The Theoretical Framework for Corporate Governance

S. Pande
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引用次数: 5

Abstract

We lack an encompassing and unifying theory of corporate governance. The most popular theoretical framework, Agency Theory, is proving to be a straight jacket: useful in some contexts but quite limiting, particularly when the underlying assumptions do not hold. The Agency Theory led to the evolution of the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate governance that has become the basis for governance codes around the world including in India. Corporate governance theory has tended to look to this theory to guide the decisions of the board of directors in curbing excessive executive power in the hands of management. While useful for this purpose, the Agency Theory provides limited guidance on corporate governance in real life situations which are far more complex. With the blurring of the roles of the principal and the agent, the currently prevalent governance framework, based on the Agency Theory has become self limiting and ineffective. Efforts to supplement the Agency Theory with alternative theoretical frameworks such as the Stakeholder Theory and the Stewardship Theory have, at times, tended to place the board of directors in conflict with their legal obligations to work in the interests of the shareholders. A governance model based on the concept of Trusteeship, while providing fresh insights, suffers from problems in implementation and remains a goal to aim for. These alternative frameworks have, therefore, not been of much practical use to the board members in helping them to decide what constitutes the “right�? decision. We need new theoretical insights that will take us towards a comprehensive theory of governance. This paper seeks to revisit the discussion on the various theoretical frameworks for corporate governance and suggests that a new and different framework is required as the underlying theory for corporate governance – one that is based on the concept of maximizing the long term strategic value for an organization. Such a framework is based on viewing the ‘organization as an organism’ with its primary focus on the organization’s longevity and growth only.
公司治理的理论框架
我们缺乏一个包罗万象的、统一的公司治理理论。最流行的理论框架——代理理论——正被证明是一种简单的理论:在某些情况下有用,但相当有限,尤其是在基本假设不成立的情况下。代理理论导致了盎格鲁-撒克逊公司治理模式的演变,该模式已成为包括印度在内的世界各地治理准则的基础。公司治理理论倾向于依靠这一理论来指导董事会的决策,以遏制管理层手中过多的执行权力。虽然代理理论在这方面很有用,但它对现实生活中更为复杂的公司治理提供的指导有限。随着委托方和代理人角色的模糊,目前流行的以代理理论为基础的治理框架已经变得自我限制和无效。用利益相关者理论和管理理论等替代理论框架补充代理理论的努力,有时往往会使董事会与他们为股东利益而工作的法律义务相冲突。以托管概念为基础的治理模式虽然提供了新的见解,但在执行方面存在问题,仍然是一个有待实现的目标。因此,这些备选框架在帮助董事会成员决定什么构成“权利”方面没有多大实际用处。的决定。我们需要新的理论见解,将我们引向全面的治理理论。本文试图重新审视关于公司治理的各种理论框架的讨论,并建议需要一个新的和不同的框架作为公司治理的基础理论-一个基于最大化组织长期战略价值的概念。这样一个框架是基于将“组织视为一个有机体”,其主要焦点仅放在组织的寿命和成长上。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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