The first year of the Pacific War. Prospects of the Belligerents

Abstract

The article provides a military-historical analysis of the development of events at the initial stage of the War in the Pacific and in East Asia from Japan's attack on the United States to the Battle of Guadalcanal inclusive. The authors aim to answer the question whether the US victory was an accident caused by strategic mistakes of the Japanese command, or whether it was an inevitable pattern. In the work, the authors also try to find out what was the role of the mobilizations in USA and Japan in the first year of the Pacific War in the development of relevant events. The article discusses strategies, in connection with which the authors come to the conclusion that there was no unity among the representatives of the highest military leadership of the Japanese Empire in matters of the directions of the offensives carried out by the imperial armed forces. The authors show the connection between the peculiarities of the mobilization of the armed forces of Japan, USA and Great Britain and the development of events at the initial stage of the War in the Pacific. It is emphasized that the Soviet factor and the resulting expenditure of resources on building up the offensive potential of the Kwantung Army, which absorbed the most prepared ground units, had a negative impact on the long-term plans of the Japanese armed forces. The authors assign great importance to the Battle for Guadalcanal, which due to the diversion of Japan's transport tonnage had a serious impact on the course of the entire Second World War in Asia. The authors pay much attention to the issue of the offensive of Japanese troops in Burma in early 1942 and the prospects of the Japanese invasion of India, they believe that the Japanese high command made a major strategic mistake by refusing to further advance in the western direction. On the other hand, the authors consider the defeat of the British in Burma as a result of the mistakes of the British War Cabinet and the peculiarities of the mobilization of human potential in the British Empire. The authors conclude that the Japanese Empire had a chance of winning the War in the Pacific in 1942.