Nsemba Edward Lenshie, Patience Kondu Jacob, Confidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna, Buhari Shehu Miapyen, Paul Onuh, Aminu Idris, Christian Ezeibe
{"title":"Multinational Joint Task Force’s counterinsurgency in the Lake Chad Basin and the consequences of Chadian exit for the Northeast, Nigeria","authors":"Nsemba Edward Lenshie, Patience Kondu Jacob, Confidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna, Buhari Shehu Miapyen, Paul Onuh, Aminu Idris, Christian Ezeibe","doi":"10.1080/09592318.2023.2257591","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACTThe Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising soldiers from the Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin), has been countering insurgency in the region since 2015. Frictional relationships resulting from mutual distrust affected the commitments of MNJTF contributing countries in counterinsurgency operations in Lake Chad. Chad, notably, considered itself an arrowhead in the counterinsurgency due to the laxity of other coalition countries. The devastation its soldiers suffered and the waxing strength of the operation of Boko Haram and allied groups in the region motivated the late Chadian President Idriss Déby to declare in December 2019 the exiting of his soldiers from the MNJTF to concentrate on protecting the borders of the country. The study relied on extant literature and explorative qualitative techniques to investigate the consequences of such exit on northeast Nigeria. At the very least, it reveals that Chad’s exit betrayed the MNJTF counterinsurgency coalition and has negative consequences for the security complexity in northeast Nigeria.KEYWORDS: Multinational Joint Task ForcecounterinsurgencyBoko HaramChadian exitLake Chad basin AcknowledgmentsWe are thankful to our research assistants for assisting during data collection and the reviewers, for valuable comments and the editors, for their observations, insights, and comments, which helped improve the quality of the article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Ezeani et al., ‘From a Religious Sect to a Terrorist Group : The Military and Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria’; Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’.2. Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’, p. 144; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’, p. 1219; Okoli and Lenshie, ‘“Beyond Military Might”: Boko Haram and the Asymmetries of Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’, p. 683.3. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’.4. Lenshie et al., ‘Boko Haram, Security Architecture and Counterinsurgency in North-East, Nigeria’, p. 2; Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, ‘Boko Haram: From Local Grievances to the Violent Insurgency’.5. Ezeibe et al., ‘Strange Bedfellows: Relations between International Nongovernmental Organisations and Military Actors in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria’; Haruna, ‘Nigerian Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram Release Video, Lament Obsolete Weapons, Accusing Commanders of Corruption’.6. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.7. Abdul’ Aziz, ‘Boko Haram: Chadian Troop’s Free Nigerian Soldiers in Captivity, Kill 100 Terrorists as Shekau Reacts’.8. Head Topic, ‘Saluting President Idriss Deby – Daily Trust’.9. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.10. Brown, ‘War against Jihadists in Sahel Dealt Major Blow as Chad Says It Will Withdraw Troops’; Shaban, ‘Chad Ends Involvement in Boko Haram, Sahel Antiterrorism Ops: President’.11. Nwezeh, ‘Military: MNJTF Agreement Precludes Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops’.12. Butfoy, ‘Critical Reflections on Collective Security, p. 1–2’.13. Butfoy, ‘Themes Within the Collective Security Idea, p. 491’.14. Miller, ‘The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security’, p. 304; Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 16.15. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 21.16. Gleason and Shaihutdinov, ‘Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia’, pp. 276–280.17. