Sequential Single Voting for Cooperative Spectrum Sensing Against Byzantine Attack

Abstract

Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) has been a crucial function of cognitive radio (CR) technology to identify the unused spectrum for growing wireless devices and applications. Nevertheless, the openness of CSS paradigm results in that the CR network suffers from Byzantine attack, thereby significantly degrading the CSS performance. To mitigate the adverse effect of Byzantine attack, we conduct out a Byzantine attack model from malicious perspective. Considering that Byzantine attack can make the fusion center (FC) blind, we propose a sequential single voting (SSV) rule to implement the sensing information fusion for CSS. To this aim, a trust value (Trv) mechanism based on interactive evaluation is formulated to measure the reliability of sensing information from secondary users (SUs). Moreover, a pair of tolerance threshold is also taken into account to suppress Byzantine attack, with aiming to make selectively use of sensing information from malicious users (MUs). Meanwhile, we are motivated by the single sign and sequential idea to further enhance the CSS efficiency. In contrast to the existing voting rules, simulation results show that the proposed SSV requires less fewer samples to provide with a better accuracy, especially in the presence of Byzantine attack.