On Probation - An Experimental Analysis

C. Engel, Heike Hennig�?Schmidt, Bernd Irlenbusch, Sebastian Kube
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Abstract

Does probation pay a double dividend? Society saves the cost of incarceration, and convicts preserve their liberty. But does probation also reduce the risk of recidivism? In a meta-study we show that the field evidence is inconclusive. Moreover it struggles with an identification problem: those put on probation are less likely to recidivate in the first place. We therefore complement the field evidence by a lab experiment that isolates the definitional feature of probation: the first sanction is conditional on being sanctioned again during the probation period. We find that probationers contribute less to a joint project; punishment cost is higher; efficiency is lower; inequity is higher. While experimental subjects are on probation, they increase their contributions to a joint project. However, once the probation period expires, they reduce their contributions. While in the aggregate these two effects almost cancel out, critically those not punished themselves do trust the institution less if punishment does not become effective immediately.
关于缓刑——一个实验分析
试用期有双重好处吗?社会节省了监禁的费用,罪犯也保持了他们的自由。但是缓刑是否也能降低再犯的风险呢?在一项元研究中,我们表明实地证据是不确定的。此外,它还面临着一个识别问题:那些被判缓刑的人不太可能再犯。因此,我们通过一个实验室实验来补充现场证据,该实验分离了试用期的定义特征:第一次制裁的条件是在试用期间再次受到制裁。我们发现,实习生对联合项目的贡献较小;惩罚成本较高;效率较低;不平等更加严重。当实验对象处于试用期时,他们会增加对联合项目的贡献。但是,一旦试用期结束,他们就会减少他们的缴款。虽然总的来说,这两种影响几乎相互抵消,但关键的是,如果惩罚不立即生效,那些没有受到惩罚的人确实会减少对机构的信任。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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