The Meaning of ‘Strategic’ in US National-security Policy

Abstract

AbstractHow is the term ‘strategic’ used today within the US Department of Defense? To address this question, the article explores the evolution of the term ‘strategic’ from the interwar period to the end of the Cold War era, when Strategic Air Command was responsible for anything deemed strategic. The contemporary use of the term is a manifestation of a growing need to integrate the activities of various commands, capabilities and operations across the Defense Department that can produce significant military or political effects. Several problems could emerge due to a lack of clarity, integration and synchronisation across the US defence establishment. The Pentagon should and could establish greater clarity in defining strategic threats, operations, systems, command relationships and deterrence.Key words: Able ArcherCold Warcyber operationsintegrated deterrencenuclear deterrencespacestrategic deterrencestrategic effectsUS Strategic Command Notes1 Colin S. Gray, The Future of Strategy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2015), p. 26, emphasis in original.2 See White House, ‘National Security Strategy’, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/8-November-Combined-PDF-for-Upload.pdf; and US Department of Defense, ‘2022 National Defense Strategy’, 27 October 2022, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF.3 See Gray, The Future of Strategy, p. 22.4 See Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 4th ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), pp. 1–15; and Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 3–9.5 See Giulio Douhet, Command of the Air (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019).6 See Michael E. Brown, Flying Blind: The Politics of the US Strategic Bomber Program (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 35–62; and John T. Correll, ‘Daylight Precision Bombing’, Air & Space Forces Magazine, 1 October 2008, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/1008daylight/.7 See George Quester, Deterrence Before Hiroshima: The Influence of Airpower on Modern Strategy (New York: John Wiley, 1966), p. 52.8 See Brown, Flying Blind, pp. 61–5.9 This paradox is known to undergraduates from the ‘Sagan–Waltz Debate’. See Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: An Enduring Debate, 3rd ed. (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2012).10 See Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989).11 Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982).12 See Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 1–34.13 See Gregory S. Gilmour, ‘From SAC to STRATCOM: The Origins of Unified Command Over Nuclear Forces’, MA Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, June 1993, pp. 60–2, https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA268609.pdf.14 Some theatre commanders also retained the authority for tactical nuclear-weapons planning in their areas of responsibility.15 See US Strategic Command, ‘History’, https://www.stratcom.mil/About/History/.16 See James J. Wirtz, ‘The Cyber Pearl Harbor Redux: Helpful Analogy or Cyber Hype?’, Intelligence and National Security, vol. 33, no. 5, April 2018, pp. 771–3.17 See US Cyber Command, ‘Our History’, https://www.cybercom.mil/About/History.18 See Harald Müller and Annette Schaper, ‘US Nuclear Policy After the Cold War’, PRIF Reports No. 69, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, 2004, https://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/HSFK/hsfk_downloads/prif69.pdf.19 Author interviews with senior officials from Australia and the United Kingdom, October 2022.20 Author interviews with senior officials, Washington DC, December 2022.21 Ibid.22 Ibid.23 See David Hackett Fischer, Paul Revere’s Ride (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 402.24 Barry Posen, Inadvertent Escalation: Conventional War and Nuclear Risks (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991).25 See Bruce G. Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1993).26 See Gordon Barrass, ‘Able Archer 83: What Were the Soviets Thinking?’, Survival, vol. 58, no. 6, December 2016–January 2017, pp. 7–30; and Nate Jones (ed.), Able Archer 83: The Secret History of the NATO Exercise that Almost Triggered Nuclear War (New York: New Press, 2016).27 For more on Unified Command Plans, see Andrew Feickert, ‘The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands: Background and Issues for Congress’, CRS Report R42077, Congressional Research Service, 3 January 2013, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42077.pdf.28 White House, ‘Unified Command Plan’, 13 January 2021, p. 3, para 10a.29 Author interviews with officials in Washington DC, and Omaha, NE, autumn 2022.30 Quoted in Justin Katz, ‘Berger: Time to Look at Changing Combatant Command Structure’, Breaking Defense, 24 May 2023, https://breakingdefense.com/2023/05/berger-time-to-look-at-changing-combatant-command-structure/.31 According to a recent study, ‘current military doctrine does not clearly assign responsibility for planning nuclear operations for regional contingencies, which is necessary for effective conventional-nuclear integration at the operational level. JP [Joint Publication] 3-72 states that the “geographic combatant commander (GCC), supported by USSTRATCOM” is prepared “to perform nuclear targeting to generate desired effects and achieve objectives,” while JP 3-35 states that “specialized planning is typically conducted by USSTRATCOM in coordination with the supported GCC.”’ Adam Mount and Pranay Vaddi, ‘An Integrated Approach to Deterrence Posture: Reviewing Conventional and Nuclear Forces in a National Defense Strategy’, Federation of American Scientists, 2020, https://docslib.org/doc/8927812/an-integrated-approach-to-deterrence-posture-reviewing-conventional-and-nuclear-forces-in-a-national-defense-strategy.32 See Hans M. Kristensen, ‘The Role of Nuclear Weapons in Regional Counterproliferation and Global Strike Scenarios’, Presentation to the New Mexico Nuclear Study Group Workshop ‘What Role, If Any, For Nuclear Weapons?’, Center for Science, Technology, and Policy, University of New Mexico, 11–12 September 2008, https://programs.fas.org/ssp/nukes/publications1/UNMbrief2008.pdf.33 One exception to this general observation may be European Command’s nuclear-contingency planners supporting NATO’s nuclear-planning office at Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe.34 White House, ‘National Security Strategy’, p. 22.35 Author interviews in Washington DC, December 2022.36 See Feickert, ‘The Unified Command Plan and Combatant Commands’.37 Author interview, February 2023.38 The regrettable lack of attention paid to nuclear matters (and to Russian studies) by the generation following the end of the Cold War has been quite noticeable to the small cohort that remained in these fields. See Bryan Bender, ‘The Dangerous and Frightening Disappearance of the Nuclear Expert’, Politico, 28 July 2023, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2023/07/28/nuclear-experts-russia-war-00108438.Additional informationNotes on contributorsJeffrey A. LarsenJeffrey A. Larsen is a research professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School and president of Larsen Consulting Group.James J. WirtzJames J. Wirtz is a professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the US Naval Postgraduate School. The opinions expressed here are those of the authors alone and do not reflect the positions of any government, government agency or commercial firm. The authors thank US Strategic Command for supporting this research.