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 13.18. Miller, ‘The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security’, pp. 309–310.19. De Luca, ‘The Gulf Crisis and Collective Security under the United Nations Charter’, p. 270.20. Tarzi, ‘The Dilemma of Collective Security: A Theoretical Critique’, pp. 45–46.21. Clark, ‘The Trouble with Collective Security’, pp. 240–242.22. Wolff, ‘The Regional Dimensions of State Failure’, p. 962; Buzan and WÆver, “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory’’, p. 254.23. Hanau Santini, ‘A New Regional Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa: Regional Security Complex Theory Revisited’, p. 4; Omotuyi, ‘Franco-Nigerian Détente? Nigeria, France and the Francophone States of the Lake Chad Region in the Era of the Boko Haram Terrorism’, pp. 4–6”.24. Olawoyin, Akinrinde, and Irabor, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian Counter- Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian Counterterrorism’, pp.116–117.25. Dyduch, Jarząbek, and Skorek, ‘The Dependence of Gulf Countries on Hydrocarbons Export – a Perspective of Regional Security Complex Theory’, pp. 131–132.26. Onuoha, ‘A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone – Boko Haram Transnational Reach and Regional Responses’, pp. 9–11.27. Ismail and Kifle, New Collective Security Arrangements in the Sahel : A Comparative Study of the MNJTF and G-5 Sahel, pp.20–22.28. Mwagwabi, “The Theory of Collective Security and Its Limitation in Explaining International Organization: A Critical Analysis, p. 6.29. Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Global Terrorism Index for 2022’.30. Lenshie et al., ‘Desertification, Migration, and Herder-Farmer Conflicts in Nigeria: Rethinking the Ungoverned Spaces Thesis’; Moses and Lenshie, ‘Border Security, Arms Proliferation, and the Conundrum of Ungovernable Spaces in Nigeria’.31. Bensahel, ‘A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism’, pp. 43–44.32. Bensahel.33. Kindzeka, ‘Lake Chad Countries Agree on Military Task Force Amid Insecurity’.34. Agbiboa, ‘Borders That Continue to Bother Us: The Politics of Cross-Border Security Cooperation in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin’, p. 404.35. Onuoha, Tchie, and Zabala, The Quest to Win Hearts and Minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force, p. 9.36. International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram? p. 29.37. Africa Defence Force, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force Shows the Strengths and Limits of Collective Security Action’.38. Omenma, Onyishi, and Michael, ‘A Decade of Boko Haram Activities : The Attacks, Responses and Challenges Ahead’, p. 17”.39. Interview: Nigerian soldier claiming to have been on the front lines of the battle against Boko Haram in Maiduguri, Borno State, in February 2021.40. Interview: displaced community leader in Maiduguri, Borno State, March 2021.41. Africa Defence Force, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force Shows the Strengths and Limits of Collective Security Action’.42. International Crisis Group, ‘What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?’ p. 28.43. Interview: freelance security actor in Mubi, Adamawa State, reported Boko Haram had a long-term regional effect on the population, including brutal experiences during the most violent period of the insurgency.44. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’.45. International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram? p. 2.46. Gavin, ‘Nigeria Security Tracker’.47. Doukhan, ‘Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram – Reflections’.48. Odunsi, ‘Boko Haram: 240 Insurgents Surrender to Military’.49. Mutum, ‘240 Boko Haram Militants Surrender To Task Force’.50. Oshoko, ‘Operation Anmi Fakat: MNJTF Kills 59 Boko Haram Terrorists, 3 Suicide Bombers; Lose 22 Soldiers in Action; 75 Injured by IEDS’.51. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in February 2021.52. Oshoko, ‘Operation Anmi Fakat: MNJTF Kills 59 Boko Haram Terrorists, 3 Suicide Bombers; Lose 22 Soldiers in Action; 75 Injured by IEDS’.53. Oshoko.54. Interview: security expert from Yola, Adamawa State, in January 2021.55. Reuters, ‘Boko Haram Militants Kill 92 Chadian Soldiers – President’.56. Asadu, ‘FLASHBACK: In 2015, Chad President Said Nigeria Was Absent from Boko Haram War’.57. