A game-theoretic framework for studying truck platooning incentives

Farhad Farokhi, K. Johansson
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引用次数: 29

Abstract

An atomic congestion game with two types of agents, cars and trucks, is used to model the traffic flow on a road over certain time intervals. In this game, the drivers make a trade-off between the time they choose to use the road, the average velocity of the flow at that time, and the dynamic congestion tax that they are paying to use the road. The trucks have platooning capabilities and therefore, have an incentive for using the road at the same time as their peers. The dynamics and equilibria of this game-theoretic model for the interaction between car traffic and truck platooning incentives are investigated. We use traffic data from Stockholm to validate the modeling assumptions and extract reasonable parameters for the simulations. We perform a comprehensive simulation study to understand the influence of various factors, such as the percentage of the trucks that are equipped with platooning devices on the properties of the pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is learned using a joint strategy fictitious play.
货车排队激励研究的博弈论框架
用两种类型的代理(汽车和卡车)的原子拥堵游戏来模拟特定时间间隔内道路上的交通流量。在这个博弈中,司机在他们选择使用这条道路的时间、当时的平均车流速度和他们为使用这条道路而支付的动态拥堵税之间做出权衡。这些卡车具有列队行驶的能力,因此,它们有动力与同行同时使用道路。研究了汽车交通和卡车排队激励相互作用的博弈论模型的动力学和均衡性。我们使用来自斯德哥尔摩的交通数据来验证建模假设,并为模拟提取合理的参数。我们进行了全面的模拟研究,以了解各种因素的影响,例如配备队列设备的卡车的百分比对使用联合策略虚拟游戏学习的纯策略纳什均衡属性的影响。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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