Evolved Methods for Risk Assessment

A. Jackson, S. Tolo, J. Andrews
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Abstract

The foundations of risk assessment tools such as fault tree analysis and event tree analysis were established in the 1970s. Since then, research has made considerable advances in the capabilities of analytical techniques applicable to safety critical systems. Technology has also advanced and system designs, their operation conditions and maintenance strategies are now significantly different to those of the 1970s. This paper presents an overview of a new methodology developed, retaining the traditional ways of expressing system failure causality, which aims to develop the next generation of risk assessment methodologies. These evolved techniques, appropriate to meet the demands of modern industrial systems, aim to overcome some of the limitations of the current approaches. These new tools and techniques will seek to retain as much of the current methodology features as possible to reduce the learning curve for practitioners and increase the chances of acceptance. The new approach aims to increase the scope of event tree/fault tree analysis through the incorporation of Petri net, Markov model, and binary decision diagram-based methodologies. Use of these techniques incorporates features such as: non-constant failure rates, dependencies between component failure events, and complex maintenance strategies to boost the capabilities of the methods. In addition, it considers dedicated routines to analyse the accident risk of transport systems formulated as phased mission models. This type of modelling is demonstrated through the application to an aeronautical system, where the system is modelled as a mission consisting of a series of phases. Mission success requires the successful completion of each of the phases. This approach allows the requirements for success (and therefore failure) to differ from one phase to another. It is also possible to model scenarios whereby a system fault that occurs in one phase of a mission may not affect the system until a later phase of the mission.
风险评估的演变方法
故障树分析和事件树分析等风险评估工具的基础是在20世纪70年代建立的。从那时起,研究已经取得了相当大的进步,分析技术的能力适用于安全关键系统。随着技术的进步和系统的设计,它们的运行条件和维护策略与20世纪70年代有了很大的不同。本文概述了一种新开发的方法,保留了表达系统失效因果关系的传统方法,旨在开发下一代风险评估方法。这些发展起来的技术适合于满足现代工业系统的要求,其目的是克服目前方法的一些局限性。这些新的工具和技术将尽可能多地保留当前的方法特性,以减少从业者的学习曲线,并增加被接受的机会。该方法旨在通过结合Petri网、马尔可夫模型和基于二元决策图的方法,扩大事件树/故障树分析的范围。这些技术的使用结合了以下特性:非恒定故障率、组件故障事件之间的依赖关系和复杂的维护策略,以提高方法的能力。此外,它还考虑了专用程序来分析作为分阶段任务模型制定的运输系统的事故风险。这种类型的建模通过应用于航空系统来演示,该系统被建模为由一系列阶段组成的任务。任务的成功需要每一个阶段的成功完成。这种方法允许在不同阶段对成功(和失败)的需求有所不同。还可以对这样的场景进行建模,即在任务的一个阶段发生的系统故障可能直到任务的后一个阶段才会影响系统。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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