Design of a new electricity spot market based on time-of-use capacity tariff

Haofeng Chen, C. Liu, Bin bin Wang, Yan Liang, Yong Wang, Miaomiao Xu, Yi Li
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Abstract

In order to support the construction of a new power system spot market with high proportion of new energy, it is necessary to establish a spot market mechanism that accurately reflects the space-time balance cost of electricity, form a price signal that measures the value of source-grid load and storage, and stimulate accurate and efficient interaction between source-grid load and storage. When new energy becomes the main power source, the current spot market mechanism will have the following problems: 1) if new energy determines the marginal price, its near-zero marginal cost will lead to the disappearance of the spot price signal, and the price regulation function will no longer exist; 2) if expensive and small amount of flexible resources determine the marginal price, the difference of power supply service between new energy and flexible resources cannot be reflected, and new energy will obtain excessive profits, resulting in the phenomenon of The “ride-sharing” phenomenon. To this end, the article designs an electricity spot market mechanism that decouples new energy and flexibility resources and forms a time-sharing capacity tariff based on the fixed cost of new energy. The new energy timesharing capacity market shares the fixed costs of new energy market players on a day-by-day basis to form a time-series price signal; the spot market for flexibility resources discovers the price of deviated power balance, frequency regulation, standby and other residual power balance services through competition; and ensures that the “whoever incurs the cost bears the cost” principle is satisfied through fair cost sharing to new energy and users. By sharing the costs fairly with new energy sources and users, we ensure that the principle of “whoever incurs the cost bears the cost” is met, and the market mechanism is used to match supply and demand for flexibility.
基于分时电价的新型电力现货市场设计
为支持建设新能源占比高的新型电力系统现货市场,有必要建立准确反映电力时空平衡成本的现货市场机制,形成衡量源网负荷与储能价值的价格信号,促进源网负荷与储能准确高效互动。当新能源成为主力电源后,现行现货市场机制将出现以下问题:1)如果新能源决定边际价格,其边际成本接近于零,将导致现货价格信号消失,价格调节功能不复存在;2)如果昂贵且数量少的灵活资源决定了边际价格,新能源与灵活资源之间的供电服务差异无法体现,新能源将获得超额利润,造成“拼车”现象。为此,本文设计了将新能源与柔性资源解耦的电力现货市场机制,并在新能源固定成本的基础上形成分时容量电价。新能源分时容量市场按日分担新能源市场主体的固定成本,形成时间序列价格信号;灵活资源现货市场通过竞争发现偏离功率均衡、调频、备用等剩余功率均衡服务的价格;通过对新能源和用户公平的成本分担,确保“谁产生成本谁承担成本”的原则得到满足。通过与新能源企业和用户公平分担成本,确保“谁承担谁的成本”原则得到落实,通过市场机制实现供需匹配,实现灵活性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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