{"title":"The Report of the Death of the Interpretive Regulation Is an Exaggeration","authors":"John A. Townsend","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3400489","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"There is a claim about in the scholarly administrative law community that the APA category of interpretive regulations, including tax regulations under IRC § 7805(a), are no longer a viable category under the Administrative Procedure Act (\"APA). Instead, so the claim goes, regulations that have historically been considered interpretive because all they do is reasonably interpret ambiguous statutory text are now legislative regulations under the APA thus subject to the APAs legislative regulations’ requirements for Notice and Comment and Prospectivity. \n \nIn the article, I quote, with permission, a noted scholar who claims: \n \n• \"regulations promulgated under 7805(a) are legislative rules as that term is understood for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act;\" \n \n• \"Administrative law doctrine says that legislative rules are those that carry the force of law, while interpretative rules do not. Although the force of law concept is blurry at the margins, I do not see any possible way that one could conclude that 7805(a) regulations do not carry the force of law;\" \n \n• \"In summary, there are no Treasury regulations that are interpretative rules as that term is understood for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act -- irrespective of the terminology embraced by the tax community.\" \n \nIf that claim is true for § 7805(a) regulations, it is true for all agency regulations interpreting the statute under similar agency grants (either express or implied). \n \nMy limited anecdotal polling from talking with administrative law professors is that the claim is a mainstream scholarly position. And courts noise around with the concept, although usually without nuance. \n \nBy contrast, in the oral argument in Kisor v. Willkie (Sup. Ct. No. 18-15), transcript p. 10), Justice Breyer, an administrative law scholar (taught administrative law at Harvard Law School), said “there are hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of interpretive regulations.” And courts regularly refer to interpretive regulations as if they were a viable APA category. \n \nSo which is it? Are interpretive regulations generally and Treasury interpretive regulations specifically a viable APA category? \n \nThe APA recognizes two categories of regulations – legislative and interpretive. The APA's original meaning of those categories may be stated as follows (in broad strokes): \n \n• Legislative rules, which must be issued as Notice and Comment regulations, are the law within the scope of the delegation. Legislative rules (regulations) are based on an express statutory delegation of authority to the agency to set the rules that are the equivalent of statutes. In APA parlance, legislative regulations have the force of law, just as statutes do. They have the force of law because Congress has delegated law-making power to the agency. \n \n• Interpretive rules, like judicial interpretations, interpret statutory text. Interpretive regulations, like judicial interpretations, do not create law. The statutory text is the law. As an interpretation of the law and not the law, the agency interpretation, like judicial interpretations, can apply from the effective date of the statute. In APA parlance, interpretive regulations do not have the force of law even when a court defers to an agency interpretation. \n \nI assert in the article that this summary was the original meaning of the APA distinction between legislative and interpretive regulations and that the interpretive regulation was a viable APA category from the enactment of the APA. There have been no intervening events that have changed the original public meaning. That original public meaning should and does control. \n \nThis is a substantial revision of an earlier posting on this SSRN page. The revision is as of August 23, 2020.","PeriodicalId":280037,"journal":{"name":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","volume":"43 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-08-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Law & Society: Legislation eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3400489","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
There is a claim about in the scholarly administrative law community that the APA category of interpretive regulations, including tax regulations under IRC § 7805(a), are no longer a viable category under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA). Instead, so the claim goes, regulations that have historically been considered interpretive because all they do is reasonably interpret ambiguous statutory text are now legislative regulations under the APA thus subject to the APAs legislative regulations’ requirements for Notice and Comment and Prospectivity.
In the article, I quote, with permission, a noted scholar who claims:
• "regulations promulgated under 7805(a) are legislative rules as that term is understood for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act;"
• "Administrative law doctrine says that legislative rules are those that carry the force of law, while interpretative rules do not. Although the force of law concept is blurry at the margins, I do not see any possible way that one could conclude that 7805(a) regulations do not carry the force of law;"
• "In summary, there are no Treasury regulations that are interpretative rules as that term is understood for purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act -- irrespective of the terminology embraced by the tax community."
If that claim is true for § 7805(a) regulations, it is true for all agency regulations interpreting the statute under similar agency grants (either express or implied).
My limited anecdotal polling from talking with administrative law professors is that the claim is a mainstream scholarly position. And courts noise around with the concept, although usually without nuance.
