Freedom and Obligation

Abstract

This chapter first summarizes the responsibility dilemma—responsibility is incompatible with both determinism and its falsity—and then outlines the homologous obligation dilemma. It primarily focuses on showing that obligation requires alternative possibilities: an obligation for one to do something presupposes that one can do, and one can refrain from doing, it. Four principles undergird the view that obligation entails avoidability: (i) If one ought to do something, then one can do it; (ii) if it is impermissible for one to do something, then one can do it; (iii) one ought to do something if, and only if, it is impermissible for one not to do it; and (iv) if it is impermissible for one to do something, there is something else one can do, which is obligatory for one. A formidable analysis of the concept of obligation validates these principles.