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.58. India Today, ‘Operation Bomo’s Anger: 1,000 Boko Haram Fighters Killed, Says Chad’s Army’.59. Nseyen, ‘Don’t Let Them Free Captured Boko Haram Members, Weapons – Deby Tells Chadian Troops [Video]’.60. Nigeria, ‘90% of Boko Haram Wiped out, President Idriss Deby of Chad Claims (Video)’.61. Interview: Damasak village chief in Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.62. International Crisis Group, ‘What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?’ p. ii.63. Nwezeh, ‘Military: MNJTF Agreement Precludes Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops’.64. The Defence Post, ‘Chad Troops Leave Nigeria with Boko Haram Mission “Finished”’65. The Defence Post.66. Aluko, ‘Boko Haram: MNJTF under Threat as Chad Army Hints at Withdrawal’.67. Interview: security expert from Maiduguri in March 2021.68. Interview with a member of the MNJTF in March 2021 in Maiduguri, Borno State.69. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in February 2021”.70. Cocks, ‘Cameroon Weakest Link in Fight against Boko Haram: Nigeria’.71. Ibekwe, ‘Boko Haram: Nigerian Government Not Doing Enough – U.S’.72. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in March 2021.73. The information provided in the table is incomplete.74. Data adopted with modification from Omenma (Citation2019), p. 15.75. Enietan-Matthews, ‘Chad, Niger Withdraw from MNJTF over Boko Haram Attacks’.76. Enietan-Matthews.77. Interviews: people of the villages of Shafa, Azare, Tashan Alade, Pemi, and Dikwa in Maiduguri, Borno State, in January and February 2021.78. Interview: security expert in Potiskum, Yobe State, in January 2021.79. Omenma, ‘Untold Story of Boko Haram Insurgency: The Lake Chad Oil and Gas Connection’, p. 4.80. Interview: security expert from Maiduguri, Borno State, in February 2021.81. Harding, ‘Chad’s President Idriss Déby Dies after Clashes with Rebels’.82. Marc, ‘The Death of Chadian President Idris Déby Itno threatens Stability in the Region’.83. Ominabo, ‘Niger Coup and Its Implications to West Africa’.84. Ogbuli, ‘What’s Happening in Niger? The Implications of the July 2023 Niger Coup’.85. Okoli and Lenshie, ‘The Military, Boko Haram, and the Dialectics of Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria’.86. Interview: some community leaders in Maiduguri and Borno, and Damaturu, Borno State, in April 2021.87. The Defence Post, ‘Chad Troops Leave Nigeria with Boko Haram Mission “Finished”’88. Africa News, ‘Nigerians Worried as Chad Withdraws All Troops from Lake Chad Area’.89. Several people and FGDs in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe concur with this position.90. Interview: participant from Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.91. FGDs with Maiduguri residents who were forced to flee their homes in January and February 2021 due to Boko Haram, Ansaru, and ISWAP attacks.92. Interviews with Kakuwa, Mungono, Gidimbari and Gajiram community leaders in Maiduguri, Borno State, between January and March 2021.93. SBMorgen, ‘Chart of the Week: Boko Haram Fatalities in 2020’.94. Interview: Damasak village chief in Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.95. Critical interview with community leaders from Gajiganna and Mungono in Maiduguri, Borno State, February 2021.96. FGDs with Maiduguri residents Boko Haram forced many resident to flee their homes to Maiduguri in January and February 2021.97. Interview with members of Gajiganna and Monguno communities in Maiduguri, Borno State, February 202.98. FGDs with Gajiganna and Monguno residents who were forced to flee their homes to flee to Maiduguri in January and February 2021 due to Boko Haram, Ansaru, and ISWAP attacks.99. Interview with a member of the MNJTF in March 2021 in Maiduguri, Borno State.100. In January and March of 2021, interviews were done with people from the villages of Bama, Gwoza, Kukawa Gubio, Dikwa, Shafa, Marte, Pemi, and Maiduguri, Borno State.101. In February 2021, Gajiganna and Mungono villagers were interviewed in Maiduguri, Borno State.102. Lawal, ‘Boko Haram Attacks Adamawa Town on Christmas Eve’.103. SBMorgen, ‘Chart of the Week: Boko Haram Fatalities in 