The Unhiring Dilemma: Effects of Job Delays, Job Rescissions, and Compensation on Organizational Attractiveness and Justice Judgments

C. J. Meyer, Donald E. Conlon
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Abstract

A relatively new phenomenon in recruitment and selection is the unhiring dilemma: New hires who were promised employment after graduation but now find their job offers rescinded or delayed. In study 1, we use a scenario context to examine how job rescissions and delays, along with four different compensation alternatives, influence new hire judgments of organizational attractiveness and organizational justice. We find that for those whose jobs were delayed, compensation structures that provide increasingly favorable outcomes are viewed more positively, but for those whose jobs were rescinded, the most favorable evaluations occurred upon receipt of lump sum compensation - in other words, the compensation outcome that also immediately severs the relationship between the rebuffed new hire and the company. In Study 2, we interviewed a small sample of MBA graduates who had job offers rescinded or delayed. Here, we find additional evidence or linear effects in that more positive unhiring outcomes (e.g., job delays or rescissions with compensation) lead to enhanced organizational attractiveness and procedural justice judgments.
失业困境:工作延迟、工作解除和薪酬对组织吸引力和公正判断的影响
在招聘和选拔过程中,一个相对较新的现象是“失业困境”:新员工在毕业后得到了工作承诺,但现在却发现工作被取消或推迟了。在研究1中,我们使用情景上下文来研究工作解除和延迟,以及四种不同的薪酬选择,如何影响新员工对组织吸引力和组织公正的判断。我们发现,对于那些工作被推迟的人来说,提供越来越有利结果的薪酬结构被认为是更积极的,但对于那些工作被取消的人来说,最有利的评价发生在收到一次性补偿时——换句话说,补偿结果也立即切断了被拒绝的新员工与公司之间的关系。在研究2中,我们采访了一小部分工作机会被取消或推迟的MBA毕业生。在这里,我们发现了更多的证据或线性效应,即更积极的失业结果(例如,工作延迟或解雇补偿)导致组织吸引力和程序正义判断的增强。
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