Auction based bandwidth allocation on the Internet

S. Baskar, S. Verma, G. S. Tomar, R. Chandra
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引用次数: 3

Abstract

QoS provisioning on the Internet entails resource allocation as per the service level agreements (SLAs) with the customer. Since, the duration of the time slots over which the resources are allocated is short, resources are allocated and de-allocated frequently. In this paper, an auction based mechanism has been proposed and evaluated for nearly consistent reservation of bandwidth together with revenue maximization for the service provider. In the usual auction mechanism, bidding is performed on the assumption that the reserve price is fixed and is known to the customers a priori. This assumption leads to an inefficient market and the revenue of the seller suffers. In the proposed auction model, a varying reserve price is proposed and incorporated in the progressive second price (PSP) model. The variation in the reserve price acts as a signal to the users to modify their bids accordingly. The results suggest that this mechanism helps raise the potential revenue of the seller irrespective of the price mechanism being adopted
基于拍卖的互联网带宽分配
在Internet上提供QoS需要根据与客户的服务水平协议(sla)分配资源。由于分配资源的时隙持续时间很短,因此资源的分配和取消分配非常频繁。本文提出了一种基于拍卖的机制,并对其进行了评估,使服务提供商的带宽保留几乎一致,同时收益最大化。在通常的拍卖机制中,出价是在假设保留价格是固定的并且客户先验地知道的情况下进行的。这种假设导致市场效率低下,卖方的收入受损。在提议的拍卖模型中,提出了一个变化的保留价格,并将其纳入累进第二价格(PSP)模型。保留价格的变化作为一个信号,让用户相应地修改他们的出价。结果表明,无论采用何种价格机制,这一机制都有助于提高卖方的潜在收益
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