Trust The Wire, They Always Told Me!: On Practical Non-Destructive Wire-Tap Attacks Against Ethernet

Matthias Schulz, Patrick Klapper, M. Hollick, Erik Tews, S. Katzenbeisser
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引用次数: 12

Abstract

Ethernet technology dominates enterprise and home network installations and is present in datacenters as well as parts of the backbone of the Internet. Due to its wireline nature, Ethernet networks are often assumed to intrinsically protect the exchanged data against attacks carried out by eavesdroppers and malicious attackers that do not have physical access to network devices, patch panels and network outlets. In this work, we practically evaluate the possibility of wireless attacks against wired Ethernet installations with respect to resistance against eavesdropping by using off-the-shelf software-defined radio platforms. Our results clearly indicate that twisted-pair network cables radiate enough electromagnetic waves to reconstruct transmitted frames with negligible bit error rates, even when the cables are not damaged at all. Since this allows an attacker to stay undetected, it urges the need for link layer encryption or physical layer security to protect confidentiality.
相信电线,他们总是告诉我!:针对以太网的实用非破坏性窃听攻击
以太网技术在企业和家庭网络安装中占主导地位,并且存在于数据中心以及Internet骨干的一部分中。由于其有线性质,以太网通常被认为从本质上保护交换的数据免受窃听者和恶意攻击者的攻击,这些攻击者没有物理访问网络设备、配线板和网络出口。在这项工作中,我们实际评估了无线攻击有线以太网装置的可能性,通过使用现成的软件定义的无线电平台来抵抗窃听。我们的研究结果清楚地表明,即使在电缆完全没有损坏的情况下,双绞线网络电缆辐射的电磁波足以以可以忽略不计的误码率重建传输帧。由于这允许攻击者不被发现,因此需要链路层加密或物理层安全性来保护机密性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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