2020’.104. Onuoha, Nwangwu, and Ugwueze, ‘Counterinsurgency Operations of the Nigerian Military and Boko Haram Insurgency: Expounding the Viscid Manacle’, p. 4–6.105. Between January and March of 2021, multiple FGDs were performed in Mubi and Gombi, Adamawa State; Damaturu and Potiskum, Yobe State; and Maiduguri, Borno State. These meetings were with people who were internally displaced.106. FGDs field data from Yola (Adamawa State), Damaturu (Yobe State) and Maiduguri (Borno State) between January and March 2021.107. Interviews: In January and February 2021, people of the villages of Shafa, Azare, Tashan Alade, Pemi, and Dikwa were interviewed in Maiduguri, Borno State.108. Residents of Busari, Tarmuwa, Damaturu, Gaidam, and Gujba in Damaturu, Yobe State, and Gombi, Madagali, and Minchika in Mubi and Yola, Adamawa State, were interviewed in February and March 2021.Additional informationNotes on contributorsNsemba Edward LenshieNsemba Edward Lenshie teaches political science at the Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria. He is completing his doctorate degree in political economy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. His research interests straddle areas such as political economy, security, citizenship, identity politics, and border and migration and refugee studies. His work has appeared in several reputable journals, including Armed Forces and Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Security Journal, Journal of Migrants and Refugee Studies, Democracy and Society, Local Environment, and African Identities and Society.Patience Kondu JacobPatience Kondu Jacob teaches political science at the Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria. She is a doctoral student in international relations in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. Her research interest includes security and gender studies, migration and refugee studies and international relations. Her work has appeared in Journal of Migrants and Refugee Studies.Confidence Nwachinemere OgbonnaConfidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna teaches political science at the Department of Political Science, Evangel University Akaeze: Okpoto, Ebonyi, Nigeria. He is completing his doctorate degree in comparative politics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. His research interest includes soft power politics, border and security studies and electoral politics.Buhari Shehu MiapyenMiapyen Buhari Shehu teaches political science at the Taraba State University. His research interest is in the areas of inequality engendered by capitalism and how such different categories of inequalities are instrumentalised to promote capitalist mode of accumulation. His most recent work is in understanding the utility of Cedric Robinson’s perspective in explaining racial capitalism in Africa, published by the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE).Paul OnuhPaul Onuh is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, specializing in the Political Economy subfield. He holds a PhD in political economy from the same department. His research interests include the political economy of security, cybercrime, terrorism, the state and governance, corruption in public health governance, election management, and public policy. This study is an aspect of a broader project on the “political economy of insecurity in Nigeria” that our team is presently working on. All listed authors played significant roles throughout the research process.Aminu IdrisAminu Idris teaches Political Science at the Federal University of Gusau, Nigeria. He holds a PhD in Political Science with a specialisation in border and migration studies from the Near East University in Cyprus. His interests straddle border and migration studies, conflict and security studies, identity politics, and international relations. His work has been published in reputable national and international journals, including Security Journal.Christian EzeibeChristian Ezeibe is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute of Climate Change Studies, Energy and Environment, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His areas of research include election, political economy and sustainable development.","PeriodicalId":46215,"journal":{"name":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.9000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Small Wars and Insurgencies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2023.2257591","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
