Huan Lin, Zhehan Wang, Tong Xu, S. Zhou, Yang Hong, Jun Steed Huang
{"title":"Analysis of Zero-Key Authentication and Zero-Knowledge Proof","authors":"Huan Lin, Zhehan Wang, Tong Xu, S. Zhou, Yang Hong, Jun Steed Huang","doi":"10.1109/CyberC55534.2022.00012","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Recently passwordless authentication such as zero-key authentication or zero-knowledge access control is becoming popular among businesses prioritizing their users' and employees' security and digital experience. A challenge-response mechanism and public key infrastructure (PKI) cryptography are employed to perform the zero-key authentication or zero- knowledge access control that authorizes user access to an online service without a password or any shared secret required. Using a large quantum computer, a quantum algorithm could break the hard mathematical problems underlying PKI. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has launched a program and competition to standardize one or more post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms to fight against quantum attacks. In this paper, we have conducted the first-ever mathematical analysis of lattice-based and polynomial-based PQC by introducing the relationship between automorphism and homomorphism. This analysis can help enterprises and organizations leverage NIST-selected PQC algorithms to safeguard their online services from quantum attacks. We performed the simulation to illustrate brute force broken probability for polynomial-based or multivariate-based PQC to validate our mathematical analysis of PQC.","PeriodicalId":234632,"journal":{"name":"2022 International Conference on Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC)","volume":"59 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2022-10-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2022 International Conference on Cyber-Enabled Distributed Computing and Knowledge Discovery (CyberC)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CyberC55534.2022.00012","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Recently passwordless authentication such as zero-key authentication or zero-knowledge access control is becoming popular among businesses prioritizing their users' and employees' security and digital experience. A challenge-response mechanism and public key infrastructure (PKI) cryptography are employed to perform the zero-key authentication or zero- knowledge access control that authorizes user access to an online service without a password or any shared secret required. Using a large quantum computer, a quantum algorithm could break the hard mathematical problems underlying PKI. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has launched a program and competition to standardize one or more post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) algorithms to fight against quantum attacks. In this paper, we have conducted the first-ever mathematical analysis of lattice-based and polynomial-based PQC by introducing the relationship between automorphism and homomorphism. This analysis can help enterprises and organizations leverage NIST-selected PQC algorithms to safeguard their online services from quantum attacks. We performed the simulation to illustrate brute force broken probability for polynomial-based or multivariate-based PQC to validate our mathematical analysis of PQC.