A new framework using biform game for cost optimisation of distribution networks

S. Mouatassim, A. Sabry, Mustapha Ahlaqqach, J. Benhra
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

The present work focuses on the demand decision making problem for regional distribution centres sharing the same product families. Each centre orders quantities to be distributed from production units. Our approach suggests a biform game to maximise the benefits of each centre and minimise the end of cycle market induced supply to demand deviations. We start by an independent demand forecasting under uncertainty. Once the demand is met, the centres enter a collaboration phase where coalitions are created and products are exchanged, in order to achieve the core stability of the actual game. If not met, we try to achieve the same objectives using individual rationality through an adapted approach based on Shapley value analysis for each possible coalition.
一种利用异构博弈进行配电网成本优化的新框架
本文研究了同一产品族的区域配送中心的需求决策问题。每个中心订购的数量从生产单位分配。我们的方法提出了一个统一的游戏,以最大化每个中心的利益,并最小化周期结束时市场引起的供需偏差。我们从不确定条件下的独立需求预测入手。一旦需求得到满足,这些中心就会进入合作阶段,在这个阶段,他们会建立联盟,交换产品,以实现实际游戏的核心稳定性。如果不满足,我们尝试通过基于Shapley值分析的每个可能的联盟的适应性方法,使用个人理性来实现相同的目标。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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