IPO-Audit Expertise, Audit Quality, and Capital Allocation Efficiency: Evidence from China

Abstract

Backed by China's economic growth, the initial public offering (IPO) market in China has been one of the most vigorous in the world. In this market, practicing auditors routinely sit on the regulatory committee responsible for screening prospective IPO firms. Against this backdrop, we examine whether IPO-audit expertise can influence IPO-audit quality and capital allocation. We find that auditors with richer IPO-audit experience improve the quality of earnings in IPO prospectus, earn an audit fee premium, and are significantly more likely to be assigned to IPO engagements by audit firms or appointed to the regulatory committee by regulators. We also show that, by enhancing the credibility of information disclosure in IPO prospectus, IPO exper-tise of the regulatory committee members and the IPO engagement auditors improves capital allocation efficiency. Collectively, our evidence implies that a more sophisticated audit profes-sion can contribute to the development of capital market in a country.