Corporate Rights and Organizational Neutrality

Vincent S. J. Buccola
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引用次数: 14

Abstract

Public clamor over the Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Citizens United and Hobby Lobby can be explained at least in part by the absence of any consistent rationale in corporate-rights adjudication. As many scholars have noted, the Court has never supplied a coherent explanation of corporate rights — where they come from and how to discern their existence and limits. Group rights derive from individual rights, we are told, but little other guidance is forthcoming. As a consequence each new judgment is open to the charge of unprincipled fiat.This article contends that, despite its opacity, the case law implies a deep and tractable logic. In particular, the article argues that the corporate-rights jurisprudence reflects an unstated principle of “organizational neutrality.” Constitutional rights are ascribed to corporations such that entrepreneurs are neither rewarded nor punished for choosing the corporate form over other modes of coordination (for example contract, proprietorship, or partnership). That is, the Constitution is presumed neutral as between the form of governance through which entrepreneurs organize productive activity. The same neutrality principle explains the corporate-rights jurisprudence in statutory cases, albeit as a presumption about Congress’s meaning rather than a binding constraint on its authority.Moreover, insights from transaction-cost economics supply a ready justification of the neutrality principle. Entrepreneurs choose their governance mechanisms — ranging from the more hierarchical to the more market-mediated — with an eye to minimizing the social costs of production. A group-rights jurisprudence favoring one or another mode of organization would bias this choice and encourage marginal enterprises to pick wasteful governance structures. Critiques of the Court’s corporate-rights jurisprudence ought therefore to explain why a non-neutral rule is, in a particular context, worth the measure of inefficiency it is apt to introduce.
公司权利和组织中立性
公众对最高法院最近对“联合公民”(Citizens United)和“爱好游说团”(Hobby Lobby)一案判决的不满,至少可以部分解释为在公司权利裁决中缺乏一致的理由。正如许多学者所指出的那样,法院从未对公司权利提供连贯的解释- -它们从何而来以及如何辨别它们的存在和限制。我们被告知,群体权利源于个人权利,但几乎没有其他指导。因此,每一项新的判决都有可能被指控为无原则的命令。本文认为,尽管判例法不透明,但它隐含着深刻而易于处理的逻辑。具体而言,本文认为公司权利法理学反映了一个未明言的“组织中立”原则。宪法赋予公司权利,这样企业家选择公司形式而不是其他协调模式(如合同、独资或合伙)既不会得到奖励,也不会受到惩罚。也就是说,在企业家组织生产活动的治理形式之间,宪法被认为是中立的。同样的中立原则解释了法定案件中的公司权利判例,尽管这是对国会含义的假设,而不是对其权威的约束性约束。此外,交易成本经济学的见解为中立原则提供了现成的理由。企业家选择他们的治理机制——从更分层的到更以市场为中介的——着眼于最小化生产的社会成本。群体权利法理学倾向于一种或另一种组织模式,会使这种选择产生偏差,并鼓励边缘企业选择浪费的治理结构。因此,对最高法院公司权利法理的批评应该解释,为什么在特定情况下,非中立规则值得衡量它可能引入的低效率。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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