Influential news and policy-making

IF 1.2 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Federico Vaccari
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Abstract This paper analyzes the implications of interventions that affect the costs of misreporting. I study a model of communication between an uninformed voter and a media outlet that knows the quality of two competing candidates. The alternatives available to the voter are endogenously championed by the two candidates. I show that higher costs may lead to more misreporting and persuasion, whereas low costs result in full revelation. The voter may be better off when less informed because of higher costs. When the media receives policy-independent gains, interventions that increase misreporting costs never directly harm the voter. However, lenient interventions that increase these costs by small amounts can be wasteful of public resources. Regulation produced by politicians leads to suboptimal interventions.
有影响力的新闻和政策制定
摘要本文分析了影响误报成本的干预措施的含义。我研究的是一个不知情的选民与了解两位竞争候选人实力的媒体之间的沟通模式。选民可以选择的选择是由两位候选人内在地支持的。我表明,更高的成本可能会导致更多的误报和说服,而低成本会导致充分的披露。由于成本较高,选民获知的信息越少,情况可能会越好。当媒体获得与政策无关的收益时,增加误报成本的干预措施不会直接伤害选民。然而,轻微增加这些费用的宽松干预可能是对公共资源的浪费。政治家制定的监管导致了次优干预。
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来源期刊
Economic Theory
Economic Theory ECONOMICS-
CiteScore
2.50
自引率
23.10%
发文量
68
期刊介绍: The purpose of Economic Theory is to provide an outlet for research - in all areas of economics based on rigorous theoretical reasoning, and - on specific topics in mathematics which is motivated by the analysis of economic problems. Economic Theory''s scope encompasses - but is not limited to - the following fields. - classical and modern equilibrium theory - cooperative and non-cooperative game theory - macroeconomics - social choice and welfare - uncertainty and information, intertemporal economics (including dynamical systems) - public economics - international and developmental economics - financial economics, money and banking - industrial organization Economic Theory also publishes surveys if they clearly picture the basic ideas at work in some areas, the essential technical apparatus which is used and the central questions which remain open. The development of a productive dialectic between stylized facts and abstract formulations requires that economic relevance be at the forefront. Thus, correct, and innovative, mathematical analysis is not enough; it must be motivated by - and contribute to - the understanding of substantive economic problems. Officially cited as: Econ Theory
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