weapons during the Cold War. But as technology becomes more powerful, the consequences of these arms races rise commensurately, as does the risk—increasingly borne not only by combatants, but by the world at large. Nowhere is this clearer than in the race to lead in AI, both on and off the battlefield (but mostly on). Scharre’s focus is on the risk that falling behind on AI would be a death blow to democracy. As Scharre puts it: “If the United States and other democracies do not work together to lead in AI and shape the rules for how it is used, they risk a creeping tide of techno-authoritarianism that undermines democracy and freedom around the globe” (p. 7). This is very much a Biden-era book, framing this global conflict as one between democracies and autocracies that the United States must focus on winning. If there were any doubts as to the purveyors of this techno-authoritarianism, Scharre puts them to bed early, opening the book with quotes from Xi Jinping and Vladmir Putin expressing their own ambitions to dominate in AI. China, in particular, is the target of Scharre’s concern. If China becomes the world’s AI leader by 2030, as is its goal, Scharre foresees a future of widespread surveillance, human-rights abuses, and the erosion of global freedoms. Worryingly, according to Scharre, China may be poised to do just that. The country produces more AI papers than the United States does, collects and can utilize far more data than the privacy-concerned West can, and is on track to spend billions on research, training, and launching large-scale AI projects. If democracies do not propose an alternative model for AI governance, Scharre fears that the speed and scale of China’s action may bulldoze other efforts. Scharre enumerates four battlegrounds on which the future of AI will be decided, each of which is described as a surface area of competition between the United States and China: data, compute (or computing hardware), talent, and institutions. Throughout the book, he ties...
重新构想民主的防御Divya Siddarth(传记)四个战场:人工智能时代的权力。保罗·夏尔著。纽约:诺顿出版社,2023。我们似乎正处于人工智能军备竞赛的阵痛之中。最近一封呼吁暂停人工智能研究的公开信指出,“人工智能实验室陷入了一场失控的竞赛,以开发和部署人工智能”,他们无法“理解、预测或可靠地控制”。联署者包括埃隆·马斯克(Elon Musk)和Yoshua Bengio。对这封信的回应包括,美国参议员和首席执行官们劝告美国不要“加紧”与中国的人工智能军备竞赛,因为美国担心落后,尽管企业竞争存在安全风险。新美国安全中心(Center for a New American Security)副总裁兼研究主任保罗·沙雷(Paul Scharre)持后一种立场,尽管他小心翼翼地避免使用“军备竞赛”一词。在他全面的《四大战场:人工智能时代的力量》一书中,沙雷认为美国陷入了一场“竞赛……领导人工智能,制定下个世纪的规则,以控制全球权力和安全的未来”(第8页)。尽管美国目前处于有利地位,但风险太高,结果也太不确定,不能自满。Scharre呼吁重新制定人工智能投资、创新和推广计划,以巩固美国的领先地位。当然,竞争对手之间控制技术的竞赛并不是什么新鲜事。公元前16世纪,战车第一次被用作武器,改变了对埃及有利的力量平衡,并引发了从安纳托利亚到美索不达米亚长达几个世纪的军备竞赛。罗马的弹道炮本身就源自早期希腊的设计,在古代世界的敌对国家中掀起了自己的竞赛。现代社会见证了这样的竞赛,每一次都更具破坏性,从导致第一次世界大战爆发的紧张局势的英德海军军备竞赛,到冷战期间核武器发展引发并威胁到的破坏。但随着技术变得越来越强大,这些军备竞赛的后果也相应增加,风险也越来越多地不仅由战斗人员承担,而且由整个世界承担。这一点在AI领域的竞争中表现得最为明显,无论是在战场上还是战场外(但主要是在战场上)。沙雷的重点是,在人工智能方面落后的风险将是对民主的致命打击。正如Scharre所说:“如果美国和其他民主国家不共同努力,在人工智能领域发挥领导作用,并制定使用人工智能的规则,它们就有可能出现一股逐渐蔓延的技术威权主义浪潮,破坏全球的民主和自由”(第7页)。这在很大程度上是一本拜登时代的书,它将这场全球冲突框定为民主国家和专制国家之间的冲突,美国必须专注于赢得这场冲突。沙雷特别关注的目标是中国。如果中国在2030年成为世界人工智能的领导者,这是它的目标,沙雷预计未来会有广泛的监视,侵犯人权和侵蚀全球自由。沙雷表示,令人担忧的是,中国可能正准备这么做。中国发表的人工智能论文比美国多,收集和利用的数据比关注隐私的西方多得多,并且正在投入数十亿美元用于研究、培训和启动大规模人工智能项目。如果民主国家不提出人工智能治理的替代模式,沙雷担心中国行动的速度和规模可能会压倒其他国家的努力。Scharre列举了决定人工智能未来的四个战场,每个战场都被描述为美国和中国之间竞争的一个表面领域:数据、计算(或计算硬件)、人才和机构。在整本书中,他把……
期刊介绍:
Since its inception in 1990, the Journal of Democracy has become an influential international forum for scholarly analysis and competing democratic viewpoints. Its articles have been cited in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal and widely reprinted in many languages. Focusing exclusively on democracy, the Journal monitors and analyzes democratic regimes and movements in scores of countries around the world. Each issue features a unique blend of scholarly analysis, reports from democratic activists, updates on news and elections, and reviews of important recent books.