ABSTRACTThe Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), comprising soldiers from the Lake Chad Basin countries (Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, and Benin), has been countering insurgency in the region since 2015. Frictional relationships resulting from mutual distrust affected the commitments of MNJTF contributing countries in counterinsurgency operations in Lake Chad. Chad, notably, considered itself an arrowhead in the counterinsurgency due to the laxity of other coalition countries. The devastation its soldiers suffered and the waxing strength of the operation of Boko Haram and allied groups in the region motivated the late Chadian President Idriss Déby to declare in December 2019 the exiting of his soldiers from the MNJTF to concentrate on protecting the borders of the country. The study relied on extant literature and explorative qualitative techniques to investigate the consequences of such exit on northeast Nigeria. At the very least, it reveals that Chad’s exit betrayed the MNJTF counterinsurgency coalition and has negative consequences for the security complexity in northeast Nigeria.KEYWORDS: Multinational Joint Task ForcecounterinsurgencyBoko HaramChadian exitLake Chad basin AcknowledgmentsWe are thankful to our research assistants for assisting during data collection and the reviewers, for valuable comments and the editors, for their observations, insights, and comments, which helped improve the quality of the article.Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. Ezeani et al., ‘From a Religious Sect to a Terrorist Group : The Military and Boko Haram in Northeast Nigeria’; Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’.2. Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’, p. 144; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’, p. 1219; Okoli and Lenshie, ‘“Beyond Military Might”: Boko Haram and the Asymmetries of Counterinsurgency in Nigeria’, p. 683.3. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Lenshie and Yenda, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency, Internally Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Response in Northeast Nigeria’.4. Lenshie et al., ‘Boko Haram, Security Architecture and Counterinsurgency in North-East, Nigeria’, p. 2; Marie Cold-Ravnkilde and Plambech, ‘Boko Haram: From Local Grievances to the Violent Insurgency’.5. Ezeibe et al., ‘Strange Bedfellows: Relations between International Nongovernmental Organisations and Military Actors in Preventing/Countering Violent Extremism in Northeast Nigeria’; Haruna, ‘Nigerian Soldiers Fighting Boko Haram Release Video, Lament Obsolete Weapons, Accusing Commanders of Corruption’.6. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.7. Abdul’ Aziz, ‘Boko Haram: Chadian Troop’s Free Nigerian Soldiers in Captivity, Kill 100 Terrorists as Shekau Reacts’.8. Head Topic, ‘Saluting President Idriss Deby – Daily Trust’.9. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.10. Brown, ‘War against Jihadists in Sahel Dealt Major Blow as Chad Says It Will Withdraw Troops’; Shaban, ‘Chad Ends Involvement in Boko Haram, Sahel Antiterrorism Ops: President’.11. Nwezeh, ‘Military: MNJTF Agreement Precludes Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops’.12. Butfoy, ‘Critical Reflections on Collective Security, p. 1–2’.13. Butfoy, ‘Themes Within the Collective Security Idea, p. 491’.14. Miller, ‘The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security’, p. 304; Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 16.15. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 21.16. Gleason and Shaihutdinov, ‘Collective Security and Non-State Actors in Eurasia’, pp. 276–280.17. Betts, ‘Systems for Peace or Causes of War ?’ p. 13.18. Miller, ‘The Idea and the Reality of Collective Security’, pp. 309–310.19. De Luca, ‘The Gulf Crisis and Collective Security under the United Nations Charter’, p. 270.20. Tarzi, ‘The Dilemma of Collective Security: A Theoretical Critique’, pp. 45–46.21. Clark, ‘The Trouble with Collective Security’, pp. 240–242.22. Wolff, ‘The Regional Dimensions of State Failure’, p. 962; Buzan and WÆver, “Macrosecuritisation and Security Constellations: Reconsidering Scale in Securitisation Theory’’, p. 254.23. Hanau Santini, ‘A New Regional Cold War in the Middle East and North Africa: Regional Security Complex Theory Revisited’, p. 4; Omotuyi, ‘Franco-Nigerian Détente? Nigeria, France and the Francophone States of the Lake Chad Region in the Era of the Boko Haram Terrorism’, pp. 4–6”.24. Olawoyin, Akinrinde, and Irabor, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian Counter- Multinational Joint Task Force and Nigerian Counterterrorism’, pp.116–117.25. Dyduch, Jarząbek, and Skorek, ‘The Dependence of Gulf Countries on Hydrocarbons Export – a Perspective of Regional Security Complex Theory’, pp. 131–132.26. Onuoha, ‘A Danger Not to Nigeria Alone – Boko Haram Transnational Reach and Regional Responses’, pp. 9–11.27. Ismail and Kifle, New Collective Security Arrangements in the Sahel : A Comparative Study of the MNJTF and G-5 Sahel, pp.20–22.28. Mwagwabi, “The Theory of Collective Security and Its Limitation in Explaining International Organization: A Critical Analysis, p. 6.29. Institute for Economics and Peace, ‘Global Terrorism Index for 2022’.30. Lenshie et al., ‘Desertification, Migration, and Herder-Farmer Conflicts in Nigeria: Rethinking the Ungoverned Spaces Thesis’; Moses and Lenshie, ‘Border Security, Arms Proliferation, and the Conundrum of Ungovernable Spaces in Nigeria’.31. Bensahel, ‘A Coalition of Coalitions: International Cooperation against Terrorism’, pp. 43–44.32. Bensahel.33. Kindzeka, ‘Lake Chad Countries Agree on Military Task Force Amid Insecurity’.34. Agbiboa, ‘Borders That Continue to Bother Us: The Politics of Cross-Border Security Cooperation in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin’, p. 404.35. Onuoha, Tchie, and Zabala, The Quest to Win Hearts and Minds: Assessing the Effectiveness of the Multinational Joint Task Force, p. 9.36. International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram? p. 29.37. Africa Defence Force, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force Shows the Strengths and Limits of Collective Security Action’.38. Omenma, Onyishi, and Michael, ‘A Decade of Boko Haram Activities : The Attacks, Responses and Challenges Ahead’, p. 17”.39. Interview: Nigerian soldier claiming to have been on the front lines of the battle against Boko Haram in Maiduguri, Borno State, in February 2021.40. Interview: displaced community leader in Maiduguri, Borno State, March 2021.41. Africa Defence Force, ‘The Multinational Joint Task Force Shows the Strengths and Limits of Collective Security Action’.42. International Crisis Group, ‘What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?’ p. 28.43. Interview: freelance security actor in Mubi, Adamawa State, reported Boko Haram had a long-term regional effect on the population, including brutal experiences during the most violent period of the insurgency.44. Campbell and Harwood, ‘Boko Haram’s Deadly Impact’; Okoli and Azom, ‘Boko Haram Insurgency and Gendered Victimhood: Women as Corporal Victims and Objects of War’.45. International Crisis Group, “What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram? p. 2.46. Gavin, ‘Nigeria Security Tracker’.47. Doukhan, ‘Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) against Boko Haram – Reflections’.48. Odunsi, ‘Boko Haram: 240 Insurgents Surrender to Military’.49. Mutum, ‘240 Boko Haram Militants Surrender To Task Force’.50. Oshoko, ‘Operation Anmi Fakat: MNJTF Kills 59 Boko Haram Terrorists, 3 Suicide Bombers; Lose 22 Soldiers in Action; 75 Injured by IEDS’.51. