Vertical Mergers in Ecosystems and Consumer Hold-up

Abstract

An ecosystem comprises all downstream products that employ a certain upstream input. Consumers make irreversible investments to join an ecosystem before downstream prices are set. By committing to buy products that use the specific ecosystem input, they are at risk of being held-up. Unable to observe future prices, consumers base their decisions on what they observe about the market structure within each ecosystem, including vertical contracts signed by the upstream firms. By entering into vertical agreements with multiple competing downstream firms, thus creating a credible expectation of lower prices, an upstream firm is able to mitigate consumers' hold-up problem and, as a result, increase ecosystem demand. Our main observation is that, in contrast to the standard case, an upstream monopolist merging with one of its downstream affiliates will find it profitable to continue to serve downstream competitors, even when products sold downstream are homogeneous. In appendix we compute measures of upward pricing pressures following a merger in a market with ecosystem effects.