Japan’s Security Cooperation with Southeast Asia: Clear Messaging is Needed

Abstract

AbstractThis article argues that Southeast Asian countries are not afraid but rather welcome Japan’s recent expansion of security-related cooperation. Based on public opinion surveys and elite interviews, the author claims that the Japanese government should, without fear of criticism and without hesitation, send clearer messages to Asian partners to explain the changes and prospects for Japan’s security cooperation with them to the public at large. They would definitely welcome Japan’s explanation, accept the change, and consider constructive ways to engage with Japan. AcknowledgementThe public opinion survey project referred to in this article was funded by the Sasakawa Peace Foundation. The author would like to thank Takahashi Ayuko, a research fellow at the foundation, Leslie Advincula-Lopez, a research fellow at the Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, and Wayan Marianta, a lecturer at STF Widya Sasana University, for their advice in designing and conducting the survey together.Notes1 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 1978 Diplomatic Bluebook, “Manila Speech” https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/bluebook/1978/s53-2-1-1-001.htm#2ho (Japanese).2 For example, the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, a Singaporean think tank, publishes annually “The State of Southeast Asia Survey https://www.iseas.edu.sg/category/articles-commentaries/state-of-southeast-asia-survey/, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan annual survey “Opinion Poll on Japan” (ASEAN version) https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/culture/pr/yoron.html (Japanese); https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/culture/pr/index.html (English).3 Former rival Japanese, American troops return to Leyte, The Philippine Star. November 19, 2013. https://www.philstar.com/news-commentary/2013/11/19/1258519/juxtaposed-former-rival-japanese-american-troops-return-leyte4 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Keynote Address by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the 13th IISS Asian Security Summit “Shangri-La Dialogue” May 30, 2014. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page18e_000087.html5 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “The Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology” https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000083.html6 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Development Cooperation Charter” November 2, 2015. https://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000138.html7 Ministry of Defense, Japan. “The Transfer of the Air Surveillance Radar Systems to the Philippines (manufacturing of the first fixed radar system in Japan had completed)” October 3, 2022. https://www.mod.go.jp/en/article/2022/10/7a5f746ab7a219be2095570fee238bb28558955e.html8 Ministry of Defense, Japan. “Defense Equipment and Technology Cooperation with Other Countries” https://www.mod.go.jp/en/equipment/tec_cooperation/index.html9 National Security Strategy of Japan. December 2022. https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-e.pdf10 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Official Security Assistance (OSA),” April 5, 2023. https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/ipc/ page4e_001366.html11 Gregory B. Poling, Andreyka Natalegawa, and Danielle Fallin. Building a U.S.-Japan-Philippines Triad. CSIS. February 1, 2023. https://www.csis.org/analysis/building-us-japan-philippines-triad12 Author’s interview with a member of the House of Representatives (anonymous) who belongs to the Japan-Philippines Parliamentary Friendship League. March 9, 2023.13 All articles and editorials from the Philippine Daily Inquirer and the Philippine Star in the Philippines and from Compass and the Java Post in Indonesia for the three-month period from November 1, 2021 to January 31, 2022 and from December 1, 2022 to February 28, 2023 were extracted for aggregation and analysis for frequency, article category, and context (whether they were mentioned in a negative, neutral, or positive tone) of references to the US, China, and Japan.14 The survey is in the form of an online questionnaire to be completed by intelligentsia from the 10 ASEAN countries: researchers, business community, civil society and journalists, ministry officials, and international organization officials. Due to the nature of the survey population, the survey can be described as an elite survey. However, there is no clear sampling list of “elites,” and the percentage of “elites” in the population is not known. The extent to which respondents are considered “elites” and the extent to which they are considered “Southeast Asians” depend on their self-reports, and it is difficult to say that the responses are a microcosm of the population. In addition, the multiple-choice method was used, and since the responses were not free-form text, it was difficult to ascertain the background and reasons for the responses. The questionnaire included the question, “Which partner country has provided the most support for COVID-19 vaccines in the (Southeast Asia) region?” China and the United States were ranked first and second, respectively, but while there are multiple perspectives on promptness, quality, quantity, and other factors, it is unclear in what ways respondents rated the two countries.15 The author and other researchers plan to officially publish a monograph on their research findings in the near future. The findings presented in this article were revealed during a public seminar and a closed-door interim results meeting that the research team held in Singapore on March 28-30, 2023.16 Although the Philippine bureaucracy is not as strong as the Japanese bureaucracy, the perceptions of these elites are reflected in policy to some extent. The general public tends to think that the Philippines’ foreign policy is influenced by the president’s stance toward the US, but the foreign affairs and defense bureaucrats do their jobs quietly, regardless of the president’s remarks. Former President Rodrigo Duterte unilaterally declared that the US-Philippines VFA was to be scrapped, but his statement was eventually withdrawn as if nothing had happened. The fact that the first Japan-Philippines Foreign and Defense Ministerial Meeting (“2+2”) was held under the Duterte administration is evidence for this.17 The norm of “to not make Southeast Asian states choose” has rapidly penetrated policymakers and the security think tank community in Washington and Tokyo over the past five years or so and is now becoming standard diplomatic etiquette. In October 2019, the Brookings Institution in the United States published a report entitled “Don’t make us choose: Southeast Asia in the throes of US-China rivalry” (Stromseth 2019). In April 2021, Donald K. Emmerson, Southeast Asia Program at Stanford University, remarked at a webinar hosted by the ISEAS Yusof Ishak Institute “The popularity of ‘Don’t Make Us Choose’ (DMUC) as a Southeast Asian plea to the United States and China in light of their rivalry in the region is not surprising,” and he frequently used the acronym “DMUC,” which stands for “Don’t Make Us Choose.” https://www.iseas.edu.sg/mec-events/autonomy-and-agency-in-southeast-asia-rethinking-dont-make-us-choose-and-resolving-the-deer-dragon-dilemma/.Additional informationNotes on contributorsKiba SayaKiba Saya is Associate Professor at Kobe City University of Foreign Studies and a member of the Expert Panel for the 50th Year of ASEAN-Japan Friendship and Cooperation, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Her major fields of interest are Southeast Asian studies, civil-military relations, and security sector governance. She has experience as a practitioner, working in the Embassy of Japan in the Philippines and Embassy of Japan in Thailand. She also served as a staff to Diet member and former Foreign Minister MAEHARA Seiji from 2010 to 2012 when the Democratic Party of Japan was the ruling party. Her recent works include a co-edited book, Pathways for Irregular Forces in Southeast Asia: Mitigating Violence with Non-state Armed Groups (Routledge, 2022).