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in February 2021.52. Oshoko, ‘Operation Anmi Fakat: MNJTF Kills 59 Boko Haram Terrorists, 3 Suicide Bombers; Lose 22 Soldiers in Action; 75 Injured by IEDS’.53. Oshoko.54. Interview: security expert from Yola, Adamawa State, in January 2021.55. Reuters, ‘Boko Haram Militants Kill 92 Chadian Soldiers – President’.56. Asadu, ‘FLASHBACK: In 2015, Chad President Said Nigeria Was Absent from Boko Haram War’.57. Eizenga, ‘Chad’s Escalating Fight against Boko Haram’.58. India Today, ‘Operation Bomo’s Anger: 1,000 Boko Haram Fighters Killed, Says Chad’s Army’.59. Nseyen, ‘Don’t Let Them Free Captured Boko Haram Members, Weapons – Deby Tells Chadian Troops [Video]’.60. Nigeria, ‘90% of Boko Haram Wiped out, President Idriss Deby of Chad Claims (Video)’.61. Interview: Damasak village chief in Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.62. International Crisis Group, ‘What Role for the Multinational Joint Task Force in Fighting Boko Haram?’ p. ii.63. Nwezeh, ‘Military: MNJTF Agreement Precludes Unilateral Withdrawal of Troops’.64. The Defence Post, ‘Chad Troops Leave Nigeria with Boko Haram Mission “Finished”’65. The Defence Post.66. Aluko, ‘Boko Haram: MNJTF under Threat as Chad Army Hints at Withdrawal’.67. Interview: security expert from Maiduguri in March 2021.68. Interview with a member of the MNJTF in March 2021 in Maiduguri, Borno State.69. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in February 2021”.70. Cocks, ‘Cameroon Weakest Link in Fight against Boko Haram: Nigeria’.71. Ibekwe, ‘Boko Haram: Nigerian Government Not Doing Enough – U.S’.72. Interview: critical informant security analyst or expert in Yola, Adamawa State, in March 2021.73. The information provided in the table is incomplete.74. Data adopted with modification from Omenma (Citation2019), p. 15.75. Enietan-Matthews, ‘Chad, Niger Withdraw from MNJTF over Boko Haram Attacks’.76. Enietan-Matthews.77. Interviews: people of the villages of Shafa, Azare, Tashan Alade, Pemi, and Dikwa in Maiduguri, Borno State, in January and February 2021.78. Interview: security expert in Potiskum, Yobe State, in January 2021.79. Omenma, ‘Untold Story of Boko Haram Insurgency: The Lake Chad Oil and Gas Connection’, p. 4.80. Interview: security expert from Maiduguri, Borno State, in February 2021.81. Harding, ‘Chad’s President Idriss Déby Dies after Clashes with Rebels’.82. Marc, ‘The Death of Chadian President Idris Déby Itno threatens Stability in the Region’.83. Ominabo, ‘Niger Coup and Its Implications to West Africa’.84. Ogbuli, ‘What’s Happening in Niger? The Implications of the July 2023 Niger Coup’.85. Okoli and Lenshie, ‘The Military, Boko Haram, and the Dialectics of Counterinsurgency Operations in Nigeria’.86. Interview: some community leaders in Maiduguri and Borno, and Damaturu, Borno State, in April 2021.87. The Defence Post, ‘Chad Troops Leave Nigeria with Boko Haram Mission “Finished”’88. Africa News, ‘Nigerians Worried as Chad Withdraws All Troops from Lake Chad Area’.89. Several people and FGDs in the states of Adamawa, Borno, and Yobe concur with this position.90. Interview: participant from Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.91. FGDs with Maiduguri residents who were forced to flee their homes in January and February 2021 due to Boko Haram, Ansaru, and ISWAP attacks.92. Interviews with Kakuwa, Mungono, Gidimbari and Gajiram community leaders in Maiduguri, Borno State, between January and March 2021.93. SBMorgen, ‘Chart of the Week: Boko Haram Fatalities in 2020’.94. Interview: Damasak village chief in Maiduguri, Borno State, in March 2021.95. Critical interview with community leaders from Gajiganna and Mungono in Maiduguri, Borno State, February 2021.96. FGDs with Maiduguri residents Boko Haram forced many resident to flee their homes to Maiduguri in January and February 2021.97. Interview with members of Gajiganna and Monguno communities in Maiduguri, Borno State, February 202.98. FGDs with Gajiganna and Monguno residents who were forced to flee their homes to flee to Maiduguri in January and February 2021 due to Boko Haram, Ansaru, and ISWAP attacks.99. Interview with a member of the MNJTF in March 2021 in Maiduguri, Borno State.100. In January and March of 2021, interviews were done with people from the villages of Bama, Gwoza, Kukawa Gubio, Dikwa, Shafa, Marte, Pemi, and Maiduguri, Borno State.101. In February 2021, Gajiganna and Mungono villagers were interviewed in Maiduguri, Borno State.102. Lawal, ‘Boko Haram Attacks Adamawa Town on Christmas Eve’.103. SBMorgen, ‘Chart of the Week: Boko Haram Fatalities in 2020’.104. Onuoha, Nwangwu, and Ugwueze, ‘Counterinsurgency Operations of the Nigerian Military and Boko