Taoism in bits

Abstract

I would never claim to be an expert on Chinese thought, culture or philosophy. In fact, I would never claim to be an expert on anything. I tend to object to discourses organised by the notion of ‘expertise’. This is because the notion of expertise is often invoked as a way to exclude, subordinate or de-legitimize non-professional voices from discussions. Rather than being an ‘expert’, at best I am a scholar of cultural studies, popular culture and ideology with a lifelong interest in martial arts. Almost everything I have learned about Chinese thought, culture or philosophy, I have learned through and in relation to martial arts and popular culture. As such, some may question what I could possibly have to say to anyone about Taoism; they may contest my authority to hold forth on such a complex subject and challenge the legitimacy of any claims I may make. However, any claims I could make in this respect relate to my longterm research interests in ideology and popular culture. In other words, this chapter will principally draw not on my ‘expertise’ but rather on my research (and) experience in these areas. For this reason, this chapter begins from what might be called two ‘popular’ propositions. First, the proposition that it is widely understood that Taoism is Chinese. Second, the proposition that there was a veritable explosion of interest in Taoism in Western popular culture in the wake of (and arguably in response to) some of the major wars of the second half of the 20th Century, particularly WWII, the Korean War and the Vietnam War (Watts 1990). To flesh out the second proposition briefly: In particular, different kinds of Western interest in Taoism can be seen in the interests and orientations of the Beat Generation, the counterculture and, of course, hippies everywhere. It is often said that these interests had much to do with different kinds of rejection of, or protest against, the institutions that carried out the wars. In other