Neural Decoding, the Atlantis Machine, and Zombies

IF 1.6 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Rosa Cao, Jared Warren
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Neural decoding studies seem to show that the “private” experiences of others are more accessible than philosophers have traditionally believed. While these studies have many limitations, they do demonstrate that by capturing patterns in brain activity, we can discover a great deal about what a subject is experiencing. We present a thought experiment about a super‐decoder — the Atlantis machine — and argue that given plausible assumptions, an Atlantis machine could one day be built. On the basis of this argument, we then argue for the rejection of robust notions of consciousness, which have generated numerous puzzles, including puzzles about the possibility of philosophical zombies. In light of the Atlantis machine, it can be seen that robust notions of consciousness do not earn their explanatory or descriptive keep. More modest concepts of consciousness are sufficient to account for all phenomena — in both senses of the term. This kind of antirobustness about consciousness is a deflationary approach to conscious experience that differs in important ways from illusionist approaches.
神经解码,亚特兰蒂斯机器,还有僵尸
神经解码研究似乎表明,他人的“私人”经历比哲学家传统上认为的更容易理解。虽然这些研究有很多局限性,但它们确实表明,通过捕捉大脑活动的模式,我们可以发现很多关于受试者正在经历的事情。我们提出了一个关于超级解码器的思想实验-亚特兰蒂斯机器-并认为在合理的假设下,亚特兰蒂斯机器有一天会被建造出来。在此论证的基础上,我们主张摒弃强有力的意识概念,这一概念产生了许多难题,包括关于哲学僵尸可能性的难题。在亚特兰蒂斯机器的光芒下,我们可以看到,强健的意识概念并不能获得解释性或描述性的保留。更温和的意识概念足以解释所有的现象——在这个术语的两种意义上。这种关于意识的反鲁棒性是一种对意识体验的紧缩方法,在很多重要的方面不同于幻觉的方法。
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CiteScore
1.50
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