By contrast, in the oral argument in Kisor v. Willkie (Sup. Ct. No. 18-15), transcript p. 10), Justice Breyer, an administrative law scholar (taught administrative law at Harvard Law School), said “there are hundreds of thousands, possibly millions of interpretive regulations.” And courts regularly refer to interpretive regulations as if they were a viable APA category.
So which is it? Are interpretive regulations generally and Treasury interpretive regulations specifically a viable APA category?
The APA recognizes two categories of regulations – legislative and interpretive. The APA's original meaning of those categories may be stated as follows (in broad strokes):
• Legislative rules, which must be issued as Notice and Comment regulations, are the law within the scope of the delegation. Legislative rules (regulations) are based on an express statutory delegation of authority to the agency to set the rules that are the equivalent of statutes. In APA parlance, legislative regulations have the force of law, just as statutes do. They have the force of law because Congress has delegated law-making power to the agency.
• Interpretive rules, like judicial interpretations, interpret statutory text. Interpretive regulations, like judicial interpretations, do not create law. The statutory text is the law. As an interpretation of the law and not the law, the agency interpretation, like judicial interpretations, can apply from the effective date of the statute. In APA parlance, interpretive regulations do not have the force of law even when a court defers to an agency interpretation.
I assert in the article that this summary was the original meaning of the APA distinction between legislative and interpretive regulations and that the interpretive regulation was a viable APA category from the enactment of the APA. There have been no intervening events that have changed the original public meaning. That original public meaning should and does control.
This is a substantial revision of an earlier posting on this SSRN page. The revision is as of August 23, 2020.
在学术行政法界有一种说法,即APA类别的解释性法规,包括IRC§7805(a)项下的税收法规,不再是行政程序法(APA)下可行的类别。相反,主张认为,历史上被认为是解释性的法规因为它们所做的一切都是合理地解释模棱两可的法定文本,现在是APA下的立法法规,因此受APA立法法规对通知,评论和前瞻性的要求的约束。在这篇文章中,我在征得同意的情况下引用了一位著名学者的说法:•“根据《行政程序法》的目的,根据7805(a)颁布的法规是立法规则;”•“行政法理论认为,立法规则是具有法律效力的规则,而解释性规则则不具有法律效力。虽然法律效力的概念在边缘是模糊的,但我认为没有任何可能的方法可以得出7805(a)规定不具有法律效力的结论。”•“总而言之,没有财政部法规是《行政程序法》所理解的解释性规则——无论税务界采用何种术语。”如果该主张适用于§7805(a)法规,则适用于在类似的机构授权(明示或暗示)下解释该法规的所有机构法规。我从与行政法教授交谈中得到的有限的轶事调查显示,这种说法是一种主流的学术立场。法院对这个概念大肆宣扬,尽管通常没有细微差别。相反,在Kisor v. Willkie (Sup. Ct.)一案的口头辩论中。第18-15号),抄本第10页),行政法学者(在哈佛法学院教授行政法)布雷耶大法官说,“有数十万,可能数百万的解释性法规。”法院经常引用解释性法规,就好像它们是可行的APA类别一样。那么到底是哪一个呢?一般的解释性法规和财政部的解释性法规是可行的APA类别吗?《行政程序法》承认两类法规——立法法规和解释性法规。《行政程序法》对这些类别的原始含义可以概括如下:•立法规则,必须作为通知和评论条例发布,是授权范围内的法律。立法规则(条例)是建立在明确的法定授权的基础上的,授权机构制定相当于成文法的规则。按照APA的说法,立法规定具有法律效力,就像成文法一样。它们具有法律效力,因为国会已将立法权授予该机构。•解释性规则,如司法解释,解释法定文本。解释性法规,如司法解释,并不创造法律。成文法就是法律。作为对法律的解释而不是对法律的解释,代理解释与司法解释一样,可以从法规生效之日起适用。按照美国行政程序法的说法,即使法院服从行政机关的解释,解释性规定也不具有法律效力。我在文章中断言,这一总结是APA区分立法法规和解释性法规的原始含义,并且解释性法规是APA制定后可行的APA类别。没有任何干预事件改变了最初的公共含义。原始的公共意义应该并且确实控制着。这是对SSRN页面上先前发布的一篇文章的实质性修订。修订日期为2020年8月23日。