Haram Insurgency: Expounding the Viscid Manacle’, p. 4–6.105. Between January and March of 2021, multiple FGDs were performed in Mubi and Gombi, Adamawa State; Damaturu and Potiskum, Yobe State; and Maiduguri, Borno State. These meetings were with people who were internally displaced.106. FGDs field data from Yola (Adamawa State), Damaturu (Yobe State) and Maiduguri (Borno State) between January and March 2021.107. Interviews: In January and February 2021, people of the villages of Shafa, Azare, Tashan Alade, Pemi, and Dikwa were interviewed in Maiduguri, Borno State.108. Residents of Busari, Tarmuwa, Damaturu, Gaidam, and Gujba in Damaturu, Yobe State, and Gombi, Madagali, and Minchika in Mubi and Yola, Adamawa State, were interviewed in February and March 2021.Additional informationNotes on contributorsNsemba Edward LenshieNsemba Edward Lenshie teaches political science at the Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria. He is completing his doctorate degree in political economy in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. His research interests straddle areas such as political economy, security, citizenship, identity politics, and border and migration and refugee studies. His work has appeared in several reputable journals, including Armed Forces and Society, Journal of Asian and African Studies, Small Wars and Insurgencies, Security Journal, Journal of Migrants and Refugee Studies, Democracy and Society, Local Environment, and African Identities and Society.Patience Kondu JacobPatience Kondu Jacob teaches political science at the Taraba State University, Jalingo, Taraba State, Nigeria. She is a doctoral student in international relations in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. Her research interest includes security and gender studies, migration and refugee studies and international relations. Her work has appeared in Journal of Migrants and Refugee Studies.Confidence Nwachinemere OgbonnaConfidence Nwachinemere Ogbonna teaches political science at the Department of Political Science, Evangel University Akaeze: Okpoto, Ebonyi, Nigeria. He is completing his doctorate degree in comparative politics in the Department of Political Science at the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, in Nigeria. His research interest includes soft power politics, border and security studies and electoral politics.Buhari Shehu MiapyenMiapyen Buhari Shehu teaches political science at the Taraba State University. His research interest is in the areas of inequality engendered by capitalism and how such different categories of inequalities are instrumentalised to promote capitalist mode of accumulation. His most recent work is in understanding the utility of Cedric Robinson’s perspective in explaining racial capitalism in Africa, published by the Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE).Paul OnuhPaul Onuh is a lecturer in the Department of Political Science, University of Nigeria, specializing in the Political Economy subfield. He holds a PhD in political economy from the same department. His research interests include the political economy of security, cybercrime, terrorism, the state and governance, corruption in public health governance, election management, and public policy. This study is an aspect of a broader project on the “political economy of insecurity in Nigeria” that our team is presently working on. All listed authors played significant roles throughout the research process.Aminu IdrisAminu Idris teaches Political Science at the Federal University of Gusau, Nigeria. He holds a PhD in Political Science with a specialisation in border and migration studies from the Near East University in Cyprus. His interests straddle border and migration studies, conflict and security studies, identity politics, and international relations. His work has been published in reputable national and international journals, including Security Journal.Christian EzeibeChristian Ezeibe is a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science and a Senior Research Fellow in the Institute of Climate Change Studies, Energy and Environment, University of Nigeria, Nsukka. His areas of research include election, political economy and sustainable development.