THE RIGHT PERCEPTION OF THE CONCEPT OF RIGHT: A VIEW THROUGH THE PRISM OF OBLIGATIONS

Abstract

Introduction: the concept of right, which is one of the fundamental concepts of legal science, cannot exist as an independent concept. It is sine qua non dependent on the concept of legal obligation that gives the former its existence and meaning. This is similar to the relationship between the concepts of stove and fire: even though fire can exist and have a meaning without a stove, neither the existence nor the meaning of a stove is possible without fire. Purpose: this article aims to thoroughly analyze the concept of right, instituted in order to provide benefits for legal personality-holding entities and protect them from potential harms that may come from other entities, which requires the protection of an interest (directly or indirectly related to at least one human being) by imposing a legal obligation (expressed either in a legal prescription to perform or in a prohibition against performing certain legal acts) on another being (directly or indirectly related to at least one human being). Conclusion: this study concludes that the concept of right does not exist in and of itself, but rather appears from the perspective of a legal personality-holding entity when a legal obligation has been established in its favor.