David A. Harrisville: The Virtuous Wehrmacht: Crafting the Myth of the German Soldier on the Eastern Front, 1941–1944

Abstract

but more weight was delivered by the events of November 1942 and June 1944. Drawing on a broad and impressive range of archival sources, particularly British, but also relevant French and American material, this book possibly suffers from the standard problems of first books, notably a failure to give adequate attention to other factors, including, in this case, the exigencies of alliance politics which were particularly sharp for Vichy in the case of the Germans. Yet Britain, Vichy and even, despite de Gaulle’s efforts, the Free French were also abstractions each pulling in different directions. The great interest of this book extends to Anglo-French rivalries in the Levant and their interaction with Levantic nationalism, which provides a valuable linkage to the post-war situation and notably the tensions of the end of the mandate period. The role of opinion emerges as a key element, which leaves this reader wanting more about other factors. Douglas Porch has produced an excellent study of France at war, the first of an intended two-volume work. Porch sets out to be a revisionist, combatting what he sees as serious misperceptions and a skewed periodisation. In particular, he argues that the 1940 armistice did not transform France into a mere bystander and suffering victim. Instead, he compares France with Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States (he could have added China and Poland) that, after initial blows, sought to reconstruct its military power. That comparison might seem questionable. What Porch repeatedly demonstrates is French agency, although, as he shrewdly notes, this agency owed much to the limitations of others, including the German lack of sufficient forces to garrison all of North Africa. In turn, however, these limitations could be made more complex because the Germans did have troops to send to invade Egypt and, in greater quantities, intervene in Tunisia. The French army, moreover, failed to act against the latter, or, indeed, to resist the invasion of Vichy France, while the navy did not deliver the Toulon fleet as Porch argues they could have done. He would have benefitted in that section from comparisons with Italy in 1943; more generally, one of the few weaknesses in this remarkable book is the lack of an adequate comparative context. Another is the lack of sufficient attention to IndoChina and, in particular, the war with Siam/Thailand and the significant role of IndoChina in relations with Japan and the United States. In contrast, the coverage of Bir Hakeim is excessive. The book includes coverage of such topics as the harsh treatment of Alsace-Lorraine, the development of the Resistance, and the details of the Torch operation. At £27.99 it offers excellent value as well.