Discussion of “the functional background of the compensation committee chair: the choice and weight of performance measures in CEO compensation”

IF 2.3 Q2 BUSINESS, FINANCE
Stephen Gong
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Purpose Nwaeze and Kalelkar (2023) examine the association between the functional background of the compensation committee chair (CC chair) and CEO compensation using S&P 500 firms from 2008 to 2018. They find that the CC chair's functional background is positively associated with the adoption of performance measures that are more aligned with such background. This discussion starts with Nwaeze and Kalelkar's (2023) incremental contribution, and offers suggestions on two areas for improvement. First, the authors could provide a more focused discussion of the conceptual framework. Second, the authors could improve their empirical design and interpretation of results. Avenues for future research are also suggested. Design/methodology/approach This discussion suggests methods and model specifications that may strengthen the research design, facilitate the interpretation of results, and provide additional insights. Findings The discussed paper could improve the reliability and rigor of the empirical tests and the conclusions by providing more contextual and granular information on firms' actual CEO compensation arrangements, using more careful testing procedures, and enhancing clarity in the writing. Originality/value Researchers could be interested in alternative perspectives and richer analyses of non-agency model based determinants of CEO compensation.
“薪酬委员会主席的职能背景:CEO薪酬绩效指标的选择与权重”探讨
Nwaeze和Kalelkar(2023)以2008年至2018年标准普尔500指数公司为研究对象,研究了薪酬委员会主席(CC主席)的职能背景与CEO薪酬之间的关系。他们发现,委员会主席的职能背景与采用更符合其背景的绩效指标呈正相关。本讨论从Nwaeze和Kalelkar(2023)的增量贡献开始,并在两个方面提出改进建议。首先,作者可以对概念框架进行更集中的讨论。其次,作者可以改进他们的实证设计和结果的解释。最后提出了今后的研究方向。本讨论提出的方法和模型规范可以加强研究设计,促进对结果的解释,并提供额外的见解。研究发现,本文通过提供更多企业CEO薪酬安排的背景和细节信息,使用更仔细的测试程序,并提高写作的清晰度,可以提高实证检验和结论的可靠性和严谨性。原创性/价值研究人员可能对基于非代理模型的CEO薪酬决定因素的替代观点和更丰富的分析感兴趣。
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来源期刊
Asian Review of Accounting
Asian Review of Accounting BUSINESS, FINANCE-
CiteScore
3.20
自引率
25.00%
发文量
32
期刊介绍: Covering various fields of accounting, Asian Review of Accounting publishes research papers, commentary notes, review papers and practitioner oriented articles that address significant international issues as well as those that focus on Asia Pacific in particular.Coverage includes but is not limited to: -Financial accounting -Managerial accounting -Auditing -Taxation -Accounting information systems -Social and environmental accounting -Accounting education Perspectives or viewpoints arising from regional, national or international focus, a private or public sector information need, or a market-perspective or social and environmental perspective are greatly welcomed. Manuscripts that present viewpoints should address issues of wide interest among accounting scholars internationally and those in Asia Pacific in particular.
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