A Double-Edged-Sword Approach to Fighting Pandemics: Patent Waivers and Incentives to Innovate

Abstract

Although continents recently experienced an apoc­alyptic pandemic that posed a mortal danger to millions of people, a new, even deadlier pandemic could soon emerge… The paper seeks to address the role played by patent waivers and current contractual arrangements in the pharmaceutical indus­try in addressing the dangers caused by the current and future pandemics. The process of waiving patents is explored where it is argued that it sadly cannot amount to the knight in shining armour that everyone has been expecting. Due to the lack of coordination, the tremendously long process, and the potential block in innovation arising from pharmaceutical companies having smaller incentives, more attention must be paid to other alternative institutional solutions. Drawing from the economics literature on innovation in the pharmaceutical sector, a concep­tual framework is proposed for improved legal intervention in the case of patent waivers in international intellectual property law instruments. In addition, the paper provides a comparative law and economics treatment of current patent waivers in US, EU, and international law instruments.